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PHILOSOPHICAL DISSERTATIONS

On the Uncertainty of

HUMAN KNOWLEDGE.

By the Marquis *D'ARGENS*,

Author of the *Jewiſh Spy*.

VIZ.

I. Of the Uncertainty of Hiſtory.
II. Concerning Logick.
III. Concerning the General Principles of Natural Philoſophy.
IV. Concerning Metaphyſicks.
V. Concerning judicial Aſtrology.

With ſome REMARKS on the

THEOLOGY of the *Grecian Philoſophers*.

To which is added,

Monſ. MAUPERTUIS's Diſſertation upon GRAVITY, &c.

In TWO VOLUMES.

Tranſlated from the LAST FRENCH EDITION.

VOL. II.

The Search of Truth ought to ſtop no where till there is no more to find.

LONDON:

Printed for *J. Wren*, at the *Bible* and *Crown*, in *Saliſbury-Court*, *Fleet-Street*, 1753.

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Concerning the UNCERTAINTY of

HUMAN SCIENCES.

DISSERTATION IV.

Concerning Metaphyſicks.

SECT. I. *The* INTRODUCTION.

THE Term *Metaphyſicks* ſignify properly *a ſupernatural Philoſophy or Theology*, to wit, a Diſcourſe of God, and Divine Things; becauſe in *Metaphyſicks* we treat principally of Things that are *above Nature.*

If we may credit a celebrated Philoſopher, Metaphyſicks, and Scholaſtic Theology are of no real Service, nor furniſh the Underſtanding with any new Knowledge. *A Man may find*, ſays *Locke*, *an infinite Number of Propoſitions, Reaſonings and Concluſions, in Books of Metaphyſicks, School-Divinity, and ſome ſorts of natural Philoſophy; and after*

all, know as little of God, Spirits, or Bodies, as he did before he ſet out *.

This Author might have added, that theſe Books are ſo far from giving us any real Information, that they hinder us in the Search after Truth, by reaſon of the Confuſion occaſioned by the falſe Ideas with which they fill the Mind. The Metaphyſicks of the Schools, and the trifling Queſtions contained therein, are as pernicious to the Underſtanding as the Rules of *Ariſtotle*'s Logic. *They are more fit*, ſays *Mallebranche*, *to leſſen than augment the Faculties of the Mind*; *becauſe it is plain, that if we ſhould make uſe of the Rules laid down therein, to find out any Truth, the Faculties of the Mind would be divided thereby, ſo that it would become leſs attentive, and more unable to comprehend the Subject it is examining* †. Juſt ſo it is with the Metaphyſicks of the Schools; uſeleſs and impenetrable Queſtions are debated therein; ſo many different Subjects, that are abſolutely above the reach of human Reaſon, perplex and weaken the Attention of the Mind, that it cannot purſue thoſe neceſſary Points, which are the proper Objects of rational Enquiries.

The School-Philoſophers have alſo the pernicious Talent of rendering the moſt clear and evident Propoſitions doubtful. They are accuſtomed to controvert the moſt plain Subjects, and of which we have the moſt perfect Ideas. This Conduct leads the Mind inſenſibly to doubt of the moſt evident Things, and to believe the moſt falſe to be probable. It is theſe vain needleſs Diſputes amongſt the Divines and Monks, which have occaſioned ſo many Hereſies, and which ſtill furniſh Atheiſts

* *Locke*'s Human Underſtanding, Lib. IV. Cap. VIII. p. 791.
† *Recherche* de la Verité, Liv. III. Chap. III. p. 181.

Atheiſts with Arguments; who of all People ſeem to be abſolutely blinded.

I declare, Madam, that I think it a ridiculous Thing, that even the Exiſtence of a God ſhould be diſputed every Day in the Schools. It is really impious to call that in Queſtion, which every Man, who has three Grains of Reaſon, and makes uſe of his natural Underſtanding, muſt own to be ſelf-evident. It often happens, that, in theſe Diſputes, weak and trivial Arguments are made uſe of to prove the Exiſtence of a God; and that Debauchees and Libertines, if they have not quite extinguiſhed the Light of Nature, never fail to darken it by a thouſand nonſenſical Doubts and Quibbles.

It is my Opinion therefore, that when any would prove the Neceſſity of the Exiſtence of a God, they ſhould only alledge clear and deciſive Reaſon, and which are ſuitable to the Capacity of all Men, provided they reflect ever ſo little; and that therefore all doubtful and controverted Proofs ought to be rejected; ſuch as are taken from the innate Idea of a God, univerſal Conſent, *&c.* which being doubtful, and perhaps falſe, tend only to weaken the Demonſtrations of a real Truth.

SECT. II. *That we have no innate Ideas.*

I Promiſed you, Madam, that I would endeavour to convince you, that we have no *innate Ideas.* I am now going to be as good as my Word; and I hope I ſhall bring you over to the Truth of my Opinion.

Firſt, If God imprinted in our Souls a certain Number of Ideas or Principles, which they carry with them from the Moment they were

created, all Men muſt needs give a general Conſent thereto, and thoſe Ideas muſt be univerſally the ſame in every Mind. Now the *Principles* or *Maxims* to which we attribute the Quality of *innate Ideas* preferably to all others, are not univerſally received; a Proof of which here follows.

Theſe two Propoſitions (*whatever is, is*; and, *that it is impoſſible for a Thing to be, and not to be at the ſame time*) paſs for *innate Ideas* preferably to all others; and yet it cannot be denied, but that Infants and Naturals have not the leaſt Notions thereof; for, it is ridiculous to ſay, that an Idea is imprinted on the Soul, is innate, and formed with it, and yet that the Soul has neither Knowledge nor Perception thereof; that would be making that Idea a meer Non-Entity; and I would as ſoon maintain, that the Soul has the Faculty of Thinking, and yet never thinks.

If we have a Right to affirm, that an Idea is in the Mind, though the Underſtanding does not perceive it; we may conclude from thence that all ſelf-evident Propoſitions, and what the Mind conſiders as ſuch, were at firſt imprinted on the Soul, and born with it. Beſides, doth it not ſeem abſurd, that Children ſhould have a Power of thinking and acquiring Ideas, and of giving their Aſſent to different Truths, and yet they ſhould be ignorant at the ſame time of the Notions that the Deity has imprinted in their Souls? Is it poſſible to ſuppoſe, that a Child ſhould receive the Impreſſions of exterior Objects, and have no Knowledge of the Characters that God has engraved in his Soul, to ſerve as a Foundation for all the Notions, which he ſhall be able to acquire, and all the Reflections, that he ſhall be able to make hereafter

It was to no Purpoſe therefore that God impreſſed innate Ideas upon the Soul, of which it could make ſo little uſe, and which it might acquire by other means; and I think no one will be ſo hardy as to maintain, that Children comprehend this Propoſition (*that it is impoſſible for a Thing to be and not to be at the ſame time*) as ſoon as many other Truths, which they are acquainted with.

I ſhall add, before I finiſh this Chapter, that if there were any innate Ideas, they muſt certainly appear more conſpicuouſly in the Minds of Idiots, Children, and illiterate People (where however we ſee no Traces thereof) than in other Perſons whoſe Minds are diſguiſed, and corrupted by Cuſtom, Prejudices, and foreign Opinions, and whoſe Thoughts have taken a new Form by Study; whereas the Thoughts of Children, Idiots, and the Illiterate have not been adulterated by the Mixture of Doctrines acquired by Art; and therefore thoſe lively Characters, which God has ſtamped upon their Souls, muſt be in a more perfect Order *.

SECT. III. *That there is no innate Rule of Morality.*

THE Principles of Morality are far from being received with the ſame univerſal Conſent that ſpeculative Maxims are. Thus this Conſent being neceſſary for the eſtabliſhing the Truth of innate Ideas, even in the Judgment of thoſe who contend for them, as ſoon as we can prove

* He that will ſay, Children join general abſtract Speculations with their Sucking-Bottles and their Rattles, may, perhaps, with Juſtice be thought to have more Paſſion and Zeal for his Opinion, but leſs Sincerity and Truth than one of that Age. *Locke's* Eſſay, Lib. I. Cap. II.

there is no ſuch Thing, all theſe pretended Notions imprinted by the Deity himſelf fall at once, and are no longer ſupportable.

It is eaſy to prove, that there is nothing that is reckoned juſt and honourable amongſt ſome People, but what is reckoned unjuſt and diſhonourable amongſt others. The *Caribees* fat up their Children and eat them; and that their Fat may be more in Quantity, and more delicate, they do by them as the *Italians* do by their Children to make their Voices fine and clear. Many People in *Peru* make Concubines of the Women which they take in War; they bring up the Children, which they have by theſe Concubines in a delicate manner, till they be thirteen Years of Age, and then eat them. They do the ſame by their Concubines, when they have done bearing Children *. In all this, they think they do no more harm, than we do when we put a Hen upon the Spit, when ſhe has done laying. The *Druſians*, a People of *Mount Libanus*, marry their own Daughters; and on a certain Day in the Year, they lie indifferently with one another's Wives †. It is ſaid, that in other Places nearer home, there is a Sect who are called *Multipliers*, who conceal themſelves for fear of the public Magiſtrates, but yet reckon ſuch a promiſcuous uſe of Women no more criminal than the *Druſians* do.

If it were true then, that there are innate moral Principles ſtamped upon the Souls of all Men, would it be poſſible that there ſhould be whole Nations, who, by an unanimous and univerſal Conſent, could contradict both by their Words and Actions the Principles of Juſtice and Truth, of which every Man amongſt them would have evident

* *Garcilaſſo de la Vega*, Hiſtoire des Yncas, Liv. I. Chap. XII.
† *Beſſier* Remarques ſur *Ricaut*. Tom. II. p. 649.

dent Conviction in himſelf? And if it be ſaid in Anſwer to this, that God engraves in the Heart of Man the Idea of what is good and honeſt, but that Man perverts this Idea by a wrong Application, it will be eaſy to ſet aſide that Objection. For what could be more uſeleſs than theſe Ideas, which anſwer no purpoſe, and of which the Soul can make no uſe? I do not believe that any will maintain, that a *Druſian*, who, bred up amongſt his Countrymen, is truly zealous for his Religion, ever reflected upon the innate Principles of Morality, which he is ſaid to have. Nay, he is perſuaded, that when he lies with his own Daughter he does as good and pious an Action, as an *Italian* when he kiſſes the Pope's Toe; or as a *Spaniards* when he devoutly whips himſelf on *Good-Friday* under his Miſtreſs's Window; or as a *Janſeniſt*, when he unmercifully deſtroys the Reputation of a *Moliniſt*; or as a *Moliniſt*, when he does the ſame or worſe by a *Janſeniſt*. There is no Queſtion to be made, but that there are in the moſt abſurd Religions ſome People that believe them to be true, and have believed them to be ſo from their Infancy, with the greateſt Sincerity and Submiſſion. What then will become of innate Ideas? What Service are they of? I cannot ſee that they can be of any greater uſe, than the forced Acceptation of the Bull *Unigenitus*, amongſt many poor Nuns in *France*, was neceſſary for the Good of the State.

SECT. IV. *That we have no innate Ideas of God.*

IF God had engraven any Ideas upon our Minds, that are innate with them, doubtleſs he would have imprinted the Notion of a Deity, in the moſt

clear and evident Characters. But we have no convincing Proofs, that all Men acknowledge a Being ſovereignly good and perfect. There were amongſt the Ancients ſome whole Sects, which abſolutely denied the Exiſtence of a Deity; and in the latter Times, a great many Nations have been diſcovered, which ſeemed to have no Notion of one. But that which is ſtill more ſurprizing is, that there were intire Countries of People, who believing the Immortality of the Soul, had notwithſtanding not even the leaſt Idea of a God, and ſeemed very much aſtoniſhed when they were told there was one.

The Inhabitants of the *Marian* Iſles had no Knowledge of a Deity before the Goſpel was preached amongſt them. They had not the leaſt Idea of Religion. *They had neither Altars nor Sacrifices, nor Prieſts; but were perſuaded of the Immortality of the Soul, and that the Spirit exiſts after the Diſſolution of the Body. They held, that there was one Place of Heaven or Joy, and another of Hell or Torment.* But, through an odd Caſt of human Conception, they believed, *that it was neither Vice nor Virtue, that conducted them to thoſe Places. Good Works, or bad Actions contributed nothing thereto. All depends upon the manner how a Man departs out of this World. If any has the Misfortune to die of a violent Death, Hell is his Portion; but if on the contrary, he dies of a natural Death, he goes to enjoy the Pleaſures of Paradiſe, where there are Trees and agreeable Fruits in Abundance* *.

Let me aſk you now, Madam, if you think the Inhabitants of the *Marian* Iſles have any innate Idea of a God? Is it poſſible that a whole Nation, that ſo many Millions of People, during

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* Le Gobien Hiſtoire des Iſles Marianes, p. 64. *&c.*

a vaſt Number of ſucceſſive Ages, ſhould have an Idea in their Minds, which they never took notice of, nor made any uſe of? Is it credible, that God giving them this Idea for a Foundation of all their Knowledge, it ſhould be of no manner of Service to them, whilſt they make a very good uſe of thoſe, which they acquire from external Objects?

SECT. V. *That if God had imprinted the Idea of himſelf on our Minds, he would have imprinted it in a clear and diſtinct manner.*

IT is very certain, that if God had imprinted the Idea of himſelf in the Souls of all Men, he would have done it in ſuch plain and intelligible Characters, that we ſhould all have known what to believe, and think of the Supreme Being. And thoſe who maintain innate Ideas, ſay themſelves, *that it being agreeable to the Goodneſs of God, that all Men ſhould have a clear Notion of himſelf, God therefore imprinted that Idea upon their Souls.* The Conſequence then of their own Argument is, that God ought to do for Men, all that Men think is of the greateſt Advantage to them. Now can it be once queſtioned, but that it would be a hundred times more uſeful and beneficial for them to have a clear and diſtinct Idea of the Deity, than ſuch an one as they now have, which for half the Days of their Life tends more to lead them into Error, than to conduct them into the way of Truth. Such were the Notions, that the *Pagans* had of the Deity, whom they imagined to be guilty of the moſt flagrant Crimes, and to whom they attributed the moſt ſhameful human Frailties. There was no Paſſion which they did not deify; the moſt enormous Crimes

were committed by the greateſt of their Gods. *Jupiter*'s Love of *Ganymede* was not the only monſtrous Idea, which the *Pagans* had of their ſupreme Deity; they had others ſtill more extravagant. Can we ſay, that ſuch Ideas were graved by the Deity in their Souls, as the Baſis of all their Knowledge of him, without maintaining that God is a Deceiver, and that he furniſhes the Minds of Men with a thouſand pernicious and erroneous Notions? Heaven forbid, that we ſhould ſo much as entertain ſuch a Thought!

I obſerved to you before, Madam, to how little purpoſe thoſe, who defend the Principle of innate Ideas, object, that though God has imprinted a Notion of himſelf in the Heart of Man, yet Man has changed and perverted that Idea by a wrong Application thereof. Of what Service then are theſe abſtract Ideas, which the Soul is never acquainted with, and of which ſhe can make no uſe? Beſides, theſe abſtract Ideas ſuppoſe, that we are already acquainted with the Objects which they repreſent; and it is ridiculous to pretend to apply Abſtraction to primitive Ideas (which ſome will have to be innate) and to imagine that God himſelf communicates immediately a Notion ſo extravagant, as the Conception of a Deity diſtinct and ſeparate from four or five hundred others, which are falſly ſo called.

Is it not alſo as abſurd to make God corporeal, to deprive him of his Unity, his Identity, and Eternity, as to deny his Exiſtence? I even think that Atheiſts offer a leſs Affront to the Deity, than the Pagans do, who aggravate their Affront infinitely, by attributing to him the moſt wanton Amours, and extravagant Crimes*; and

* Bayle; ſee his Penſées diverſes, on Occaſion of the Appearance of a Comet in 1680.

and this is alſo the Opinion of one of the greateſt Genius's of the laſt Century. In reality, would not an *Indian* ſhew a much leſs Indignity to our King, by denying that he is, than by owning his Exiſtence, and charging him with a thouſand Enormities?

SECT. VI. *That the ancient Philoſophers in general had no true Idea or Notion of a God.*

I Obſerved to you before, Madam, in the preceding Diſſertation, that the Idea, that the ancient Philoſophers had of a Deity, was contrary to the true Attributes of a divine and infinitely holy Being. They gave him a Body, and conſequently made him material. You have ſeen, that *Tully*, when he examines the different Syſtems of the Philoſophers concerning the Exiſtence of a God, rejects that of *Plato* as unintelligible, becauſe he makes the Sovereign Being a Spirit. *Quod* Plato *ſine corpore Deum eſſe cenſet, id quale eſſe poſſit, intelligi non poteſt* ‡.

The Spirituality of God appeared to the ancient Philoſophers ſo contrary to Reaſon, that rather than believe, that the *Jews* worſhipped a Being infinitely good, powerful and immaterial, they imagined, that they adored the Clouds and the Sky.

Nihil præter nubes et Cœli Numen adorant *.

They looked upon the *Jews* as Enemies to the Gods, becauſe they would not own *Jupiter*, *Juno*, *Mercury*, *Mars*, *Venus*, &c. to be ſuch †.

Is it poſſible to believe, that People, who conſidered thoſe as impious Madmen, who were the

‡ See above Page 297.

* Juvenal, Sat. XIV. Ver. 97.

† Judæa, Gens Contumeliâ Numinum inſignis. Plin. Hiſt. Nat. Lib. XIII. Cap. IV. p. 69.

only Nation that had any juſt Idea of the Deity, could themſelves have any innate Idea of a God? An Idea which they were unſenſible of, which they made no uſe of, and which in no wiſe guarded them from the dangerous Errors into which they fell? For the Philoſophers were ſo far from having juſter Notion of a God, or more conformable to his divine Attributes than the reſt of the *Pagans*, that they generally were the firſt to embrace the groſſeſt Errors. So that they have often been reproached with their divided Sentiments, not knowing where to fix; ſome affirming, that there were Gods, but that they concerned themſelves with no Affairs; others abſolutely denying, that there are any at all; and others admitting both their Exiſtence, and providential Care and Government. Some again aſſigned them a determinate Figure and fixed Abode, and all endeavoured to maintain their Opinions by Arguments, that had an Appearance of Truth, the better to make an Impreſſion upon the Minds of their Hearers and Followers *.

Could People think you, who had ſuch diſcording Sentiments about one and the ſame Thing, have any innate Idea of the only Thing, that is not cognizable to their Senſes, and of which they had

* Nec hoc eſt admiratione dignum, cum ſciamus inter iſtos (Philoſophos) quanta ſit de ipſâ Deorum naturâ diſſenſio, quantiſque diſputationum argumentis vim totam Divinitatis conentur evertere; cum alii Deos non eſſe dicant; alii eſſe quidem, ſed nihil procurare definiant; alii et eſſe, et rerum noſtrarum curam procurationemque ſuſcipere; et tantâ ſint hi omnes varietate et diſſenſione, ut longum et alienum ſit ſingulorum enumerare ſententias. Nam alii figuras his pro arbitrio ſuo tribuunt, et loca aſſignant, ſedes etiam conſtituunt, et multa de actibus eorum vitâque deſcribunt, et omnia quæ facta et conſtituta ſunt ipſorum arbitrio regi gubernarique pronunciant. Alii, nihil moliri, nihil curare, et ab omni adminſtrationis cura vacuos eſſe dixerunt, afferuntque omnes veriſimile quiddam, quod auditorum animos ad facilitatem credulitatis invitet. Julius Firmicus Maternus, Aſtronom. Lib. 1. in Præfat.

had properly no Knowledge? And let none ſay, that the greateſt Philoſophers, and Sages of Antiquity, were agreed in their Sentiments concerning the Deity; they were the Perſons, if we may believe *Tully*, that held the moſt diſcordant Opinions about it *.

But, in fine, though we ſhould grant to them, that hold the Doctrine of innate Ideas, that among certain Nations, ſome wiſe Men have had a more perfect and diſtinct Knowledge of the Deity than others, it muſt be allowed, that an univerſal Agreement, which according to them is the Proof of innate Ideas, is no where to be found; ſince for one wiſe Man or Philoſopher, which may have had ſome Ideas that are worthy of the Deity, there have been twenty thouſand Perſons that have had others, which being directly contrary thereto, could not proceed immediately from God, who cannot give or engrave any Idea in the Soul, which has a Tendency to authorize Wickedneſs and Idolatry.

SECT. VII. *That univerſal Agreement is no ſufficient Proof of the Exiſtence of a God.*

THE Light of Nature furniſhes us with ſo many convincing Proofs of the Exiſtence of a God, that we need not heſitate to reject thoſe which are not demonſtrative, and may even be falſe. For it is doing a great Injury to a good Cauſe,

* Cum multæ res in philoſophia nequaquam ſatis adhuc explicatæ ſunt, tum perdifficilis, brute, (quod tu minimè ignoras,) et perobſcura quæſtio eſt natura Deorum; quæ et agnitionum animi pulcherrima eſt, et ad moderandam religionem neceſſaria; de qua tam variæ ſunt doctiſſimorum hominum tamque diſcrepantes ſententiæ, ut magno argumento eſſe debeat cauſam id eſt principium philoſophiæ eſſe ſcientiam.

Cicero de Nat. Deor. Initio.

Cauſe, to maintain it indifferently by good or bad Arguments. They that argue in that manner give their Opponents great Advantage.

Atheiſts, who are ſo daring as to attack the Exiſtence of the Deity, always dwell upon thoſe Proofs, that appear to have the leaſt Force or Solidity; and when they have ſet aſide them, they think they may eaſily ſkip over the more eſſential. They raiſe a Duſt before the Eyes of the Ignorant, and by that means render all the Arguments of their Adverſaries ſuſpected. When we deſign to demonſtrate any Truth, we muſt keep to eſſential Arguments, lay hold of the juſt and true Reaſons; there fix, and never depart from them; that Method will be more capable of giving Conviction, than when the Truth is weakened by diverſe Allegations, which only darken the Evidence thereof.

The univerſal Conſent of all People in acknowledging a Deity, which is alledged not only as a Proof of the innate Idea of a God, but even as an evident Demonſtration of his Exiſtence, is a Proof, that is not only weak and inſufficient, but it is even falſe. Beſides it draws ſeveral abſurd Conſequences after it, which are diſcovered, when it is examined with Attention. In reality, if that Proof were of any Validity, it would have ſerved, (and would ſtill) to eſtabliſh that wicked and abominable Doctrine of the Plurality of Gods, and not the Exiſtence of one only true God. For during a long Series of Years, all the Nations of the Earth, excepting the *Jews*, who poſſeſſed only a Point in the Univerſe, univerſally agreed in the Belief of many Gods.

Thus if univerſal Conſent be a Proof of a Deity, it muſt alſo prove for the ſame Reaſon, a Pluraality of Gods; and when the *Pagans* made uſe of

of the Argument of univerſal Conſent, and the Agreement of all Nations, concerning the Exiſtence of a Deity, they always employed it to prove the Plurality of Gods. *Eſſe igitur Deos confitendum eſt*, ſays *Tully*. He infers, that there is a Plurality of Gods, ſeeing all Men agreed upon that Head: By the ſame Argument alſo *Maximus Tyrius* proved the Exiſtence and Divinity of *Jupiter*, of *Juno* his Spouſe, of *Ganymede* his Catamite, and of a Crowd of Nymphs and *Nereids*, which were *Jupiter*'s Concubines; *Olympus* very much reſembling the Opera-houſe at *Paris*; and the Goddeſſes of Paganiſm having as little Chaſtity as thoſe of the *Palais Roial* *. *Do but examine*, ſays that *Platonic* Philoſopher, *the different Thoughts of Men, and in that great Variety of Opinions you will ſee, that they agree in all their Laws and Sentiments that there is a God, one Sovereign and Father of all Things; and many other Gods, who are his Children, and, as it were, his Colleagues in Power. In this the* Greek *agrees with the Barbarian; the Inhabitant of the Continent with the Iſlander; the wiſe Man with the Fool. Go to the utmoſt Extremities of this Globe, and you will find Gods who riſe and ſet within a little of one another.*

I fancy, Madam, that you ſee plainly, that if *Maximus* of *Tyre* reaſons conſequentially, and that univerſal Conſent be the Characteriſtic of the Truth of an Opinion, it muſt be allowed that Men had Reaſon, for a long Time, to believe

* In hac tanta pugna, contentione, atque opinionum varietate, in ea leges ubique terrarum atque opiniones convenire videbis, Deum eſſe, unum regem omnium & patrem; huic multos additos eſſe Deos alios, qui ſupremi illius filii ſunt, & quaſi in Imperio Collegæ. In ea Græcus cum Barbaro, Mediterraneus cum inſulano, ſapiens conſentit cum ſtulto; ut ſi uſque ad extrema oceani Littora proceſſeris, hic quoque Deos inventurus ſis, qui non procul ab aliis oriuntur, ab aliis occidunt.

Maxim. Tyrius, Orat. I. p. 5.

lieve the Exiſtence and Plurality of Gods; ſeeing a Belief unanimouſly received by all People cannot be falſe.

Epicurus, who had baniſhed all the ſolid and convincing Reaſons of the Being of a God, ſubſtituted the foregoing in their Stead, to deceive and gull the People. It is a little unhappy for the *Carteſians*, and for all thoſe who aſſert there are innate Ideas, that this greateſt and moſt formidable Atheiſt of Antiquity undertook to prove the Exiſtence of the Gods by the ſame Arguments that they uſe to this very Day; and that he has alledged Reaſons which he looked upon as good, only to abuſe the People, while in theſe Times they are made uſe of in a ſerious Manner, and are thought to be of great Weight. Let us hear an *Epicurean* ſpeak for himſelf, who may eaſily be miſtaken for a *Carteſian*. 'Thoſe who have examined, *ſays he*, the falſe Opinions of the Philoſophers concerning the Nature of the Gods, 'can they forbear, after this, not to place *Epicurus* among theſe very Gods, when they conſider 'that he is the only Perſon who has eſtabliſhed 'their Exiſtence upon the Ideas which Nature itſelf has engraved in our Minds? Where is the 'People, where is the Nation, which without 'any Study had an Idea of the Exiſtence of Gods? '*Epicurus*, in his Book *de Regula & Judicio*, has 'ſtrongly eſtabliſhed this Principle, the true Foundation of the Queſtion which he diſcuſſed *.'

Not-

* Ea qui conſideret, quam inconſulte ac timere dicantur, venerari Epicurum, & in eorum ipſorum numero, de quibus hæc quæſtio eſt, habere debeat; ſolus enim vidit primum eſſe Deos, quod in omnium animis eorum notionem impreſſiſſet ipſa natura. Quæ eſt enim gens, aut quod genus hominum, quod non habeat ſine doctrina anticipationem quandam Deorum? Quam appellat πρόληψιν Epicurus, id eſt anteceptam animo rei quandam informationem, ſine qua nec intelligi quidquam nec quæri, nec diſputari poteſt. Cujus rationis vim, atque utilitatem ex illo cœleſti Epicuri, de regula & judicio, volumine accepimus.

Cicer. de Nat. Deor. Lib. I. Cap. XVI.

Notwithſtanding this, *Epicurus* thought it ſo much the worſe, as he had the utmoſt Contempt for popular Authority, and univerſal Conſent. But the Fear he was under from the *Areopagus* obliged him to obſerve a wary Conduct; he was afraid of *Protagoras*'s Fate, who was exiled by Order of the *Athenians*, for having ſaid, in the Beginning of his Book, *that he had nothing to ſay with regard to the Gods, whether they exiſted or exiſted not.* Thus *Epicurus* alledged the weakeſt Proof of the Exiſtence of a God that he could think of. The *Epicureans* alſo, being deſirous to leſſen, or even nullify the Notion of a Deity, inferred from this Principle a ridiculous Falſhood, which naturally flowed from it, *viz.* that the Gods had a human Shape, ſeeing all Men conceived them to be ſo *.

Samuel Parker, an *Engliſhman*, and celebrated Doctor of Divinity, abſolutely rejects this Argument taken from univerſal Conſent. He frankly owns, that nothing more diſparages that Notion, than to ſee the *Epicureans*, who conſtantly made uſe of it, acknowledge no God in reality; for they ſpoke of the Gods in ſuch a Manner, that they might as well have openly denied their Exiſtence †.

Some, perhaps, may reply to all theſe Reaſons, which, I think, are nearly equivalent to Demonſtrations, that all Nations did not give their Aſſent to

* A natura habemus omnes omnium gentium, ſpeciem nullam aliam, niſi humanam Deorum. Quæ enim alia forma occurrit unquam aut vigilanti cuiquam, aut dormienti.

Cicero de Nat. Deorum, Lib. I.

† Qui quæſo, omnem de Deo notionem majori contemptu onerare potuit, quam quod in multitudinis temeritatem referret, ipſamque in cauſam ab omni ratione ſecretam. Atque adeo hoc tandem pervenit viri inſulſi Diſputatio, quam vis vulgaris ſit de Deo opinio, eam tamen nulla ratione demonſtrari poſſe. Quo mehercle non minus aperte ipſum ſuſtulit, quam ſi nullum certe dixiſſet. *Sam. Parker*, de Deo & providen. divina, p. 141.

to the Belief of a Plurality of Gods, ſeeing the *Jews* diſſented therein from the *Pagans*, and acknowledged only one God. But the *Iſraelites*, inhabiting but a little Speck of the Globe, were ſo few in Number, in compariſon of the reſt, that if we admit of this Theſis, it would naturally follow, that all Men have not generally believed in a Deity, ſince there have been diverſe philoſophical Sects among the *Pagans*, who did not own his Exiſtence; and *Strabo* aſſures us, that there were formerly many People in *Spain*, and in *Ethiopia*, who had no Notion of a God. Several Authors and Travellers alſo have given us Relations of the new World, as it is called, in *America*, which confirm *Strabo*'s Account, and render it probable. They aſſures us, that they have ſeen, and know, that there are whole Nations of People that have no Notion of a Deity. Now, if one Nation only be capable of deſtroying the Belief, which ought to reſult from univerſal Conſent, I conclude therefrom, that the Idea of God is not known by all the World. And if one or two Nation be no Obſtacle, but that the unanimous Conſent of all the reſt may be true, I conclude again, that we muſt believe that once there exiſted a great many Gods, all Nations giving into that Belief by an univerſal Conſent, and that univerſal Conſent being an evident Proof of the Truth of that Propoſition.

Whoever will examine theſe Reaſons coolly, and without Prejudice, will eaſily diſcover the Truth thereof; and he will ſo much the more readily renounce his former Error, as that it is contrary to the propereſt Manner, by which the Exiſtence of a God ought to be proved; of which, I am perſuaded, as evident a Demonſtration may be made,

as

as that the three Angles of a Triangle are equal to two right Angles.

SECT. VIII. *Of the Exiſtence of a God.*

NO Perſon in their Wits, I believe, was ever ſo extravagantly fooliſh as to deny, that ſomething has exiſted from all Eternity. And it is impoſſible that any ſhould imagine that Non-entity, a meer nothing, could produce an actual exiſting Being. Seeing therefore ſomething muſt have always exiſted, let us examine what that Thing is.

We know and conceive but two Sorts of Beings in the World, *viz.* a *thinking Being*, and a *not-thinking Being*.

By *not-thinking Beings* I mean thoſe that are abſolutely material, which have neither Knowledge, Perception, Thought, nor Senſation; as the Hairs of our Head, the Parings of our Nails, *&c.*

By *thinking Beings* I underſtand and deſign ourſelves, Beings which have Senſation and Knowledge, that can think, conceive, and reflect.

Now, if there be a Being that has exiſted from all Eternity, it muſt neceſſarily be one of theſe two Sorts of Beings.

The Mind readily obſerves, and the Light of Nature ſhews us at once, that a Subſtance that does not think cannot produce an intelligent Being that does think. It is here that we may juſtly apply this Axiom; *Nemo dat quod non habet*; that is to ſay, *a Being cannot give, or communicate that which it has not*. And it is as impoſſible to believe that Matter that does not think, can produce Knowledge and Thought, as it is to believe, that nothing, or the Privation of all Beings, can produce thoſe which exiſt. Let any one break a Flint Stone,

Stone, and reduce it to Powder; and then let him toſs this Powder about with what Force, and in what manner he pleaſes; if he can make any Conception, any Thought reſult from thence; if this Powder, this unthinking Matter can become, or produce an intelligent Being, I am ready to believe the Atheiſt's Syſtem. For, to ſhorten all Diſputes, I am willing even to ſuppoſe with them, contrary to my own Arguments, that Matter has been in Motion from all Eternity: and though I grant them this falſe Principle, I defy them to give any one plauſible Reaſon to prove, that unthinking Matter and Motion will ever produce Thought.

Beſides, if Matter were the firſt eternal thinking Being, there would not be only one firſt thinking Being, but an infinite Number of them; even every Atom would be an eternal thinking Being, which would have no Dependance upon others. Every Grain of Sand, every Drop of Water would become an intelligent eternal God. For it is as impoſſible, that a thinking Being ſhould be compoſed of unthinking Parts, as it is that an extended Being ſhould be compoſed of unextended Parts. Every Particle therefore of Matter muſt think, and be an intelligent Being. I have ſhewn you above, Madam, how ridiculous that Notion is, where I confute *Spinoſa*'s Syſtem. We muſt then allow, unleſs we wilfully ſhut the Eyes of our Underſtanding, that it is not only impoſſible, that Thought ſhould proceed from a material and unthinking Being, but alſo that the firſt thinking Being, which muſt be endowed with all Wiſdom and Power, is not Matter, ſeeing if it were, it could have no more Power than the ſmalleſt Atom, which would be a God as well as it. Now, I aſk if it be poſſible, that the Arangement, Order, and Magnificence of the Univerſe could,

be

be produced by a Number of Gods perpetually at Variance and Oppoſition, and endeavouring to deſtroy one another by quitting their own Bounds, and invading thoſe next them? The Gods of Fire, and thoſe of Water, are at perpetual Diſcord; and thoſe of Water alſo are at War with thoſe of the Earth. And really I admire at the Complaiſance of ſuch an immenſe Number of little Deities, that are contained in every Drop of Water in the Sea, that they can ſo diſcreetly keep within their narrow Bounds. Methinks, ſuch a regular Conduct of ſo many little Deities, naturally ſuppoſes the Power of a ſupreme God to preſide over them, and keep within their juſt Limits. If I had not the Happineſs to know, that there is an eternal and ſpiritual Deity, I would admit at leaſt, with *Plato*, one ſupreme Governor of the reſt.

The Blindneſs of thoſe who make God a material Being, ſeems to me to be as great as that of thoſe who believe that Confuſion and Diſorder produced the Beauty and Order of the Univerſe, and that a Jumble of Atoms, endeavouring to catch hold of one another, had formed the World *. To ſay the Truth, I do not know which of the two Errors is the moſt abſurd, *viz. to allow, that Diſorder and Confuſion are the Principles of Order and Regularity, and to believe, that a blind Continuance of this Diſorder is the only Thing that preſerves all Things in Order; or to imagine, that every Particle of Matter is a Deity, and conſequently that there*

* Were I a Believer in *Epicurus*'s Syſtem, every Day when I conſidered the Courſe of the Sun, ſeeing him appear above our Horizon, and marching in haſte to our Antipodes, I ſhould cry out,

'I ſalute thee, O eternal Chance, incomprehenſible Diſorder, 'admirable Confuſion, who maintaineſt Order and beautiful Ar- 'rangement! ſuffer me to pay thee thoſe Honours, that other 'blind Mortals pay to a God of all Goodneſs, Power, and Wiſ- 'dom.

Letter the 28th. Jewiſh Letters.

there are as many Gods as there are Atoms in the Univerſe *.

SECT. IX. *That Matter is not coeternal with God.*

SOME Philoſophers, who allow that God is a ſpiritual Being, fall into another Error; they will have it that Matter is coeternal with God: They ſay, that they cannot conceive how it could be created and formed out of nothing. But they might be evidently convinced of the Almighty Power of God, if they would but attentively conſider *themſelves*.

They will there obſerve, that they began to exiſt but a few Years ago. When I ſay they, I don't ſpeak of the Matter which their Bodies are compoſed of, ſince that Matter was already created, and that it began only at the Time of the Formation of their Bodies, to be modified in that certain Manner; but I mean that thinking and intellectual Principle, which is in them, and which I regard as really *themſelves*. I don't think that they imagine, or will dare to ſay, that they have exiſted from all Eternity, and have always been thinking Beings; they muſt therefore own, that they began to exiſt ſome few Years ago. Now, how can they perſuade themſelves

* Is it not the moſt inconceivable thing in the World to ſay, that Matter, which has no Senſation or Knowledge, conforms itſelf perfectly to the eternal Laws? that it has an Activity, which never errs from the Courſe it ought to keep; and that among the numberleſs Properties it is endued with, there is none but what performs it's Functions with the utmoſt Regularity? Can we conceive any Laws that were not eſtabliſhed by intelligent Cauſe? Can we conceive any, that are punctually executed by a Cauſe which knows nothing of them, nor that has itſelf any Exiſtence in the World?

Bayle Continuation des Penſées diverſes ſur les Cometes, Tom. I. p. 526.

ſelves that it is difficult for an omnipotent Power, who can create a thinking and intellectual Being, to form a Subſtance that is *meerly material* out of nothing * ? It is at leaſt as far above our Capacity to conceive one, as it is to underſtand the other: Nay, if we duly conſider theſe two different Creations, that of a thinking and intellectual Principle will appear to us even more incomprehenſible than that of Matter. Beſides, tho' we cannot comprehend a Thing, it is ridiculous to deny, for that Reaſon, that it can be, and thereby limit the Power of God; and the more ſo, as we are already convinced in ourſelves, that he has created a thinking and intellectual Being out of nothing; a Being that is far more perfect than meer Matter, which has no Knowledge, and which we cannot ſay is coeternal with God, without giving into a monſtrous Error: For whatever is not created is neceſſarily infinite, ſeeing there is nothing that can bound or limit it †. If Matter therefore were eternal with God, there would be two Infinites, God and Matter. To this Argument I may alſo add another as convincing, *viz.* That if Matter be uncreated, God could not deſtroy it, ſeeing a Thing that is not created can have no End. The Deity therefore could not be Almighty, and Matter would be independant upon him. Now, is it not abſurd to admit of a Being coeternal with God, yet independant upon him, and of infinite Ex-

* I ſay *merely material*, that is to ſay *unthinking*, becauſe you will ſee hereafter, or at leaſt I ſhall endeavour to prove, that it is not impoſſible but that our Souls may be *material*; and that an eternal and ſpiritual God can give Thought to Matter. So I have all along made uſe of the Terms, *thinking* and *not thinking* Being, inſtead of *material* and *immaterial*, ſhewing that God, who is neceſſarily ſpiritual, has made all other Beings, thinking or not thinking material.

† Omne ens creatum neceſſe eſt ex ſe infinitum & illimitatum eſſe, non habet enim a quo limitetur.

Simiglecius de Baptiſmo adverſus Moſcorovium, p. 40.

Extenſion? would not that be to admit of two Gods, or two infinite Powers?

You ſee, Madam, that one muſt be blind, not to perceive plainly the abſolute Neceſſity of a Being who is ſupremely good, powerful, wiſe, ſpiritual, eternal, and the Creator of all Things. As to the Difficulties which are brought concerning the Origin of natural and moral Evil, we need only anſwer, that I am as certain that there is a God, *as I am convinced of my own Exiſtence. I clearly perceive that God cannot be the Author of Evil; and if he permits it, it is becauſe it is neceſſary it ſhould be ſo. I do not embarraſs my Mind any farther, I acknowledge my Ignorance, I own I cannot comprehend any Thing of the Myſteries relating to the Unhappineſs of the Creatures. But though there is one Thing which I cannot comprehend, I ought not for that Reaſon to reject a Thing whoſe Truth I am fully convinced of; he muſt be a mad Man who will act in that Manner.*

SECT. X. *Of our Ignorance concerning the Nature of the Soul.*

ALL the ancient Philoſophers knew as little of the Nature of the Soul as we do now-a-days, and as all Men will do to the End of the World. It will always be impoſſible for us to know how this Being or Subſtance, which is in us, and which we look upon as ourſelves, *is united to a certain Aſſemblage of Animal Spirits, which are in a continual Flux or Motion.* We ſhall never be able to comprehend how this thinking Being, which we call the Soul, *can have the Power to think and remember, when it is out of an organized Body like ours.* Reaſon can never inform us whether it be

be *material* or *immaterial*; and Revelation only can ſolve our Doubts concerning the Mortality or Immortality of this thinking Subſtance, which we call the Soul.

Every Philoſopher has defined the Soul in a different Manner. The Ancients were only agreed in this ſingle Point, that it is *material*; for all the nice Turns which have been made in our Time, to prove that ſeveral Pagan Philoſophers owned the Spirituality of the Soul are frivolous, ridiculous, and eaſily anſwered. If it be conſidered, that all the Ancients, except *Plato*, held God to be corporeal, and that they looked upon his Sentiment as unſupportable and unintelligible *, it will eaſily be granted, that it is abſurd to ſay, that People who make God material can believe the Soul to be immaterial.

The Pagans, at leaſt ſome of them, diſtinguiſhed the Soul from the Spirit, *Anima & Mens*. But by this Diſtinction they did not underſtand what ſome of our modern Philoſophers do, *to wit*, that the Soul *Anima*, is the Principle of Life; and the Spirit *Mens*, the Principle of Reaſon, which is an incorporeal and immortal Being, and is properly to be conſidered as the *real Soul*, the other being only the *vital Principle*, which we have in common with Brutes. However great the Difficulty is to ſupport this Opinion, yet it is looked upon as orthodox. *Macrobius* and *Lactantius* have maintained it openly, without having been cenſured for it. 'The Spirit, *ſays the former*, is properly the Un-'derſtanding, which we cannot doubt but is 'ſomething, that is more divine than the Soul.' Here follows the Aſſertion of the ſecond. 'It is 'difficult to know whether or no the Soul be the 'ſame Thing that the Spirit is.'

* Quod Plato ſine corpore Deum eſſe cenſet id quale poſſit intelligi non poteſt. Cicero de Natura Deorum, Lib. I.

When the Pagan Philoſophers diſtinguiſhed between the Soul and the Spirit, they did not take them to be two diſtinct and ſeparate Beings from each other: but they conſidered the Spirit as a Modification produced from the Soul *. To have a clear Idea of what the Ancients underſtood by Spirit, it muſt be conſidered, that ſome Philoſophers conceived it as the Motion of the Soul. Now, it is very certain that Motion has nothing corporeal in itſelf, but it can have no Exiſtence without ſomething that is corporeal; for there could be no Motion, if there were no Matter. Thus, according to this Syſtem, the Spirit, which is nothing but Motion, will be only a neceſſary Conſequence of the Materiality of the Soul, and cannot be regarded as a Being diſtinct from, and independant upon Matter.

Lucretius, who believed, as indeed did all the *Epicureans*, the Mortality of the Soul, (which, according to them, was only an Aſſemblage of very fine and ſubtle Atoms) diſtinguiſhed alſo between the Nature of the Soul and the Nature of the Spirit †. *We muſt conſider*, ſays he, *in what the Nature of the Soul, and that of the Spirit conſiſts.* But they made them both corporeal; and *Lucretius* would have it, that the Spirit conſiſts of extremely ſmall and fine Particles, as well as the Soul.

As for the other Philoſophers, who have not explained themſelves ſo clearly as the *Epicureans* have done, and who are ſaid to have made a Diſtinction between the ſpiritual and material Soul, I maintain, that by the incorporeal Spirit, they meant

* Nunc animum atque animam dico conjuncta teneri.
Inter ſe, atque unam naturam conficere ex ſe.
Lucret. de Rerum Natura, Lib. I. Verſ. 137.

† Unde animæ atque animi conſtet natura videndum eſt.
Lucret. Lib. I. Verſ. 132.

meant only the Motion produced by the Soul, which they believed to be material. Is it probable, that Perſons who made the Deity corporeal, could acknowledge any other Being to be purely ſpiritual? All the Ancients therefore, never looked upon the Spirit, when they diſtinguiſhed it from the Soul, but as a Concomitant of Matter. They embroiled their Diſcourſes and Opinions with a Number of Diviſions and Subdiviſions; and thoſe who came after them endeavoured to find in their muddled Notions, wherewithal to ſupport their new Sentiments. They had done better, if, inſtead of hunting after Authorities that are of no Uſe in ſuch an incomprehenſible Article, they had frankly owned with St. *Jerom*, St. *Auguſtine*, and St. *Gregory*, that they could know nothing for certain of the Nature of the Soul, and that that Diſcovery is reſerved for the Life to come.

Plato, who no doubt got acquainted with the Books of *Moſes*, and the Religion of the *Jews*, in his Travels into *Egypt*, acknowledging the Spirituality of God, thought that the human Soul was a Part or Portion of God, as his Body was a Part of Matter. This Opinion reſembles that of the *Anima Mundi*. But I am poſitive, that if any would carefully examine all the different Syſtems of the ancient Philoſophers, he would find by reducing them to a certain Point, that they all nearly agree, if not exactly, in their Belief of the Materiality of the Soul.

Thales * maintained, that the Soul was *a Nature without Reſt*. This Definition evidently proves what I have been ſaying concerning the Diſtinction of the Soul and Spirit; for what is a *Nature without Reſt*, but a perpetual Motion.

* *Thales* was the firſt who defined the Soul to be a Nature, which always moved itſelf by it's own Energy, *Plutarch*, Lib. IV. of the Opinions of the Philoſophers, Chap. II.

Anaximander ſaid, that the Soul was a Compoſition of Earth and Water. It need not coſt a Man much Trouble of thinking, to ſay, that he believed a Thing to be material, that was compoſed of Matter.

Empedocles placed the Exiſtence of the Soul in the *Blood* *. His Opinion had ſome Appearance of Probability; for Experience teaches us, that every Creature ceaſes to live as ſoon as it has loſt all it's Blood.

Some other Philoſophers ſaid, that it was a *celeſtial Fire* †; and others that it was *Harmony* ‡; others

* Empedocles animum eſſe cenſet cordi ſuffuſum ſanguine. Cicer. Tuſcul. Quæſt. Lib. I. Cap. IX.

Virgil makes an Illuſion to this Opinion, when he ſays, in the ninth Book of his Æneis, ſanguineam vomit ille animam.

† Zenoni Stoico animus ignis videtur. Cicer. Tuſcul. Quæſt. Lib. I. Cap. IX.

Virgil likewiſe makes an Illuſion to this Opinion, in the ſixth Book of his *Æneis*. Ignis eſt ollis vigor & cœleſtis origo.

‡ What follows is what *Cicero* ſays concerning Harmony. 'Ariſtoxenes, who was a Muſician and Philoſopher, pretends, 'that in the ſame Manner as Harmony is cauſed in ſinging, and 'muſical Inſtruments, by the Proportion of the Concords; ſo 'likewiſe all the Parts of the Body are diſpoſed in ſuch a Manner, that the Soul reſults from the Relation that they have to 'each other. He certainly borrowed this Idea from the Art 'which he profeſſed. However, he was not the firſt who maintained this Opinion; for *Plato* had ſpoke of this Harmony a 'long while before, and had amply diſcourſed concerning it.'

Proxime, autem Ariſtoxenus, muſicus idemque philoſophus, ipſius corporis intentionem quandam, velut in cantu & fidibus, quæ harmonia dicitur; ſic ex corporis totius natura & figura varios motus cieri, tamquam in cantu ſonos. Hic ab artificio ſuo non receſſit; & tamen dixit aliquid, quod ipſum quale eſſet, erat multo ante & dictum & explanatum a Platone. Cicer. Tuſcul. Quæſt. Lib. I. Cap. X.

‡ *Xenocrates*, following the ancient Principles of *Pythagoras*, who maintained that Numbers had infinite Virtues and Qualities, aſſerted that the Soul was deſtitute of Form, and void of Corporeity; and only conſiſted in Number. Xenocrates animi figuram & quaſi corpus negavit eſſe, verum numerum dixit eſſe, cujus vis, ut jam antea Pythagoræ viſum erat, in natura maxima eſſet. Id. ſum.

others number * *Ariſtotle*, who is always very deciſive, even in Things that he did not underſtand, defines the Soul to be *an Action that gives Motion to the Body*, which he calls *Entelecheia*. Am I ever the wiſer with regard to the Nature of the Soul, after this Definition than I was before? Had not Father *Mallebranche* Reaſon to ſay, *Certainly a Man muſt have a* deal of Faith to believe *Ariſtotle* thus, ſeeing he only gives us logical Reaſons, and explains the Effects of Nature only by the confuſed Notions of the Senſes; particularly, when he boldly decides Queſtions, which we cannot ſee it will ever be poſſible for Men to decide; for which Reaſon *Ariſtotle* takes ſpecial Care to inform us, thatt his Word in many Things muſt be taken witho ut any further Proof, for that Author lays it down as an inconteſtable Maxim, δεῖ πιστεύειν τον μανθάνοντα †, a Learner muſt believe.

Is it not a hundred Times more prudent, more honourable, and more worthy of a Philoſopher, to own that we are ignorant of what we do not know, than to amuſe People with meer cant Terms inſtead of Reaſons? Does not *Lucretius* follow Nature much more than *Ariſtotle*, and conſequently is more worthy of our Regard? He owns, that we are ignorant of the Nature of the Soul ‡; and that we cannot demonſtrate whether or no it is born with the Body, or whether or no it dies with it; or whether or no it paſſes into other Bodies, according to the Syſtem of thoſe Philoſophers, who

Mallebranche recherche de la verite, Lib. III. p. 180.

† *Ignoratur enim quæ ſit natura animai,*
Nata ſit, an contra naſcentibus infinuetur,
Et ſimul intereat nobis cum morte dirempta,
An tenebras orci viſat, vaſtaſque lacunas,
An pecudes alias divinitus infinuet ſe.
Lucret. de Nat. Rerum, Lib. I. Verſ. 113, &c.

hold a Metempſychoſis, or Tranſmigration of Souls *.

We ſhould at this Day be ſtill in the ſame Uncertainty, Madam, that the Ancients were, if Revelation had not determined our Belief; but in as much as it determines our Doubts, and yet does not clear them up, I am going to tell you the Reaſons *pro* and *contra*, upon which they ground their Opinions, who hold the Materiality or Immateriality of the Soul.

SECT. XI. *Whether or no the Soul be material?*

THE firſt Difficulties that are formed againſt the Spirituality of the Soul, ariſe from the different Manners in which Men pretend it has it's Riſe. Some Philoſophers ſuppoſe, that the Soul grows by little and little, in Proportion as the Body becomes organized in the Womb of the Mother. But an inſurmountable Difficulty is here objected, *viz.* that it is impoſſible for a Thing that is corporeal to become incorporeal. Thus if the Soul at the firſt be material, it can never become ſpiritual, which proves the Neceſſity of the Materiality of the Soul. *Thomas Aquinas* had a Mind to evade this Abſurdity, but he only added one Difficulty to another; he ſays, that the Animal and the Soul, which exiſted before the Arrival or Creation of the ſpiritual Soul, both die; and that here is formed a new Animal, which is actuated by the ſpiritual Soul. Now, as God always acts by

* *Ipſe ego, nam memini Trojani tempore belli*
Pantboides Euphorbus eram. ------
Ovid. Metamorph. Lib. XV. Ver. 160.
Conſult the fifth Part of the Secret Memoirs of the *Republic of Letters*, where I have ſpoke at large of this Opinion of *Pythagoras*.

by the moſt ſimple and natural Ways, I demand to what Purpoſe there ſhould be a double Creation of two Souls, and two Animals? Alſo by what Means, or by what Experiment, St. *Thomas* could come at the Knowledge of this, and what evident Proofs he could give of that Change of the Soul?

Some learned Men aſſert, that the Embryo is inanimate till the fortieth Day, when the Parts of the Body are formed; but this Notion only adds new Strength to thoſe who hold the Materiality of the Soul. *How is it poſſible*, ſay they, *for the ſeminal Power, which is not aſſiſted by any Principle of Life, to produce vital Actions? Now, if you grant*, ſay they, *that there is a Principle of Life in the Seed, that is capable of producing the Formation of the Parts, and giving them Motion and Action, by improving this Principle, and giving it Power to increaſe and act freely by perfect Organs, it is eaſy to ſee, that it may and even muſt become what we call the Soul, which conſequently is material.*

There is alſo another Opinion, which many Philoſophers hold, *to wit*, that our Soul takes it's Origin from our Parents, by Means of the ſeminal Virtue, and that at firſt it is only a vegetative Soul, like that of a Plant, and that afterwards it becomes ſenſitive as it increaſes, and at laſt is made rational by the Co-operation of God. But this Opinion is attended with all the Difficulties, that attend the others, which I have been ſpeaking of, where we are obliged to ſuppoſe the Materiality of the Soul; without this Suppoſition, we muſt, in the firſt Place, defend the Succeſſion of theſe three Souls, contrary to the plain and ſimple Ways, by which God always acts, and who at the firſt might have made it a reaſonable Soul; and then we muſt prove how a corporeal Thing can become incorporeal, as the reaſonable Soul cannot have the ſame

Eſſence that the ſenſitive has; and if it be true, that Matter is incapable of Reaſoning; and if the reaſonable Soul be the ſame with the ſenſitive, only more pure or refined, it muſt then neceſſarily be material. Now, this is the Syſtem of the *Epicureans*, except that the Soul, according to the Pagan Philoſophers, had a Power of bringing itſelf to Perfection; whereas, according to our Chriſtian Philoſophers, it is the Power of God that brings it to Perfection; but the Materiality of the Soul is always the ſame on both Sides. Some Philoſophers again make the Soul an abſolutely ſimple and incorporeal Subſtance; they avoid by this, it is true, ſome Difficulties that attend the others; but then they meet with new ones in their ſtead; for they cannot explain how the Soul, which is an incorporeal Subſtance, can receive corporeal and organic Faculties, or, in ſhort, how Matter can act upon Spirit, or Spirit upon Matter*. All that they can ſay in anſwer to theſe Queſtions contains only ſome weak Reaſonings, and Scholaſtic Subtleties, which ought never to have been imitated by thoſe who have ſo ſeverely condemned them with a View to explain Myſteries and Secrets which they did not underſtand†. I don't blame them for giving their Opinions, as all other Philoſophers have done, upon doubtful Subjects. But I wiſh that they had not been ſo poſitive about the Truth of them; and that they had given their Opinions as probable Con-

* How can the Soul receive vital Actions, which are alſo corporeal? ſeeing they are inherent, they ought to be received into the ſame Principle that produced them; and thus it ſignifies nothing ſaying, that the corporeal are received into the Body, ſeeing the Soul is the Principle which produces them; or into the Faculties themſelves, ſeeing the Faculties are really and truly the ſame thing that the Soul is, and that conſequently they are diſtinct Bodies.

Bernier's Abregé de la Philoſ. de Gaſſendi, Tom. V. p. 482.

† This relates to the *Carteſians*.

Conjectures, and not as abſolute Demonſtrations *. It is in vain for them to cry out, that we cannot conceive how Matter can be capable of Thought. They will ſee, provided they reflect ever ſo little without Prejudice, that it is not more difficult for us, with regard to our Ideas, to conceive that God is able to join to the Idea, which we have of Matter, the Faculty of Thinking, as to know and comprehend, how he unites to this Faculty of Thinking another Subſtance.

We are intirely ignorant in what Thought conſiſts, and to what ſort of Subſtance God has given the Faculty of Thinking; and it is limiting the Power of the Almighty to imagine, that he cannot give Senſe and Perception to certain minute Particles of Matter, which he has created, and unites together, as he thinks fit. *Since we muſt allow*, ſays *Locke*, *that God has annexed Effects to Motion, which we can no way conceive Motion able to produce, what reaſon have we to conclude, that he could not order them to be produced, in a Subject we cannot conceive capable of them, as well as in a Subject we cannot conceive the Motion of Matter can any way operate upon* †?

However firm in their Sentiments thoſe Philoſophers may ſeem, who maintain with Aſſurance, that God cannot communicate Life and Perception to a ſolid Subſtance, it may be, they would be leſs tenacious of their Opinions, if they would conſider without Prejudice, how difficult it is *to join Senſation to extended Matter, and Exiſtence to a Thing that has no Extenſion*. Many great Men, and even ſome Fathers of the Church, have believed the Soul to be material. *Tertullian* ſays, that

* Ut potero explicabo, nec tamen ut Pythius Apollo certa ut ſint, et fixa quæ dixero. Cicer. Tuſcul Quæſt. Lib. I.

† Locke's Eſſay upon Human Underſtanding, Lib. IV. Cap. 3.

that the Soul is a Body, and that it would be nothing without it, every Thing that is being a Body *. And St. *Auguſtine*, far from having haughtily refuted this Opinion, he, who believed however the Soul to be of a ſpiritual Nature †, ſeems to excuſe it, when he tells us that *Tertullian* believed the Soul to be a Body, becauſe he could not conceive it incorporeal; and that he was afraid, that it would be nothing, if it were not a Body.

Notwithſtanding thoſe, who deny the Materiality of the Soul, affect to ſhew a Contempt of their Opponents, yet, there have been in all Ages, ſome of that Opinion, who are venerable for their Knowledge and Learning. For not to mention the ancient Philoſophers, and confine myſelf to the Moderns, *Averroes* and *Calderine Politian* and *Pomponatius*, *Ceſalpin* and *Taurell*, *Cremonin* and *Berigard*, *Viviani* and *Hobbs* were Men of ſuch Learning, that they ought not to be treated with ſuch Contempt ‡.

If the Truth of an Opinion depended upon the Greatneſs of the Genius of thoſe, who have maintained

* Cum autem ſit (loquitur de anima) habeat neceſſe eſt aliquid per quod eſt; ſi habeat aliquid per quod eſt, hoc erit corpus ejus. Omne quod eſt corpus eſt ſui generis; nihil eſt in corporale, niſi quod non eſt.

Tertullianus de Carne Chriſti, Cap. XI.

† Auguſtinus de Anima et ejus Origine. Lib. IV. Cap. 23.

I might here cite a great Number of the ancient Fathers, who have believed the Soul to be material, and have explained themſelves, formally concerning it, ſuch as *Origin*, *Juſtin*, *Athenagoras*, *Theophilus*, *Tatian*, *Arnobus*; but I refer the Reader to what I have ſaid of it in *Memoirs of the Republick of Letters*, and in the firſt and ſecond Volumes of the new Edition of *Cabaliſtick Letters*. There they will find the Original Paſſages, which will juſtify what is here advanced, and which the Learned are ſufficiently convinced of.

‡ I do not here mention in this Liſt, either *Spineſa* or *Vanini*, becauſe they were profeſſed Atheiſts; and though, amongſt them I have named, ſome have been ſuſpected of Atheiſm, yet they never openly maintained it.

tained it, it would be eaſy to prove the Uncertainty of the Materiality or Immateriality of the Soul, from the Authority of the great Mr. *Locke*, whom I believe I may ſafely put in Parallel with *Des Cartes* and *Mallebranche*, and that their moſt zealous Followers will not, I fancy, think it an unjuſt Compariſon. But I have often ſaid, that the Labours of the Learned ought to contribute towards the finding out of the Truth, and not to hide the Uncertainty thereof under the Vail of Authority. But be that as it will, I ſhall here inſert a Paſſage from that celebrated Philoſopher. *He who will give himſelf leave to conſider freely, and look into the dark and intricate Part of each Hypotheſis, will ſcarce find his Reaſon able to determine him fixedly for or againſt the Soul's Materiality. Since on which Side ſoever he views it, either as an unextended Subſtance, or as a thinking extended Matter; the Difficulty to conceive either, will, whilſt either alone is in his Thoughts, ſtill drive him to the contrary Side* *.

SECT. XII. *Whether or no the Soul be Material and Mortal* †?

FATHER *Mallebranche*, who affected to ſhew a great deal of Contempt for *Montagne*, becauſe he ſeemed at a Difficulty in reſolving the Queſtion of the Immateriality and Immortality of the Soul, has himſelf given but very weak Proofs of them both. *The Soul*, ſays he, *being a Thinking Subſtance muſt be Immortal; becauſe it is not conceivable, that a Subſtance can become nothing. To*

 imagine

* Locke's Eſſay upon Human Underſtanding, Lib. IV. Cap. 3.

† We here examine this Queſtion by the Aſſiſtance only of the Light of Nature, as People would do, that have received no Information from Revelation.

imagine ſuch a Thing, we muſt have Recourſe to the extraordinary Omnipotence of God *.

I would aſk Father *Mallebranche*, why it is neceſſary to have Recourſe to the extraordinary Omnipotence of God, to permit a Subſtance, that had a Beginning to have an End? As for me, I am of Opinion (and believe I have the Majority of Mankind on my Side) that it requires no greater Power to annihilate any Subſtance, than it does to create it out of nothing. Thus, if God, when he created the Soul, decreed that it ſhould have an End, it will be as eaſily deſtroyed, as it was made. Father *Mallebranche* may reply, that if God does not annihilate the Soul, it remains eternally. I allow, that if God pleaſes it may be ſo; but ſtill it remains to be proved, that God is abſolutely obliged to make the Soul eternal. Till then no Man is obliged to believe, that a created Subſtance cannot have an End. And it is to no purpoſe, in this Caſe, *to have Recourſe to the extraordinary Omnipotence of God to conceive ſuch a Thing poſſible.* And here Father *Mallebranche* has no right to confirm his Opinion by Revelation, becauſe the Queſtion is only, whether or no we can prove as Philoſophers, the Immortality and Immateriality of the Soul, by Reaſon or the meer Light of Nature.

The next Argument that he brings for the ſupport of his Opinion, is as little convincing as the former. *The Soul is immortal*, ſays he, *becauſe it cannot corrupt, nor be diſſolved into Vapours or Air; for it is evident, that that which cannot be divided into an infinite Number of Parts cannot corrupt, nor be diſſolved into Air.* I could wiſh that this Philoſopher would do me the Favour to tell me how he certainly knows, that the Soul *cannot be diſſolved*

* *Mallebrancke de la Recherche, Lib.* IV. *Ch.* 7. p. 428.

ſolved into Vapours or Air. Till he has proved clearly to me, that God cannot communicate and give Senſation and Perception to certain very fine and ſmall Particles of Matter, and that thus the Soul cannot be made material even by the Power of God, I have a right to ſay to him, *You lay that down for an undoubted Principle, which I diſpute; you ground the Immortality of the Soul upon its Spirituality and Indiviſibility; and I maintain it to be Mortal, becauſe being material it is diviſible. Let us ſee then clearly in the firſt Place, what its Nature is; without this it is impoſſible that we ſhould reaſon conſequentially; I have a right to ſet aſide all your Proofs, ſince you ground them upon a Principle whoſe Certainty and Evidence you are far from proving.*

Father *Mallebranche* ſeems to have partly foreſeen theſe Objections. For he enquires into the Neceſſity of the Spirituality of our Souls, by refuting the Opinion of thoſe who allow Beaſts a material one, which he will not grant, but reduces them to the Rank of meer Machines. Before I undertake to anſwer the Objections, which he raiſes againſt the Materiality of our Souls, I am going, Madam, to give you a ſhort Sketch of the Arguments that all the *Carteſians* generally make uſe of. And I beg you will give your Attention thereto, to the end that having perfectly in your Mind the Reaſons which favour the Spirituality and Immortality of the Soul, you may draw a juſter Parallel between them, and thoſe that are alledged for the contrary.

The *Carteſians* maintain, that Thought is the Eſſence and Property of the Soul. *It may doubt*, ſay they, *of all its other Attributes; but it cannot of this, by which it has a Power to think, for that very doubting would be thinking. Now Though has neither*

neither Length, Breadth nor Thickneſs; thus therefore it is not a Mode of an extended Subſtance. If it be not the Mode of an extended Subſtance, it muſt then be a Mode of an incorporeal Subſtance: for ſeeing it exiſts, and that it is a real and true Mode, but in no wiſe of a corporeal and extended Subſtance, it muſt neceſſarily be incorporeal, and without Extenſion, which is plainly denoted by the Word Spiritual.

Thus, Madam, is the ſhort and preciſe manner, in which the *Carteſians* maintain the Spirituality of the Soul. And if you grant them thus far, it will be eaſy for them to prove clearly from thence, the Immortality of the Soul. *The Deſtruction of one Subſtance* ſay they, *does not cauſe the Deſtruction of another. Thus an extended Subſtance being diſtinct from a ſpiritual one, they are not neceſſarily deſtroyed together. Beſides, the extended Subſtance is not intirely deſtroyed; there is only a Change, or a Diſſolution of ſome of the Parts of Matter, which always continues naturally the ſame; as if we break a Clock in Pieces, none of the Subſtance of it is deſtroyed, though we ſay the Clock is deſtroyed. Thus a Subſtance is ſaid to be deſtroyed, becauſe the Parts thereof are diſſolved. So the Soul, which is a ſpiritual Subſtance, can never be deſtroyed, becauſe it is not diviſible, nor has any Parts, and conſequently muſt be immortal.*

However ſtrong and concluſive theſe Reaſons may ſeem to be, do not think, Madam, that by granting the *Carteſians* the Spirituality of the Soul, they have a right to conclude from thence, that it muſt be abſolutely immortal. For, when they ſay the Soul, not being compoſed of Parts, nor capable of Diviſion, cannot be deſtroyed, they do not reſolve the Difficulty, that God might create the Soul a Spiritual Being, and yet ordain that it

ſhould

ſhould die with the Body. Every thing, that had a Beginning, may have an End. He that created Matter out of nothing can annihilate it, and he that created the Spirit, could have created it mortal, or can make it ſo, if he pleaſes. Thus, though we ſuppoſe the Soul to be ſpiritual, we have no evident Proof that it muſt be immortal, if Revelation had not aſſured us it is ſo. And the Objection that is made, that as it is not compoſed of Parts, nor capable of Diviſion, it cannot therefore be deſtroyed, is of no Force, only ſo far as we ſuppoſe that the Creator ordained it to be Immortal; ſince he who creates a thing out of nothing, be it ſpiritual or corporeal, may aſſign a time when it ſhall return to nothing again; unleſs any imagines, that it requires a much greater Power to annihilate a Being, than it does to create it, and that God has privately inſtructed a certain Philoſopher how far his Power extends.

Father *Mallebranche* therefore had no reaſon to treat *Montagne* with ſo much Contempt, becauſe he did not evidently ſee the Neceſſity of the Soul's Immortality. I defy all the Philoſophers in the World, provided they have no Recourſe to the Authority of Revelation, to prove that it is abſolutely neceſſary, that the Soul ſhould be immortal, by granting them the Advantage, that it is a Spirit.

You conceive, Madam, that they who maintain that the Soul is material, have alſo much greater reaſon to diſpute its Immortality; I am going therefore to let you ſee an Examination of the Arguments they make uſe of, and alſo of thoſe of their Opponents.

SECT.

SECT. XIII. *That there are no evident Proofs againſt the Materiality of our Souls.*

THE *Carteſians* lay it down as a certain and evident Principle, that Thought is nothing more than a Mode of an extended Subſtance. But may we not query of them in this manner? *Who told you that God cannot communicate Thought to meer Matter? How came you by the Knowledge of it? Who revealed it to you? It is by Reflection*, ſay they, *that we conclude that the Soul muſt be abſoluted ſpiritual. We ſee that Matter, be it ever ſo fine, or whatever Motion it has, is not capable of Reaſoning; and from thence we infer, that the Soul, which reaſons, cannot be material* ——. 'We know, 'ſays *Des Cartes*, that for to be, we want neither Extenſion, nor Figure, nor local Reſidence, 'nor any other Thing, which can be attributed 'to Body; and that we are for this very reaſon 'only, becauſe we think *.' But this is far from being either evident or proved. For we may maintain on the other hand, that we do not know that we exiſt, and we think, only becauſe we are extended; that is to ſay, that our Soul, which is material, has a Power to think. Though we cannot conceive, however fine and light Matter may be, or whatever Motion it may have, how it can acquire Thought; yet we muſt not ſuppoſe, that God cannot, by ways unknown to us, inveſt it with a Faculty of Thinking. Thus the foregoing Point will always remain undetermined, to wit, the proving that God cannot inveſt Matter with the Property of Thinking, till it can be ſhewn that the Power of the Deity is ſo limited, that

* Des Cartes Principes de Philoſophie, Liv. I. p. 6.

that he cannot make Brutes rational Creatures, without changing the Eſſence of their Souls, and conſequently without giving them others; till then, I ſay, we have a right to maintain, that there is no evident Proof againſt the Materiality of the Soul.

The Manner is very comical, and yet very weak, which ſome Philoſophers make uſe of, to prove that God cannot communicate the Faculty of Thinking to Brutes. *Thought*, ſay they, *is the Mode of a ſpiritual Subſtance; now the Soul of Brutes being Material, God cannot give them the Faculty of Thinking, becauſe he cannot change the Eſſence of Things.* But this is taking that for a Principle, which is diſputed. For the Queſtion is only to know, whether or no Thought be the Mode of a ſpiritual Subſtance, and whether or no Matter may not, by the Power of God, become ſuſceptible of Perception?

The ſtaunch *Carteſians* diſclaim this Argument, becauſe, by one as remarkably abſurd, they pretend, that God can change the Eſſence of Things, and make a Stick be a Stick without an End; which is of all Arguments the moſt ridiculous; but yet they as obſtinately deny, that Matter is capable of Thinking.

SECT. XIV. *That the Soul of Brutes is a Proof, that Matter may be endued with a Power of Thinking.*

FATHER *Mallebranche* endeavours to demonſtrate the Impoſſibility of the Materiality of the Soul, by proving that Brutes have none. But the Proofs which he brings to uphold and ſupport his Opinion, are rather glaring than ſolid.

If

If any can clearly conceive, ſays he, *that Matter of any Form, be it ſquare, or round, or oval, is Pain, or Pleaſure*, &c. *they may be aſſured, that the Souls of Brutes, let them be as material as they will, are capable of Thinking.* &c. *Likewiſe, if any can conceive, that Matter extremely agitated upwards and downwards, in a circular, ſpiral, parabolic, or elliptic Line, is Love, Hatred, Joy or Sorrow, he may ſay, that Brutes have the ſame Paſſions that we have. But if this does not appear to be ſo, let none ſay ſo, unleſs he has a mind to ſay he does not know what* ——— *for, we ought to affirm nothing but what the Mind conceives to be.*

It is eaſy to anſwer theſe Objections, and from thence to raiſe others of equal Force for the ſupport of the Materiality of the Soul; and we have a right to ſay to Father *Mallebranche* thus; *If you can conceive clearly, how a Thing which has no Extenſion exiſts, how a Thing, which has no Parts, acts upon Matter, and* vice verſa, *how Matter acts upon a Thing, which has neither Extenſion, nor Breadth, nor Thickneſs, then you may affirm, that the Soul is an incorporeal Subſtance; but if you cannot conceive how that can be, you muſt not ſay ſo, unleſs you have a mind to ſay you know not what* ——— *for you ought to affirm nothing but what you clearly conceive. And I believe you have Sincerity enough to own, that you are ignorant, or at leaſt do not certainly know, in what manner an extended Subſtance can act upon a Thing that is not ſo, and which, being immaterial, has no Parts.*

Father *Mallebranche*'s Proofs therefore are like ſome Theatrical Dreſſes; like Buſkins that will fit any Player's Legs; there are only different ways of fitting them on; and if we muſt judge of the Spirituality or Materiality of the Soul only by the Clearneſs and Evidence of the different Arguments,

Arguments, which are uſed in this Diſpute, it will certainly be an everlaſting one amongſt People of Honeſty and Sincerity; or rather, they will incline towards the Opinion, that holds it to be material. For, is it not eaſier to believe that God has endued with Thought a Subſtance, which we are acquainted with, and of which we have a clear and diſtinct Notion, than to conceive how a Subſtance, which is not extended, and of which we have no juſt Idea, can act upon Matter?

There is but one Difficulty in maintaining the Materiality of the Soul, and that is of no great Weight, provided we do not limit the Power of God, and will honeſty allow, that he that created Matter out of nothing, can, if he pleaſes, give it Perception. But, in the contrary Opinion, we meet with new Difficulties every Step we take. In the firſt Place, we muſt admit of a Subſtance, without Extenſion, which we can have no Idea of. Secondly, we cannot conceive how a Subſtance, which has no Parts, which is ſpiritual and which in ſhort is not material, can act upon Matter. Thirdly, we are as ignorant how Matter, in its turn, can act upon that which is not material. There are beſides many other Difficulties. And ſurely thoſe, who ſo boldly limit the Power of God, as to think that he cannot communicate Thought to Matter, are very indulgent to their own Opinions, in granting him the Permiſſion to perform ſo many Miracles, in favour of their peculiar Tenets.

The learned *Gaſſendus* has laid before us with infinite Strength, the Difficulties which occur in the Opinion, which admits of a Soul purely ſpiritual; and though *Des Cartes* has ſupported it with all the Sagacity his Mind was endued with, yet his Reaſons ſeem to be more convincing, than

thoſe

thoſe of his Adverſaries: *however ſmall*, ſays *Gaſſendus* *, *the Part may be, that you take up in the Brain*, (he is ſuppoſed to ſpeak to the Soul of *Des Cartes*) *it is nevertheleſs extended, and you are neceſſarily of the ſame Dimenſions with it; therefore you are not without Extenſion, and you have alſo*

* Et deinde in cerebro ſolum, aut in exigua ſolum ejus parte: cernis idem plane incommode eſſe, quoniam quantulacumque ſit illa pars, extenſa tamen eſt, et tu illi coextenderis, atque idcirco extenderis, particulaſque particulis illius reſpondentes habes. An dicis te cerebri partem præ puncto accipere? Incredibile ſane; ſed eſto punctum. Si illud quidem Phyſicum ſit, eadem remanet difficultas, quia tale punctum extenſum eſt neque partibus prorſus caret. Si mathematicum, noſti primum id niſi imaginatione non dari. Sed detur vel fingatur potius dari in cerebro mathematicum punctum cui tu adjungaris, et in quo exiſtas, vide quam futura ſit inutilis fictio. Nam ut fingatur, ſic fingi debet, ut ſis in concurſu nervorum per quos omnes partes informatæ animæ tranſmittunt in cerebrum ideas, ſeu ſpecies rerum ſenſibus perceptarum ad primum, nervi omnes in punctum non coeunt, ſed quia cerebro continuatæ in pinealem medullam multi nervi toto dorſo in eam abeunt: ſeu quia, qui tendunt in medium caput, non in eundem cerebri locum deſinere deprehenduntur-ſed demus concurrere omnes; nihilominus concurſus illorum in mathematico puncto eſſe nequit, quia videlicet corpora, non mathematicæ lineæ ſunt, ut coire poſſint in mathematicum punctum. Et ut demus coire, ſpiritus per illos traducti exire e nervis, aut ſubire nervos non poterunt, utpote cum corpora ſint, et corpus eſſe in non loco, ſeu tranſire per non locum, cujuſmodi eſt punctum mathematicum, non poſſit.

Et quamvis demus eſſe, et tranſire poſſe: attamen tu in puncto exiſtens, in quo non ſunt plagæ, dextra, ſiniſtra, ſuperior, inferior, aut alia, dijudicare non potes unde adveniant, aut quid renuncient. Idem autem dico de iis, quos tu debeas ſentiendum, renunciandumve, et ad movendum tranſmittere. Ut præteream capi non poſſe, quomodo tu motum illis imprimes, ſi ipſe in puncto ſis, niſi ipſe corpus ſis, ſeu niſi corpus habeas, quo illos contingas, ſimulque propellas. Nam ſi dicas illos per ſe moveri, ac te ſolummodo dirigere ipſorum motum; memento te alicubi negaſſe moveri corpus per ſe, ut proinde inferri poſſit te eſſe motus illius cauſam. Ac deinde explica nobis, quomodo talis directio ſine aliqua tui contentione atque adeo motione eſſe valeat? Quomodo contentio in rem aliquam, et motio illius, ſine contactu mutuo moventis et mobilis? Quomodo contactus ſine corpore, quando (ut lumine naturali eſt adeo perſpicuum) tangere nec tangi ſine corpore nulla poteſt res? Pet. Gaſſend. Object. cont. Medit. Renat. Deſcartes. p. 32. & 33.

alſo Parts, however fine and impreceptible they may be, which correſpond to his. I cannot believe, that you affi med at random, that you take for a Point, the ſmall Part to which you are united; but ſuppoſe that you had recourſe to this Subterfuge, it muſt needs be that this Point ſhould be either Phyſical or Mathematical. If it is Phyſical, the Difficulty remains, for a Phyſical Point is extended however ſmall it may be, and is not entirely without Parts. If it be Mathematical, it is an imaginary Point, which has no other Exiſtence, but in our Imagination. But let us carry Matters to the utmoſt Extremity, and ſuppoſe that it is poſſible that there may be one of theſe mathematical Points found in the Brain; to which you are intimately united, and in which you reſide: this Fiction will be quite uſeleſs; for notwithſtanding this Suppoſition, you muſt neceſſarily be placed in the Concourſe of the Nerves, by which all the Parts of the ſhapeleſs Soul, tranſmit to the Brain the Ideas and Species of Things, which have been perceived and diſcovered by the Senſes. However, take Notice that they all do not meet together in a ſingle Point; the Brain being continued and extended, as far as the ſpinal Marrow of the Back, ſeveral Nerves belonging to the Back, are terminated entirely in this manner.

Beſides the Nerves which tend towards the middle of the Head do not end in the ſame Place of the Brain, but take their Courſe to diſtinct Parts. And though it ſhould be true that they meet all together, it would be ridiculous to ſuppoſe, that they are reunited in a mathematical Point.

Let us ſuppoſe, however, that this may be poſſible; then the Animal Spirits, which flow through the Nerves, can neither get out, nor enter in, becauſe they are Bodies; and no Body can exiſt in a Point where there is no Space; which would be the Caſe if it was a mathematical Point, which has no Exiſtence

ſtence but what is imaginary. But I will make a ſtill farther Conceſſion, and allow that this likewiſe may poſſibly be. I ask then how it is poſſible, that you who exiſt in a Point where there is neither Countries nor Regions, where there is neither right nor left, nor high nor low, can diſcern, from whence any thing comes, or perceive the Impreſſion thereof? The ſame Difficulty relates to the Animal Spirits, which you are to ſend through the Body, in order to communicate Sentiment and Motion thereto. Is it not impoſſible that this can be done, if you exiſt in a mathematical Point, if you are not a Body, or if you have not a Body, by whoſe means you touch and thruſt forward that which you animate? If you ſay that the Spirits move of themſelves, and that you only direct their Motion, I deſire you would remember that you have acknowledged, that the Body has no Self-motion; thus I have a right, from your own Principles, to conclude, that you are the Cauſe of its Motion. Be ſo kind as to teach us, how the Conduct and Direction of the Spirits, may be performed without ſome ſort of Contention, and conſequently without ſome Motion, and Impulſion on your Part. Tell us by what means one thing can act upon another, and put it in Motion, without the mutual Contact of the Things moving and moved, and without a real Pulſation, and how this Pulſation can be performed without a Body? For, in ſhort, natural Light plainly teaches us, and makes it evidently appear, that nothing but Bodies can touch and be touched.

I am going on ſtill, Madam, to examine the Reaſons, which engaged Father *Mallebranche* to refuſe Brutes a Soul. As you ſee he maintains, as well as all the *Carteſians*, that Matter can never be capable of Perception, or Thought, he is obliged to deprive Brutes of Souls intirely; for if he ſhould grant them Souls, the reſult in his Syſtem would

would be, that they would be ſpiritual, which no Philoſopher durſt undertake to maintain. 'It is 'true, ſays he, that the Actions of Brutes denote 'Intelligence; for every Thing that is regulated 'denotes it; even a Watch denotes it; it is im-'poſſible for Chance to make the Wheels thereof, 'and there muſt be an Intelligence to direct the 'Motions. In ſhort, all that we ſee done by 'Plants, as well as Animals, certainly denotes In-'telligence —— But, continues Father *Malle-'branche*, this Intelligence is not from Matter; 'it is as diſtinct from Brutes, as that which ſets 'in order the Wheels of a Watch is diſtinct from 'the Watch. For this Intelligence appears to be 'infinitely wiſe and powerful. —— Thus in 'Animals there is neither Intelligence nor Soul. 'Otherwiſe we muſt ſay, that there is more In-'telligence in the leaſt of Animals, nay, even in 'a ſingle Grain of Corn, than in the wiſeſt Men; 'for it is certain, that there are more different Parts 'therein, and it produces more regulated Mo-'tions, than we can ever comprehend *.'

For my part, I muſt ſay, if ever any Proofs were weak and inſufficient, theſe are ſuch. But that they may have their due weight, I ſhall here conſider them ſeparately one after another.

In the firſt Place, Father *Mallebranche* lays it down as a Maxim, that the Intelligence, which we obſerve in Brutes, is not from Matter. But that he ought to have proved; it is this very Theſis, that I have been ſhewing to be neither evident nor clear. When we reaſon from juſt Principles, it is eaſy to draw juſt Conſequences therefrom. But when theſe Principles are either falſe or doubtful, all the Conſequences which reſult

* Mallebranche, Recherche de la Verité, Liv. IV. Chap. 7. p. 431.

ſult therefrom will be alſo either falſe or uncertain. Before we lay it down as a Maxim, that the Underſtanding, which we obſerve in Brutes, is not from Matter, we muſt prove that Matter is incapable of Senſation and Perception, and that even the Power of God cannot make it capable thereof. But, let us go on with the Examination of Father *Mallebranche*'s Arguments. 'The 'Underſtanding, ſays he, that we obſerve in 'Brutes, appears to be infinitely wiſe, and in-'finitely powerful; for that reaſon, there can be 'no Intelligence in Brutes themſelves; becauſe 'if the Intelligence, which we obſerve in them, 'proceeded from the r Soul, they would have a 'greater Perception and Underſtanding, than the 'moſt knowing amongſt Men, who cannot com-'prehend the Motions and different Parts there-'of *.'

Now, I cannot ſee for my Life, what Foundation this honeſt Father builds upon, to think, that a Thing cannot be, becauſe it is above the Reach of human Knowledge. What! becauſe our Underſtanding cannot comprehend how a Grain of Corn ſprouts out and grows in the Earth, muſt we ſay, that it does not grow? In reality,

We ſee ſometimes that even Homer *nods* †.

I am perſuaded it is with great Philoſophers, as it is with great Poets; they ſometimes loſe themſelves. What would *Mallebranche* have ſaid if *Montagne* had aſſerted, that the Soul could not be immortal, becauſe he could not comprehend how it

* Mallebranche, Recherche de la Verité, Liv. IV. Chap. 7. pag. 432.

† Aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus. Hor.

it could be ſo? He would certainly have told him; 'You have no right to deny that a Thing may 'be, becauſe you cannot conceive how it is made. 'All that you have a right to do, is to deny 'that a Thing can be, when you evidently know 'that it is impoſſible.' Thus, though Father *Mallebranche* cannot conceive how Brutes can have a material Soul, he has no right to affirm as he does, that 'it is in a mechanical manner, and 'without any real fear, that they avoid every 'thing that would hurt or deſtroy them; that 'they eat without Pleaſure, and cry out without 'Pain; that they grow without being ſenſible 'of it, that they deſire nothing nor fear nothing;' and that they are in ſhort, meer Machines, under the Care and Direction of the Deity.

The more I examine this Opinion, the more extravagant I find it, and contrary to all our Ideas of Things. The leaſt Animals that we know of, an Ant, or a Bee proves this Opinion to be falſe, which has no other Foundation than the pretended Belief of the Impoſſibility of the Materiality of the Soul. I aſk, if it is not as probable, that God ſhould give Perception to certain Atoms, and fine Particles of Matter, as to put it into the Power of Machines to act with ſo much Wiſdom, as to appear intelligent Creatures? But, I ſay further, and can maintain it, that Brutes have Souls that are capable of performing all the Operations that the Mind of Man is capable of; 'firſt, of 'Conception; ſecondly, of reaſoning or collecting their Thoughts; and thirdly, of drawing juſt 'Conſequences therefrom.' I perceive diſtinctly theſe three different Operations in a Dog, when I am teaching him to jump over a Stick; when he jumps over it, I coax him; there is his firſt Thought; but when he will not jump, I beat

him; there is his ſecond Thought; upon this he does not fail to leap over the Stick; and that is the Conſequence of his two former Thoughts. Thus, the Actions of the Dog may be reduced to the following Form of Argument. 'If I jump 'over the Stick, I am coaxed; if I do not jump, 'I am beaten; therefore I will jump over it.

If Brutes be meer Machines incapable of Senſe or Knowledge; if they can feel neither Pain, nor Pleaſure, let the *Carteſians* give me a probable Reaſon, to ſhew that a Dog that dies of Grief upon his Maſter's Grave, is inſenſible of Friendſhip or Compaſſion. 'If God has formed Ani-'mals in ſuch a manner, that they avoid only 'mechanically, and without any fear whatever 'would hurt and deſtroy them;' why does not the Dog reſiſt that Motion of Grief, that occaſions his Death? Why does he not eat, but refuſes the Food that is given him? How is it that his ſorrowful and down-caſt look declares what oppreſſes his Soul? In truth, to maintain ſeriouſly that Brutes are meer Machines, or a Species of Plants, is to maintain a Paradox beyond all Senſe and Reaſon.

If Brutes then have a material Soul, Senſation is not incompatible with Matter; nay, it is ſuſceptible of Senſation; and who can then deny, but that God can ſubtilize and purify it to ſuch a Degree, as that it may equal the Knowledge, which we obſerve in the Souls of Men?

SECT. XV. *An Anſwer to an Objection of the* Carteſians *againſt the Materiality of the Soul.*

'IF the Soul were corporeal, ſay the *Carte-'ſians*, it would be diviſible into many Parts,

'every one of which would alſo be a Soul. Thus 'the Soul of a Horſe would really contain a mul-'titude of Souls to which Unity could not be 'applied, but in the manner it is applied to a 'Machine, or to a Confederacy of Men of the 'ſame Sentiments. ——— There are ſome Ani-'mals, whoſe Parts being ſeparated have each of 'them Motion and Senſation; from whence it 'is concluded, that the Soul of every Brute is 'not the ſole Principle of their vital Actions. 'A great many of the Schoolmen ſuppoſe, that 'the Soul of a Dog, though it be material, is 'indiviſible; which is abſurd. Others ſay, it is 'compoſed of integral Parts. Now, is not this 'in reality ſaying, that the Soul of Brutes is an 'Aſſemblage of many Souls; as the Body of Brutes 'is an Aſſemblage of many Bodies?'

Theſe Objections have not the Force that the *Carteſians* imagine they have. For God has Power to give, to any certain Number and Quantity of Atoms, the Faculty of Perception and Senſation, when they are connected together, in ſuch a manner as he thinks fit; and he may ordain at the ſame time, that as ſoon as this Connection is diſſolved and broken, thoſe very Atoms ſhall become inſenſible.

But may not ſome ſay, *you compoſe a ſenſible Whole of inſenſible Parts, which cannot be.* I anſwer, that the Parts or Atoms, which compoſe the Soul, are not without Senſation ſo long as they are connected together, in the manner God has done it, to conſtitute the Nature of the Soul, but that they loſe that Senſation, whenever they are diſunited, and God permits them to be deſtroyed. And let none think it a ſtrange Thing that I maintain, that God can communicate Senſation to that fine and ſubtile Matter, of which

the Souls of Brutes are formed, and that afterwards he deprives it of it again. For it is a very eaſy think for him, who was capable of making that Matter think, being modified after a certain manner to deprive it of Senſation, when the Figure, Form, and Situation of it are changed, and there happens a Diſſolution of the Connection of its Parts; and it is by this Diviſibility, that we can eaſily account for the Mortality of the Souls of Brutes. But ſome may object further, and ſay, 'If you allow that a material Soul may be deſtroyed by Diviſibility, the Soul of Man muſt be mortal, if it be material; for all Matter is diviſible.' In anſwer to this Objection, I am going to ſhew you, Madam, that our Souls may be material, and yet indiviſible for two Reaſons. I ſhall alſo ſhew afterwards, that though there be *Animals, whoſe Parts being ſeparated have each of them Motion and Senſation*, yet none have therefore a right to conclude therefrom, that *the Soul of every Brute is not the ſole Principle of their vital Actions, provided they have a Soul, and it be material.*

SECT. XVI. *That the Soul of Man conſiſts of two Parts, of which the one is rational, and the other irrational.*

THE Soul of Man may be divided into two Parts, whereof the one is rational, and the other ſenſitive. By the rational Part of the Soul, I mean the Mind or Underſtanding; and by the ſenſitive Part, I mean a Heat diffuſed through all the Parts of the Body, which Phyſicians and Philoſophers call *Calidum Innatum*, and which we uſually call the Vital Spirits. Theſe Spirits are the Principle of our Life; for when our Blood is

taken from us, we die; becauſe the vital Spirits are principally in the Blood; with which they perpetually circulate, giving and diffuſing, by that means, Life to every Part of the Body. On the other hand, the rational Soul has its Reſidence in one ſingle Part, where it performs its Operations. Some ſay, that it reſides in the Brain, others in the pineal Gland, others in the Breaſt, and others in the Heart.

Far from dwelling long upon this impenetrable Queſtion, I ſhall ſuppoſe with them, againſt whom I am diſputing, that it is in the Brain, or in the Heart, or where elſe they pleaſe. But at the ſame time, I ſhall maintain that it may be material, and incapable of being divided. The firſt Reaſon, that I alledge for this, is taken from the Omnipotence of God, who can, if he pleaſes, cauſe certain Parts of Matter to be connected and joined together in ſuch a manner, as that no Force or Power whatever can ſeparate them; and though they may be divided in Imagination, they cannot be ſo in reality, God ordaining that their Connection ſhould ſubſiſt eternally. Thus theſe fine Particles, which form the Soul in the Brain, not being ſubject to any Diſſolution, the Soul ſhall be immortal, though it be material.

My ſecond Reaſon for the Indiviſibility of the material Soul, is a Conſequence of the Indiviſibility of Atoms. Let us ſuppoſe that our reaſonable Soul is only one of the ſmalleſt Atoms that lodge in the pineal Gland; this Atom being in its Nature indiviſible, the Soul of conſequence muſt be indiviſible alſo. Thoſe who maintain that the Soul is a Subſtance, that has neither Extenſion, nor Breadth, nor Depth, will certainly find no fault with my making the Soul to conſiſt of one ſingle Atom, ſince it is ſomething that falls much more under

the Cognizance of the Senſes than an incorporeal Subſtance. However ſmall this Atom may be that forms the rational Soul, thoſe which compoſe the ſenſitive Soul (which we call the animal Spirits) may nevertheleſs act upon it. Thus we can conceive how the rational Soul can join with, and be united to every thing that the ſenſitive Soul feels or partakes of, ſeeing it may receive Impulſes therefrom; whereas it is impoſſible to conceive, how a Subſtance which is not extended can act upon Matter, and Matter upon that which is not material.

Thoſe Philoſophers, who maintain that the rational Soul is an unmixed immaterial Being, and who deny the Exiſtence of a ſenſitive Soul, are obliged to inveſt the Soul with two contrary Faculties. This muſt be ridiculous; for it is abſurd to believe that a Thing can be contrary to itſelf. For how can we make out this perpetual Conteſt, which is between the Senſes and the Underſtanding; that is to ſay, between the rational and the ſenſitive Part, to be in an unmixed Soul? *I ſee*, ſays the Apoſtle, *another Law in my Members warring againſt the Law of my Mind* *. And the Syſtem, which admits of a rational and ſenſitive Soul is far from being contrary either to Reaſon, or revealed Religion. The Divines are of this Opinion, but under different Names, when they divide the Soul into two Parts, the ſuperior, and inferior. But it is in vain to ſuppoſe, that Man, having two Souls, can ſubſiſt after the Diſſolution or Deſtruction of one of them, by ſaying, that if he has a ſenſitive Soul as brute Animals have, he may live (though his rational Soul be deſtroyed) ſuch a Life as thoſe Animals do. For in anſwer to this, I ſay, that God has united the rational and ſenſitive Soul together, in ſuch a manner, that as ſoon

* Rom. vii. 23.

ſoon as the rational Soul departs from the Body at the Call of God, the ſenſitive Soul is deſtroyed by the Diſſolution of its Parts. But ſome may ſay perhaps, that as Brutes have but one Soul, there is no reaſon to believe that Men have two *. This Difficulty I am going to ſet in a clear Point of Light, ſo that by anſwering thoſe Philoſophers, who make this Objection, you may alſo ſee the Solution of another Argument, that is made uſe of by the *Carteſians*.

'If brute Animals, ſay they, are capable not 'only of Senſe, but alſo of Knowledge, they muſt 'needs have two Souls. For, if they have only 'the ſenſitive Part, which is diffuſed throughout 'the whole Body, in proportion as we cut off 'any Part of their Body, we ſhould cut off a 'Part of their Underſtanding; But we ſee that 'Animals that are cut in two, have Life equally 'in both the ſeparated Parts. If you anſwer, that 'that they have only a ſenſitive Soul, you muſt 'then allow that it may be divided, and of con-

* A Difficulty alſo may be ſtarted upon the Arguments, which the following Paſſage ſufficiently clears up; ſo that I did not think it of ſo great Importance, as to inſert it in the Body of this Diſcourſe.

Some, perhaps, will ſay alſo, that Man would not then be a Whole of himſelf, *unum quid, unum per ſe, ſed duo*. But, if Man being compoſed of ſo great a Diverſity of Parts, be nevertheleſs ONE HIMSELF, as theſe Parts are very cloſely united; he may alſo, though compoſed of Body and Soul, be ONE HIMSELF, conſidering that one is the Power, and the other is the Act; or, if you will, the one is naturally fitted to receive, and the other to be received. The human Soul alſo will be one thing of itſelf, *unum quid per ſe*, conſidering that the ſenſitive Part will be as the receiving Power, and the rational Part as the Act received; and the Compound of them both will be afterwards an Act fit to be received into the Body, and to make therewith one whole of itſelf, *aliquid per ſe unum*; Though we ſay commonly, that every one of us is two; to wit, the inward Man, and the outward Man; or the ſpiritual Man, and the animal Man. *Bernier*'s Abregé de la Philoſophie de *Gaſſendi*, Tom. V. Liv. VI. p. 487.

'ſecuence it may be deſtroyed, or diminiſhed, A Dog, for Example, whoſe Leg is cut off, muſt have leſs Knowledge than another, ſeeing a Part of his Soul is taken away. A Man, who has loſt a Leg is not in that Condition, becauſe his Animal Spirits only are leſſened, or that Part of the ſenſitive Soul, which animated that Limb; but his rational Soul is not at all affected thereby.'

To this I anſwer, that it is not neceſſary for Dogs to have two Souls to be capable of Perception; and that by diminiſhing the vital Spirits of a Part of the ſenſitive Soul, which animated a Leg that is cut off, there is no Diminution made of the limited Knowledge, that God has beſtowed upon Brutes, which I undertake to prove thus.

God having created the Souls of Men to enjoy Immortality, deſigned to make an entire Difference between the rational and the ſenſitive Soul; ſo that the former ſhould ſuffer no Detriment at all by the Diſſolution of the latter. But it was not his Pleaſure to make that Differenee in the Souls of Brutes, which periſh abſolutely with their Bodies; he has only ordained that certain Spirits, which have a continual circular Motion with the Blood into the Heart, or ſome other of the nobleſt Parts, ſhould there cauſe certain Perceptions, which conſtitute the Knowledge or Intelligence of Brutes; which Knowledge ceaſes, as ſoon as the Circulation of the Animal Spirits is ſtopped in thoſe noble Parts. It is therefore eaſy to ſee, that tho' we cut off the Limb of an Animal, and he lives, and the Wound is healed again, we do not diminiſh his Intelligence, becauſe there always remains a Sufficiency of the Animal Spirits in the Body to work upon and affect the remaining Parts, or rather thoſe Springs to which God has annexed that Intelligence, which he has

has thought proper to communicate to Brute Animals. But whenever any one of theſe Reſources that are neceſſary for the Formation and Performance of the vital Operations, comes to be diſplaced or deſtroyed, then all Intelligence ceaſes, and the reſt of the Harmony, which the ſenſitive Soul performs, is deſtroyed alſo. We may obſerve every Day, that even in Men the rational Soul performing nothing for the Preſervation and Support of the Body, whenever the ſenſitive Soul operates but feebly upon the Parts of the Body, the rational Soul, I ſay, is ready then to take her Flight, and becomes in a Manner inſenſible to every thing that paſſes. In theſe Faintings, when the vital Spirits loſe their Motions, all Perception ceaſes, or at leaſt becomes extremely languid. Juſt ſo it is with Brute Animals; whenever the Spirits fail to operate upon the intellectual Parts, their Soul is diſſolved, and their Intelligence ceaſes. The only Difference that there is between Brutes and Men is, that the rational Soul being indiviſible, either by the Will of God, or of it's own Nature, receives no Detriment by the Diſſolution of the ſenſitive Part, but leaves the Body, and goes whither God calls it, the Moment a Man is deprived of Life, by the Ceſſation of the Animal Spirits.

The Principle of Underſtanding, both in Men and Brutes, has ſo little Dependance upon any ſeparated Parts of the ſenſitive Soul, or any of the vital Spirits, which are taken from the Whole, that we often ſee Men and Brutes loſe whole Limbs at once, and conſequently the Spirits that animated them, without their being ſenſible of it. Which could not happen, if the Underſtanding had an abſolute Dependance upon the vital Spirits, or conſiſted in a determinate Quantity thereof.

'We are told, ſays *Lucretius*, that the Rage of 'War cauſed the Invention of certain Chariots 'armed with Scythes, which in the Heat of an 'Engagement often cuts off Men's Limbs in ſo 'ſudden a Manner, that their Motion continues 'after their Separation. You may ſee them lie 'trembling full of Life upon the Ground, while 'the Suddenneſs of the Stroke leaves neither the 'Body nor the Mind ſenſible of the Pain; nay, 'ſometimes the Senſes are ſo far ſuſpended by the 'Eagerneſs of the Fight, that he that is mutilated 'goes to return his Blow, forgetting that he has 'loſt his Shield with his left Arm, which the ſharp 'Scythes have lopped off, and is fallen under 'the Chariot-Wheels, and trodden under the 'Horſes Feet. Another attempts to lay hold of, 'or courageouſly attack his Enemy, without be-'ing ſenſible that he has no right Hand. With 'the ſame Impetuoſity, another attempting to 'run, finds he has loſt a Leg in the Heat of the 'Engagement, while he ſees the Toes of his Foot 'ſtill quivering as they lie upon the Ground *.'

We may add, to what *Lucretius* here ſays of Men, what we ſee frequently in Animals †. A Dog,

* Falciferos memorant currus abſcindere membra
Sæpe ita defubito permiſta cade calenteis,
Ut tremere in terra videatur ab artibus id quod
Decidit abſciſsum. Cum mens tamen atque hominis vis
Mobilitate mali non quit ſentire dolorem:
Et ſimul in pugna ſtudio quod dedita mens eſt,
Corpore cum reliquo pugnam, cædeiſque petiſſit:
Nec tenet, amiſſam lævam cum tegmine ſæpe
Inter equos abſtraxe rotas, falceiſque rapaceis:
Nec cecidiſſe alius dextram, cum ſcandit & inſtat.
Inde alius conatur adempto ſurgere crure,
Cum digitos agitat propter moribundus humi pes.
Lucret. Lib. III. Ver. 642.

† With regard to this Subject, the Reader alſo may apply all thoſe Accidents that happen to Men in Battle, to Dogs, Bears, Tygers, and other ſavage Creatures, that are accuſtomed to fight together.

Dog, for Example, whoſe Leg, or Part of his Shoulder, a wild Boar ſnatches off, in making his Defence, follows the Combat as eagerly as ever. He ſeems inſenſible of the Pain, and violently ſeizes the Boar with the other Dogs, and ſometimes does not appear to be ſenſible of his Loſs, till his Enemy is quite killed.

Upon this, therefore, we may eſtabliſh two certain Principles; the firſt is, That in Men the ſenſitive Soul being diſſolved, cannot occaſion the Diſſolution of the rational Soul, ſeeing the firſt may be divided, and ſuffer Dimunition, or Change, or even Deſtruction in Part, and the reaſonable Soul, in the mean time, be inſenſible thereof. The ſecond is, That the Underſtanding of Brutes does not depend upon the Quantity, nor even the Totality of their vital Spirits, but upon thoſe which exiſt in certain Parts, to which it has pleaſed God to unite the Knowledge which he grants to Brutes. So that tho' one ſhould cut off a Dog's four Legs, and even many other Parts of his Body, it would not diminiſh his Underſtanding, only ſo far as the vital Spirits wherein his Underſtanding conſiſts, are immediately affected or damaged.

It is eaſy now to wipe off the Reproach with which the *Carteſians* upbraid thoſe who think Brutes have a material Soul. In ſome Animals, whoſe Parts being ſeparated, retain Life, there continues a Motion without Senſation in the Parts ſeparated, even until all the Spirits are entirely evaporated; but there is Senſation only in the Body, the Head, or the more noble Parts: So that when a Snake is cut in two, the Tail has only Motion; but that Part to which the Head is joined, if it be of any conſiderable Length, continues to have Senſation for ſome Moments. And if any ſhould ſay, that the Parts to which the Head is not

joined, ſeem to be ſenſible, when they are cut aſunder again, or ſtamped upon, we may ſay as the *Carteſians* do, when they would prove that Brute Animals have no Souls: *It is becauſe thoſe Parts avoid, after the Manner of a Machine, without Fear or Pain, every thing that is like to deſtroy them*: Becauſe God has given a Power to ſome Creatures to heal and join themſelves together, when they are not abuſed or divided too much. But tho' it were true, that theſe Animals, in which we ſee Motion, after they are cut aſunder, had no Faculty of re-uniting; granting, I ſay, that Fact, it would not follow from thence, that we divide the Underſtanding of an Animal, when we divide it's animal Spirits; on the contrary, we kill it intirely; and the Motion which we perceive in the ſeparated Parts, is only cauſed by the Spirits that are going off. Thus the Objection, that the Souls being corporeal would be capable of being divided into diverſe Parts, and that each of thoſe Parts would have a Soul, can have no Place even in Brutes; becauſe the Parts that are divided and ſeparated, are only meer minute Corpuſcles, which have neither Senſation nor Intelligence.

When the Head of a Man is cut off, it often happens that the Head when it is ſeparated from the Body, rebounds ſeveral Times above a Foot from the Ground, and often ſtirs for half a Quarter of an Hour. Will any one ſay, that this Head is capable of Senſation, becauſe the Animal Spirits which iſſue from it, put it in Motion? There are even Beaſts whoſe ſeparated Parts keep in Motion, and continue in it, a longer or a ſhorter Time, as the Animal Spirits which they contain, are diſſipated ſwifter or ſlower.

SECT.

SECT. XVII. *That the Soul is ſpiritual, and that we are obliged to believe that it is immaterial.*

I Have been ſhewing, Madam, that there is a Poſſibility of the Materiality of the human Soul. But tho' it might be material, reaſonable, and immortal, yet it has pleaſed God to make it ſpiritual, and of a Subſtance which is not perceptible by any of our Senſes. But this does not deſtroy the Syſtem which I have been explaining, of a rational and ſenſitive Soul. There is nothing contrary to the Chriſtian Faith in that, provided we believe the rational Soul, which is that which is immortal, and as one may ſay, the real Soul is incorporeal. Faith puts and End to all our Doubts. So that after having examined Things, we have nothing to do but ſubmit to it; the Belief of the Spirituality of the Soul, as taught in the Scriptures, containing nothing contrary to our natural Light and Reaſon. For tho' it be difficult for us to conceive an unextended Subſtance, yet the Certainty of the Spirituality of God may carry us to the Knowledge of the Immortality of our Souls. We know that ſomething exiſts, that is more perfect than Matter. We conceive that it is ſo; may not our Souls be of the ſame Quality with that Being? It is no more difficult for an Almighty Power to make the Soul ſpiritual, than it is to endue Matter with Thought; he that made all Things out of nothing, and can reduce all Things into nothing again, can make our Souls immaterial by a meer Act of his Will.

SECT.

SECT. XVIII. *Of the Immortality of the Soul.*

IT is as difficult to prove, to a Demonſtration, the Immortality of the Soul, as it's Spirituality; and tho' there be nothing contrary to our Reaſon in believing that God can preſerve a Being which he has created to all Eternity, yet there is no Proof from Philoſophy, which can evidently confirm it; and the only Aſſurance that we have thereof is from Revelation.

The *Epicureans*, who believed, that the Soul was formed by a fortuitous Concourſe of Atoms, as well as all other Beings, are poſitive that it is mortal. *The Body and the Soul*, ſays *Lucretius*, *are of the ſame Age; their inſeparable Alliance receives a mutual Augmentation, and Time ſubjects them both equally to the Infirmities of old Age. Is not every Man ſenſible that the ſpiritual Faculty is but of little Uſe in the tender and weak Bodies of Children? but that the Parts being fortified by the Increaſe of a more perfect Age, the Judgment comes to it's full Strength, and the Productions of the Mind are in Proportion to the Augmentation of the Body; but as ſoon as Time begins to make the Body feel the Shocks of Decay, and it's Strength grows feeble again, the Judgment loſes it's Stability; the Tongue is only a ſtammering Interpreter of a Mind relapſed into it's firſt Infancy; and as at the ſame time, the Cauſe ceaſes as well as the Effects, may we not juſtly conclude, that as Smoke vaniſhes in the Air, ſo the Soul, at it's Retreat, is not exempt from the Laws of Diſſolution* ?*

Is

* Præterea, gigni pariter cum corpore & una
Creſcere ſentimus, pariterque ſineſcere mentem.
Nam velut infirmo pueri, teneroque vaguantur

Cor-

Is it certain alſo that the Soul has ſuch a Connection with the Body, that when this is attacked by violent Diſtempers, that likewiſe feels cruel Tortures, and ſeem to preſage that the Deſtruction of the Body will be attended with her own, it often happens, that there is, as it were, a ſudden Conſpiracy formed within a Man againſt his Life; the Soul is immediately diſturbed in it's Operations; the languid Paleneſs of the Countenance denotes the Certainty of it's Diſſolution. It acts more or leſs, according as the Body has more or leſs Strength. The Mind and the Underſtanding follow the Courſe of the ſenſitive Soul! ſo that it ſeems to be that which determines their Duration.

The Materiality of the Soul furniſhed the *Epicureans* with many Proofs of it's Mortality. *The Mind*, ſay they, *being a Part of Man, Nature has given it a fixed Situation, as ſhe has to the Ears, the Eyes, and the other Senſes, which are the moveable Parts of Life. And tho' the Hands or Ears being ſeparated from the Body preſerve, for ſome time, the exterior Form of the Parts; yet they no longer have the Faculty of thoſe Senſes or Motions, which animated them. Thus the Exiſtence of the Mind does not conſiſt in it's own Strength; the Body muſt contribute to the Subtility of it's Nature, and the whole Man who is, as it were, the Veſſel of the Soul, contains it's delicate Eſſence, or elſe we muſt conceive ſome other*

Corpore; ſic animi ſequitur ſententia tenuis.
Inde ubi robuſtis adolevit viribus ætas:
Conſilium quoque majus, & auctior eſt animi vis:
Poſt ubi jam validis quaſſatu eſt viribus ævi
Corpus; & obtuſis ceciderunt viribus artus:
Claudicat ingenium, delirat linguaque menſque
Omnia deficiunt & uno tempore deſunt.
Ergo diſſolvi quoque convenit omnem animi
Naturam, ceu fumus in altas aëris auras:
Quando quidem gigni pariter, pariterque videmus
Creſcere; & ut (docui) ſimul ævo feſſa fatiſcit.

Lucret. de Rerum Natur. Lib. III. Verſ. 445, & ſeq.

other thing, which being more inſeparably united with with it, preſerves and keeps it from Deſtruction; which cannot be, ſeeing the Body is the only Veſſel which contains the Soul, and that their Union is ſo cloſe, that it cannot be diſſolved, but by their joint Deſtruction *.

The Opinion of the *Epicureans* concerning the Mortality of the Soul was a neceſſary Conſequence of their firſt Principles; it had been abſurd to ſay, that a Thing formed by Chance could become an eternal and incorruptible Subſtance, as every Thing that has a Beginning muſt neceſſarily have an End, unleſs the divine Will is pleaſed to endue it with Immortality. Now the *Epicureans* admitting of a Deity only for Form's Sake, and that they might not bring the Reſentment and Rage of the People upon them, were far from believing that the Soul was created by the Will or Power of God.

The next Thing that I am going to examine, Madam, is whether or no, by admitting the Deity to be a ſpiritual, good, intelligent, juſt, and powerful Being, it would follow that the Soul muſt neceſſarily be immortal? To give this Queſtion a larger Extent, we muſt conſider the Soul as an incorporeal Subſtance, becauſe if it can be proved that a ſpiritual Subſtance may not be eternal, it will be very eaſy to make an Application of all thoſe Proofs to an extended Subſtance, which of conſequence is much more ſubject to Diviſion and Deſtruction.

* Et quoniam mens eſt hominis pars una, locoque
Fixa manet certo, velut aures, atque oculi ſunt,
Atque alii ſenſus, qui vitam cunque gubernant:
Et veluti manus, atque oculus, nareſve ſeorſum
Secreta a nobis nequeunt ſentire, neque eſſe:
Sed tamen in parvo linguuntur tempore tali.
Sic animus per ſe non qui ſine corpore, & ipſo
Eſſe homine, illius quaſi quod vas eſſe videtur:
Sive aliud quidvis potis eſt conjunctius ei
Fingere, quandoquidem connexus corpore adhæret.
Lucret. Lib. III. Ver. 550.

ſtruction. I told you before, Madam, that when any object that the ſpiritual Soul, being neither compounded nor diviſible, cannot be deſtroyed; that Argument * *can have no Force, only ſo far as we ſuppoſe the Creator deſigned it ſhould be immortal, ſeeing he who creates a Thing out of nothing, whether it be ſpiritual or corporeal, may appoint a Time when it ſhall return again into nothing. Except any can imagine that it requires a great deal more Power to create a Being than to annihilate it; and that God has apprized certain Philoſophers, and the* Carteſians *in particular, how far his Power extends.* If they have therefore no certain Knowledge of the Immortality of the Soul, but by Revelation, they have no Grounds to pretend to prove it by Reaſons ſupported meerly by the Light of Nature. I believe the Immortality of the Soul as much as they do; but I maintain that it cannot be demonſtrated to be ſo, by evident Proofs, if we only make uſe of ſuch as Reaſon affords us. When I attentively conſider the Nature of the Soul, far from being convinced that it muſt be eternal, it ſeems rather to give me Marks of the Poſſibility of it's End. I obſerve the Soul ſometimes to continue a long while without Action or Thought; and I conclude from thence, that if it can remain ſome Hours without thinking, without having any Knowledge of itſelf, it may, in Proceſs of Time, come to reſt in an eternal Lethargy.

Methinks, Madam, I now hear the *Carteſians* begin to ſay in a Fume, 'What does the Soul 'ſometimes ceaſe to think? That is advancing a 'pleaſant Abſurdity; it is as much as to ſay, that 'Matter ſometimes ceaſes to be extended. This 'laſt Aſſertion is as little ridiculous as the other; 'for in ſhort, if Extenſion be the Eſſence of Mat-

'ter,

* See the twelfth Section aforegoing.

'ter, Thinking is the Eſſence of the Soul.' I aſk theſe Philoſophers that are ſo forward to condemn whatever is contrary to their Sentiments, who has diſcovered to them the Nature of the Eſſence of a Subſtance, of which they have only a confuſed Idea? For when we conſider Spirituality, the narrow Mind of Man can hardly conceive it any thing elſe but *a Negation of Matter* (if I may make uſe of ſuch a Phraſe) and I don't believe a *Carteſian* has much clearer Ideas of Spirituality than a *Gaſſendiſt* has of a Vacuum. We know certainly from Experience, that we think ſometimes; and we have a Right from thence to conclude, that there is ſomething in us that has a Power to think; but to be certain, that we think always, we cannot be, only ſo far as Experience convinces us of it. 'We know, ſays *Locke*, 'that the Soul in a waking Man is never without 'Thought, becauſe it is the Condition of being 'awake: But to know whether Sleeping without 'Dreaming be not an Affection of the whole Man, 'Mind as well as Body, may be worth a waking Man's Conſideration, it being hard to conceive that any ſhould think, and not be conſcious 'of it; if the Soul doth think in a ſleeping Man, 'without being conſcious of it, I aſk, whether 'during ſuch thinking, it has any Pleaſure or 'Pain, or be capable of Happineſs or Miſery? 'I am ſure the Man is not any more than the Bed 'or Earth he lies on; for to be happy or miſerable 'without being conſcious of it, ſeems to me to be 'utterly inconſiſtent and impoſſible: Or if it be 'poſſible, that the Soul can, while the Body is 'ſleeping, have it's thinking Enjoyment, and concerns it's Pleaſure or Pain apart, which the Man 'is not conſcious of, nor Partakers in; it is certain that *Socrates* aſleep and *Socrates* awake is

not

'not the ſame Perſon. But his Soul, when he 'ſleeps, and *Socrates* the Man, conſiſting of Body 'and Soul when he is waking, are two Perſons; 'ſince waking *Socrates* has no Knowledge of, or 'Concernment for that Happineſs or Miſery of his 'Soul, which it enjoys alone by itſelf, while he 'ſleeps without perceiving any thing of it; no 'more than he has for the Happineſs or Miſery of 'a Man in the *Indies*, whom he knows nothing at 'all of. For if we wholly take away all Conſci-'ouſneſs of our Actions and Senſations, eſpecially 'of Pleaſure and Pain, and the Concernment 'that accompanies it, it will be hard to know 'wherein to place perſonal Identity *.'

As long as this Quotation is, Madam, I could not well curtail it. If it does not prove, that the Soul does not always think, it renders that Queſtion at leaſt problematical; and I do not ſee why it is more neceſſary for the Soul to be always thinking, than it is for the Body to be always in Motion. There is nothing more abſurd than to pretend to convince a Man who ſleeps without Dreaming, that he has been thinking all Night long, and enjoying Pleaſures, without having the leaſt Trace of Remembrance of them when he awakes. If a Man aſleep, as *Locke* ſays, has a continual Succeſſion of Thoughts, without knowing them, the Man aſleep and the Man awake are not the ſame; there are two different Perſons in him, one who perhaps is always unhappy awake, and the other who is always happy in his Sleep; ſo that a Porter, who has lived fourſcore Years, has paſt half his Time a miſerable Porter awake, and the other half a happy Gentleman aſleep; and yet the Porter never knew any thing of the Happineſs of the Gentleman, nor the Gentleman

* *Locke*'s Eſſay upon human Underſtanding, Lib. II. Cap. I.

tleman the Miſery of the Porter. But ſome may ſay, that People dream, but don't remember it; and that the Soul in Sleep has Thoughts which the Memory does not retain. Whenever the Soul thinks we are ſenſible of it; the Dreams which we take notice of are evident Proofs of it; and a Man muſt be very credulous to perſuade himſelf, that the Soul in a Man whom we awaken, loſes in an Inſtant all the Ideas it had a Minute before, ſo that the leaſt Trace of them does not remain, and that the Memory cannot recal one ſingle Circumſtance.

The Philoſophers, who maintain that the Soul is always thinking, will allow me to ſay, that I think it very merry that they ſhould aſſure me, that I am thinking in thoſe very Moments that I do not know that I am. If they have no other Proofs to alledge than that which they draw from the Definition, which they give of the Eſſence of the Soul, I deſire them to conſider, that I ought not to believe any thing to be evident, that is grounded upon doubtful Principles; nor look upon that as a Proof which I know to be uncertain. Were I to make uſe of that way of reaſoning, I might eaſily prove, that the Statue of the Woman of *Samaria* at *Verſailles* always thinks; I have only to ſuppoſe, that Fountains always think, ſo long as they ſpout out Water, and from thence draw an inconteſtable Conſequence, that the Statue of the Woman of *Samaria* at *Verſailles* always thinks. No Hypotheſis ought to be built upon dubious Facts, or rather, nothing ought to be alledged as a Proof which is diſputable.

If the Soul be intirely at reſt for many Hours together without thinking, or having any Knowledge of it's Exiſtence in a Sleep like that of the Body, why may not it, as well as the Body, one Day

Day undergo an eternal Death, ſeeing it is ſubject to a momentary one? We muſt therefore honeſtly own, that we have no certain Proof of the Immortality of the Soul but from Revelation. The *Jews* had a Sect among them, who never ſeparated from their Communion, who held the Soul to be mortal; and we muſt own, that if Revelation did not fix our Doubts, it would be very hard to conceive a Thing which had a Beginning, and yet muſt have no End. And yet the Immortality of the Soul, though hard to be conceived is not contrary to Reaſon; which ſhews us, that God, who has Power to create a Subſtance, be it material or ſpiritual, has doubtleſs a Power to prolong its Being as far as he think fit, and even to all Eternity if he pleaſes. Thus it is in the Will of the Deity, only that we muſt lodge the Proof of the Immortality of the Soul. All the Proofs that we can draw from Nature, and its Eſſence are uncertain, and, far from being demonſtrable, depend more upon the Authority of the Vulgar, than the firm Belief of Philoſophers*.

SECT. XIX. *Whether or no the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul be eſſential to the Character of an honeſt Man?*

IT would ſeem, at the firſt Sight, as if a Perſon, who neither fears nor expects any thing after his Death, can be under no reſtraint of Dread; and that conſequently he may commit the greateſt Crimes without Remorſe.

I own, and it is a thing that cannot be doubted of, that the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul, is

* Cum de animorum æternitate diſſerimus, non leve momentum apud nos habet conſenſus hominum aut timentium inferos, aut colentium; utor hâc publicâ perſuaſione.

Senena Epiſt. CXVII.

is neceſſary to reſtrain People of a low and vulgar Rank within juſt Bounds; who being bred up in ſordid Notions, act more like Slaves than free Agents endued with Reaſon; which teaches us to love Virtue for her own ſake, as being the moſt perfect Good we can acquire. But I think alſo, and Experience juſtifies my Opinion, that among People of higher Stations, the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul is a Qualification no ways neceſſary for them to become, or to be eſteemed Men of Virtue and Honour.

Many Heroes, Philoſophers and Poets, who have believed the Mortality of the Soul, have ardently deſired to immortalize their Names. This Deſire was ſufficient to excite them to perform glorious and virtuous Actions. *Epicurus*, who was one of the greateſt Oppoſers that ever was of the Immortality of the Soul, was alſo one of thoſe ancient Philoſophers who lived moſt examplarily; the Regularity of his Conduct, his good Nature, and his Integrity forced the Stoics to own, that his Morals were unblameable. *Seneca* who was bred and brought up in a Sect, that was always oppoſite to that which *Epicurus* eſtabliſhed, has done Juſtice to the Merit of this Philoſopher *, and the Excellency of his Precepts. The ſame *Seneca* alſo ſays, that ſome of thoſe who followed the Doctrine of that Philoſopher, did not become baſe and lewd People, becauſe they had embraced his Tenets, but becauſe they were ſuch by Nature and Inclination. *Epicurus*'s Pleaſure was of the ſober, circumſpect, and even of the ſevere kind.

* Mea quidem ſententia, et hoc noſtris invitis popularibus dicam, ſancta Epicurum et recta præcipere; et ſi propiùs acceſſeris, triſtia.

Seneca de Vita Beata, Cap. XII.

kind *. Some Fathers of the Church alſo give him great Encomiums; St. *Jerom* in particular had a great Eſteem for him. And St. *Auguſtine* owns frankly, that he ſhould have preferred him to all the other Philoſophers, if he had maintained the Doctrine of Rewards and Puniſhments in the World to come †. *Lucretius*, the celebrated Follower of *Epicurus*, lived always in a plain, ſober and frugal manner. The Chancellor *de l'Hopital* alſo believed the Soul to be mortal, or at leaſt it is ſaid ſo ‡; and yet he was a very honeſt Man, and lived amongſt a great Number of Raſcals, who believed it to be immortal.

If the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul was abſolutely neceſſary to the Character of an honeſt Man, this Perſuaſion would depend upon ourſelves, as the Acquiſition of Virtue depends upon us; without which we ſhould not be in a Capacity of being honeſt Men, and they only would be ſo, who had the Happineſs to be convinced of this Truth. Now it does not depend upon ourſelves to believe this; and none can object, that thoſe People, who are not convinced thereof, are ſuch as are ſelf-blinded, and deſire that the Soul might periſh with the Body; on the contrary, they are ſuch as wiſh that it might be eternal. Neither are they

* Non ab Epicuro impulſi luxuriantur, ſed vitiis dediti luxuriam ſuam in Philoſophiæ ſinu abſcondunt, et eò concurrunt, ubi audiunt laudari voluptatem. Nec æſtimatur voluptas illa Epicuri; ita enim, mehercule, ſentio, cum ſobria et ſicca ſit; ſed ad nomen ipſum advolant, quærentes libidinibus ſuis patrocinium aliquod ad velamentum.

Seneca de Vita Beata, Cap. XII.

† Epicurum accepturum fuiſſe palmam in animo meo, niſi ego credidiſſem poſt mortem reſtare animæ vitam, et tractus meritorum, quod Epicurus credere noluit.

Auguſt. Confeſ. Lib. VI. Cap. XVI.

‡ Homo quidem doctus, ſed nullius Religionis, aut, ut verè dicam, [illegible]. Belcarius Commentar. Rerum Gallicar. Lib. XXVIII. Numb. 57.

they young Debauchees, who endeavour to ſtifle all Remorſe; but they are Philoſophers, who, on the contrary, take all reaſonable Pains to be convinced of its Immortality. *I take Pleaſure*, ſays *Tully* *, *in believing the Soul to be immortal, and if it ſhould not be ſo, I will always ſtrive to cheriſh that Sentiment in me.* And *Seneca* tells us, that he took delight in philoſophizing and meditating upon the Eternity of the Soul; and that he was fond of believing that pleaſing Opinion †, which had been rather aſſerted than proved by many great Men.

Men do not always act conformably to their Belief; ſome who have believed the Soul to be mortal, have lived a virtuous Life; others, who believed it to be immortal, have aſtoniſhed the World by their Crimes, and have trampled upon all Laws, both human and divine. *Cataline* had an Altar in his Houſe erected to an Eagle, to which he offered Sacrifice, with great Reſpect and Superſtition, whenever he was about to Attempt any notorious Crime ‡. *Nero* paid great Devotion to the Image of a little Child, to which he offered Sacrifice three Times a Day. A great many others of moſt flagitious Lives, have been very ſuperſtitious, and yet were perſuaded of the Truth of the Immortality of the Soul. *Lewis* XI. believed in the Doctrine of Rewards and Puniſhments hereafter; but for all that he was a very

* Me verò delectat, idque primùm ita eſſe; deinde etiam, ſi non ſit, mihi tamen perſuadere velim.
Cicer. Tuſcul. Quæſt. Lib. I.

† Juvabat me de æternitate animarum quærere, imò mehercule credere. Credebam enim ſacris è opinionibus magnorum virorum gratiſſimam promittentium magis quam probantium.
Senec. Epiſt. CII.

‡ Quam venerari ad cædem proficiſcens ſolebas, à cujus altaribus ſæpè iſtam dextram impiam ad necem civium tranſtuliſti.
Cicer. Orat. I. in Catil.

very wicked Man while he ſtaid here. He ſuited his Religion to his Deſigns, rather than his Deſigns to his Religion. *Brantome* tells us, that this King, one Day ſaying his Prayers before the Altar of the Virgin *Mary*, was heard to repeat the following Words, *O my good Lady, my little Miſtreſs, my dear Friend, in whom I have always repoſed my Confidence, I beg of thee to pray to God for me, and to be my Advocate with him, that he would forgive me the Murder of my Brother, whom I cauſed to be poiſoned by the wicked Abbot of* St. John's; *I confeſs this to thee as to my good Miſtreſs* †.

It is not their Religion or Belief then that determines Perſons of a certain Rank to follow the Paths of Virtue and Probity. The Temperament of the Body, Education, and the Love of Fame have a great Share therein. *Spinoſa* moſt certainly diſbelieved the Immortality of the Soul; and yet all that knew him allow that he was a very honeſt Man. All the *Hollanders*, with whom he lived, were Witneſſes of his circumſpect Life and Morals. The *Jew*, who, in the Heat of his Zeal, attempted to ſtab him with a Knife as he came out of the Synagogue, was perſuaded of the Immortality of the Soul, and his Crime was a Conſequence of his Belief.

Upon the whole, Madam, though I tell you that the Belief of the Immortality of the Soul is not neceſſary to form the Character of an honeſt Man, I would not have you think I am an Heretic. For though we may be virtuous and follow this Opinion, yet being of that Belief we can neither be Chriſtians, nor indeed be perfectly perſuaded of the Exiſtence of a God. And far from approving the Blindneſs of thoſe who maintain that crude Notion, I think that if we will reaſon

† Brantome Memoires vie de Charle. VIII. Tom. I. p. 30.

conſequentially, and examine Things coolly, we ſhall clearly ſee the Neceſſity of the Immortality of the Soul. It flows naturally from the undeniable Proofs of the Exiſtence of a God. And we muſt make no uſe of our Reaſon to believe, that the Deity, abſolutely good and powerful, who created Men, forbad them to do Evil, and commanded them to do Good, yet would not puniſh them for their Diſobedience; the moſt invincible Argument for the Immortality of the Soul, is the Proſperity and the Happineſs of the Wicked in this World. Their Felicity will paſs away like a Dream; and when they are ready to go out of this Life to another, they will then be ſenſible how weak the Arguments were, which they made uſe of to darken thoſe Truths, which would have been as Lights and Guides to them.

A learned Philoſopher, after having examined all that can be ſaid concerning the Nature of the Soul, and being truly convinced that there is no evident philoſophical Proof of the Immateriality and Immortality thereof, makes the following beautiful and wiſe Reflection. *Since the Reaſons* which are brought to prove that the Soul is immortal, are as ſtrong at leaſt, as thoſe on the other Side of the Queſtion, and as they are alſo ſupported by a divine Revelation, we ought not to heſitate a Moment, in adhering to the Opinion, which aſſures us of its Immortality.*

I believe, Madam, that you will be ſo favourable to me, as to think that I am a ſincere Man, and

* Profecto utcumque rationes immortalitati abſtruendæ allatæ, mathematicæ evidentiæ, ut ſumus initio teſtati, non ſint, eæ tamen ſunt, quæ non neminem bene affectum permoveant; quæ congeſtis aliis immortalitati impugnandæ præponderent; quæ denique ſuperveniente authoritate fidei, pondus, atque robur ineluctabile obtineant.

Syntagma Philoſ. Epicuri. P. Gaſſend. p. 72. Edit. in Quarto.

nd incapable of diſguiſing my Thoughts; I there-
ore aſſure you, that I am firmly perſuaded, that
my Soul is immortal. Is it poſſible, Madam, to
believe a Being which is capable of examining the
Queſtions, which are contained in this Treatiſe,
is nothing but an inconſiderable Vapour, deſtined
to vivify for a few Years, a vile Maſs of Matter?
The greateſt Proof of the Immortality of the Soul
ſhould be ſought for in the Nature thereof: when
I examine its Nobleneſs, its Grandeur, its Dig-
nity, I am more readily convinced of its Immor-
tality, than by all the Arguments of Divines. It
is impoſſible that God ſhould have created ſo noble
a Being, to perform the Functions, which are
allowed thereto here below; it muſt needs be
deſtined to ſome higher end. I am likewiſe con-
vinced that none but Malefactors, or vicious Per-
ſons, ſhould wiſh for its Annihilation: nothing is
more agreeable to a Man of Honour, than the cer-
tain Hope of Immortality; this is the greateſt Con-
ſolation that true Philoſophy affords; and this
ought to be that of every Perſon, who is governed
by Reaſon. I look upon the Deſire which wiſe
Men entertain, of rendering their Names immor-
tal, as a very ſufficient Proof of the Immortality
of the Soul. For whence comes it to paſs, that
the Soul ſhould have ſuch a natural Propenſity,
to look forward into Futurity, and have ſuch a
longing for Immortality, unleſs by an Inſtinct im-
planted therein by a Divine Being, and if it was
not deſtined thereto by its very Eſſence? We are
certain, that the Soul has an Intereſt diſtinct from
that of the Body, ſince we find by daily Expe-
rience, that what hurts the latter, amuſes and
pleaſes the former. A Man, for inſtance, who in-
commodes his Health by hard Study, nevertheleſs
ſatisfies his Mind. For what Reaſon then can

we imagine, that two Subſtances ſo different from each other, cannot have a ſeparate Subſiſtance, ſince even while they are united, they give viſible Signs of the Poſſibility of their being diſunited? In ſhort, have not we a right to ſay with *Cicero*, the moſt learned of all the *Romans*, and perhaps the fineſt Genius that ever the World produced*, that *when we perceive the Activity of our own Minds, the Remembrance of what is paſſed, the Foreſight of what is to come; when we conſider the great Number of Arts and Sciences, the wonderful Diſcoveries which they have made, we ought to be fully perſuaded, that a Nature which has in itſelf ſuch a Fund of great Things, muſt needs be immortal.*

SECT. XX. *A Recapitulation.*

I HOPE you will now own, Madam, that our Knowledge is confined within very narrow Limits. We are not only ignorant of the chief Secrets of the Nature of Things in general, but we are even perfectly ignorant of what relates to ourſelves. We have a clear Inſight only into ſuch Things as are neceſſary for the Conduct of our Life, and the Rule of our Actions. It ſeems as if the Deity had confined our Underſtanding within theſe narrow Bounds, only to give us the more occaſion to diſtruſt ourſelves and others; he has afforded us Reaſon, and has united thereto not the Privilege of diſcovering the Sources and Cauſes of Things, but of diſtinguiſhing what is Good from what is Bad for us. So that though the

* Quid multa? Sic mihi perſuaſi, ſic ſentio, cum tanta celeritas animorum ſit, tanta memoria præteritorum, futurorum prudentia, tot artes, tantæ ſapientiæ, tot inventa, non poſſe eam naturam quæ res eas contineat, eſſe mortalem.

Cicer. de Senect. Cap. XXI.

e Light of Nature does not diſcover to us cer-
in hidden Myſteries, it prevents us however from
ving Credit to a great many Falſities, provided
e will make uſe of it, and not ſuffer ourſelves
be blinded by the Authority of thoſe that would
npoſe upon us. The greateſt Genius's ſometimes
ffer themſelves to be miſled by Prejudices, and
dopt falſe or doubtful Conjectures for ſelf-evi-
ent Truths *.

There is another Rock to be avoided, if we
eſire a ſafe Paſſage, and that is, not to receive
ithout Examination a great many Facts, which
re ſupported by the Authority of Revelation. We
ught not to believe implicitly, except in Things
hat Reaſon cannot judge of, or upon which it is
ot in a Capacity to form a probable Deciſion;
ut where Reaſon can come at certain Know-
edge, it ought to be an abſolute Miſtreſs, and
ecide in a ſovereign manner; becauſe it is cer-
ain, that every thing that is contrary to the clear
nd evident Deciſions of the Light of Nature,
an never be a Revelation from God; for it would
e making him a Deceiver, to ſuppoſe that he ap-
oints any thing contrary to the Rules and Max-
ms which he has given us for the Diſcovery of
hat is true; were not this laid down as a cer-
in Principle and Foundation to build upon, there
here is nothing ſo extravagant, nothing ſo ab-

 ſurd,

* Ariſtotelis Doctrina eſt ſumma veritas quoniam ejus in-
llectus fuit finis humani intellectûs. Quare benè dicitur de
lo, quòd ipſe fuit creatus, et datus nobis à divinâ providentiâ,
t non ignoremus poſſibilia ſciri. *Averroes* might even have ſaid,
at Divine Providence had given us *Ariſtotle*, to teach us what
is not poſſible to know; for this Philoſopher not only teaches
the Things that may be known; but ſeeing we muſt be-
ve his *ipſe dixit*, his Doctrine being the *ſumma veritas*, the
ghеſt Truth, teaches us even thoſe things, that it is impoſſible
know.

Mallebranche Recherche de la Verité, Lib. III. Cap. III.

ſurd, but what ſome might call a Revelation, and muſt conſequently be implicitly obeyed *.

All Religions have their pretended Revelations. It is by examining them, and finding them contrary to the Light of Nature, that we reject and and refute them. Reaſon is then the Rule by which we muſt judge of the Validity of Revelations; and none can ſay, that we ought only to examine falſe Religions by it; for all might then make uſe of that Argument; and every Man by that means continue for ever in his Error, ſeeing he would not examine whether his own Syſtem was erroneous or not.

This, Madam, I think, is ſufficient to convince you, that we know but a few Things; and that it is abſolutely in vain for us to hope to obtain a clear and evident Knowledge of ſome Things. I ſhall think the time I have employed in compoſing theſe Diſſertations very well ſpent, if they have the good Succeſs to pleaſe you; and as you deſire I ſhould give you a few Hints concerning Judicial Aſtrology, I promiſe you, Madam, I will dedicate my firſt ſpare Moments to that Service.

* Indeed, if any Thing ſhall be thought Revelation, which is contrary to the plain Principles of Reaſon, and the evident Knowledge the Mind has of its own clear and diſtinct Ideas; there Reaſon muſt be hearkened unto, as to a Matter within its Province.

The End of the Fourth Diſſertation.

Phi-

Philoſophical Diſſertations,

Concerning the UNCERTAINTY of

HUMAN SCIENCES.

DISSERTATION V.

Concerning Judicial Aſtrology.

SECT. I. *The* INTRODUCTION.

I AM now come to treat, Madam, of a Science in which you ſeem to put the greateſt Confidence; and yet, (may I be ſo bold as to ſay it?) there is none more falſe, none more deceitful. Your Prejudices have hitherto hindered you from making uſe of your Reaſon. You have given too much much Credit to Stories and Fables, which were told you in your Youth. But I flatter myſelf I ſhall thoroughly convince you of your Errors; and I will ſhew you the Ridiculouſneſs of Judicial Aſtrology in ſo clear a Light, that I do not queſtion but that you will

deſpiſe it for the time to come, as much as ever the great and wiſe Ancients and Moderns have done. This fallacious Science has juſtly been regarded by ſuch great and wiſe Men, as the Inheritance of a Pack of Cheats, who for vile Intereſt having been duping others, and made Dupes of themſelves; they wrap up their Predictions in ſo obſcure a manner, and expreſs them in ſuch ambiguous terms, that like the ancient Pagan Oracles, they have always two or three different Meanings, and ſo may be explained as Times, Perſons, or their own Fancy ſhall make it neceſſary.

It was a Cuſtom once at *Alexandria*, for Aſtrologers to pay a certain Tax, which was called the Tribute of Fools, becauſe it was raiſed out of the Gain, that Aſtrologers and Fortune-tellers made out of the vain Credulity of their Followers. What would you think, Madam, of a Man who was to determine what he ſhould or ſhould not do by the Caſt of a Dye? Doubtleſs you would laugh at his Folly. The Deciſion of an Aſtrologer is full as uncertain as that of the Dice. *Whoever will attempt*, ſays a celebrated Author, *to gull the World, may be ſure to find Perſons enough who may be eaſily gulled; and the moſt ridiculous Fooleries will always meet with a welcome Reception in ſome Minds, ſeeing we obſerve ſo many People infatuated with Judicial Aſtrology. There is a Conſtellation among the Stars, which ſome have been pleaſed to call Libra, or the Ballance, which is no more like a Ballance than a Windmill; this Ballance is the Emblem of Juſtice; thoſe, therefore, who are born under that Conſtellation, will be juſt and equitable. However extravagant this ſort of Reaſoning may appear, it is certain there are ſome who make uſe of it, and others who are led by it.*

Here-

Heretofore People gave much more Credit to Judicial Aſtrology than they do now; many Perſons, by little and little, have been brought off from that vain Science; and the Study of ſound experimental Philoſophy has cured many of that Diſtemper of the Mind. The greateſt Genius's in all Ages, have juſtly complained of the Credulity of the Vulgar, and the cheating Tricks of Aſtrologers. *They are a ſet of Fellows*, ſays *Tacitus* *, *that gull Princes, and deceive all ſuch as believe in them; they have always been proſcribed the City, and yet are always retained.*

The greateſt Part of the World love to be made Dupes of, and the Generality are eaſily led away by Chimeras and extravagant Stories. The Vulgar are more affected with whimſical and romantick Notions, than plain Truth. They will excuſe every Thing in thoſe, that know how to deceive them agreeably, and excite their Curioſity. A Lye deſtroys the Reputation of an honeſt Man; it makes him ſuſpected of Falſhood, even when he ſpeaks Truth. But an Aſtrologer has a right to lye with Impunity; and many are ſo far from reckoning his Impoſtures a Crime, that they endeavour to palliate them by plauſible Arguments. If by meer Chance he happens but once to hit upon ſome notable Fact, that is enough to make all his random Gueſſes believed, that he ſhall pronounce in the Name of Fate ever after. There is no notice taken of the Lyes that he has confidently vented; Men only ſpeak of the Truth, that he hit upon by meer Chance. Does an Aſtrologer foretell the Death of a Prince? If it does not come to paſs, the Thing drops; no body at-

* Genus hominum, potentibus infidum, ſperantibus fallax, quod in civitate noſtra, et vetabitur ſemper et retinebitur.
Tacit. Hiſt. Lib. I.

tempts to ridicule the pretended Prophet; but if the Prince dies, People run in Crowds to the Conjurer to know their own Fate. There are very few, who take upon themſelves carefully to examine the Reality of Aſtrologers Skill and Learning; they rather on the contrary are eager to find out Arguments to palliate their own Credulity. *How many times*, ſays *Tully*, *have I heard Aſtrologers foretell to* Pompey, Craſſus, *and* Cæſar, *that they ſhould die in a very advanced Age, in the Boſom of their Friends, and arrive to the higheſt Pitch of Glory and Honour? Juſt the Reverſe of this Prediction befell them; and I cannot imagine how, after ſuch viſible Marks of the Falſhood of Judicial Aſtrology, any can be ſo ſtupidly credulous as to put any Confidence in their blind Gueſſes* *.

To what Purpoſe is it to deſire to know, what can never be known? God has not thought fit to reveal certain Secrets. Is it not ridiculous to think that he has communicated them to the Stars? An impertinent Curioſity has not a little contributed to put Judicial Aſtrology into vogue, and give it the Credit it has gained. We all readily believe what flatters our Hopes. Does Aſtrology promiſe us Riches, Honours, and good Succeſs? Is it not natural therefore for People to give Credit to it? And as for thoſe whom it threatens with Dangers, their Fears, Superſtition, and Care to avoid what is hurtful, are ſufficient to make them regard its Predictions, as Leſſons of Prudence and Circumſpection. There are few Perſons, who are abſolutely content with their preſent Condition, and are not fond of peeping into Futurity. They are

* Quam multa ego Pompeio, quam multa Craſſo, quam multa huic ipſi Cæſari, à Caldæis dicta memini, neminem eorum niſi ſenectute, niſi cum claritate, eſſe moriturum, ut mihi permirum videatur quemquam extare qui etiam nunc credat iis, quorum prædicta quotidiè videat re et eventu refelli.

Cicero de Divinat, Lib. II.

are Philoſophers who are of that Claſs. They are ſure they can get nothing by knowing, what muſt inevitably come to paſs, and that it is a vain thing to torment themſelves to no purpoſe. * *Jupiter*, ſays *Horace*, *has hidden future Events in the Abyſs of Obſcurity, and laughs at the Man, who is anxiouſly ſolicitous to know more than is fit and neceſſary for him to know.*

SECT. II. *That the Principles, upon which Judicial Aſtrology is founded, are ridiculous.*

THE Rules of Judicial Aſtrology are ſo vaſtly different concerning one and the ſame Subject, that it is impoſſible to form any certain Judgment from thoſe Rules. Many of them are even ſo ridiculous, that one cannot well tell how to go about to confute them ſeriouſly. Among the twelve Signs of the *Zodiac* there is one called the *Ram*, another the *Bull*, and a third *Capricorn*, which might as well have been called *Pigeon*, *Dog*, and *Cat*. But, *becauſe the Ram, the Bull, and the horned Goat are Animals that chew the Cud, thoſe who take a Purge when the Moon is in any of thoſe Signs, will be in Danger of having their Phyſic work upwards*; a Man muſt be a through-paced Aſtrologer to maintain ſuch Whimſies, and be an eaſy *Ignoramus* that can believe them. For the giving theſe Names rather than any other, to the Signs of the *Zodiac*, is meer Caprice and Fancy; and generally ſpeaking, they are no more like the Things they are called after, than a *Windmill* is like a *Swallow*. The Ancients, to accommodate themſelves to the Fictions of the Poets, pretended that Juſtice, diſguſted at the Scenes of

* Hor. Carm. Lib. III. Od. 29.

Wickedneſs, that are acted upon the Stage of this World, fled to Heaven; and on this chimerical Notion, we are told, that Women born under that Sign will be barren, or at leaſt ſubject to Abortions. Very good! Now ſuppoſe the ancient Poets had called that Sign *Canis*, which is called *Virgo*, would not Women, think you, have been in danger of running mad, when the Moon or ſome other Planet came to be poſited under that Conſtellation?

I would gladly hear an Aſtrologer tell me, how he knows that ſuch a Sign is more like a *Woman* than a *Church Steeple?* And where he will find Teleſcopes of ſuch Perfection as to be capable of ſhewing this Likeneſs, at the Diſtance probably of near *a hundred Millions of Miles?* Till then, I cannot ſee how he can be aſſured, that a Vomit will work kindly if taken when the Moon is in *Aries*; I have as good reaſon to maintain, on the other hand, that a Man will be in danger of ſpraining his Foot, if he dances then, becauſe the Sign, which he thinks is like a *Ram*, has more the Reſemblance of a *Dancer upon the Stiff-Rope*. Upon this Suppoſition, I can make Predictions, if I have a Mind, in the ſame manner that he does; where, amongſt a multitude of falſe ones, I may chance to foretell ſomething that is true. The Queſtion then will only be to know, whether his Science or mine be the beſt grounded; and whether or no there be not actually a *Dancer on the Rope* in the Firmament, as much as a *Ram*, or a *Crab fiſh*.

Mr. *Bernier* has gained the ſame Reputation and Glory, as all thoſe great Men have done before him, who have employed their Pens in ſhewing the Falſity of Judicial Aſtrology; and I am going, Madam, to quote a Paſſage in that Author,

Author, which will evidently demonſtrate to you the Folly of making thoſe twelve Houſes, into which Aſtrologers divide the ſtarry Heaven, and which, according to them, communicate their Influences to the Planets. *From whence*, ſays this Philoſopher, *do theſe Houſes take their Virtue? Perhaps you will ſay, from the moveable Heaven; but how comes it to paſs then, that ſome one Part of that moveable Heaven has a happy Poſition in one Houſe, and immediately an unhappy one in another? Does this proceed from the Place or Situation it is in? Or how can pure Space have ſuch Effects, and ſo different one from another? Let it not be ſaid, that it is not the Houſes, but the Planets in thoſe Houſes, that produce theſe various Effects; for as a Planet which is naturally benevolent becomes malevolent in an unfortunate Houſe; and one that is malevolent becomes much more ſo, I ask whence this Malignity is gained by being in ſuch Houſe* *?

Methinks you cannot but ſee, Madam, that Judicial Aſtrology muſt needs fall under the Weight of this Argument; can any thing be ſo ridiculous as to maintain, that meer Space can communicate ſo many different Effects, and give what it has not? I know you have more good Senſe than to aſſent to ſuch Chimeras, which are only founded in the vain Imaginations of a Set of People, who have no Taſte or Idea of the only true and rational Philoſophy.

SECT. III. *That it is impoſſible, that the Stars can determine the Happineſs, or Unhappineſs of Man.*

CONSIDER, Madam, that if the Rules of Judicial Aſtrology were certain, God would have

* Bernier, Abregé de la Philoſ. de Gaſſen. Tom. IV. p. 457.

have tied up (as one may ſay) his own Hands, and would have laid us under the greateſt Neceſſity imaginable. All our Actions, our moſt ſecret Thoughts, every Motion of our Bodies, would be graven in Heaven in indelible Characters, and we could not have the leaſt Mite of Free-Agency. We ſhould be neceſſitated to Evil as well as to Good; ſeeing we muſt abſolutely do whatever is written in the aſtral Book of Fate, or otherwiſe the Record would be falſe, and the Science of the Aſtrologer a Sham. Our Fortune depends upon Places, Perſons, Opportunities, and our Will, and not upon chimerical Conjectures, and the Fancies of Juglers.

Suppoſe two Men born under the ſame Poſition of the Planets; the one happens to be a King, the other a Porter; from whence ariſes this Difference? *Jupiter would have it ſo*, ſays the Aſtrologer. But what is this *Jupiter?* A Body that is not endued with Knowledge, and can only act influentially. How comes it to paſs then that it acts at the ſame time, and in the ſame Climate, in ſo different a manner? From whence ariſes this Influence? Or how can this Influence paſs through ſuch a vaſt Extent of Air? An Atom, the leaſt Portion of Matter may ſtop, turn aſide, and weaken theſe pretended Particles, which are ſaid to proceed from the Planets. Beſides, I would aſk whether or no, the Stars have one continued regular Influence, or that it varies according to the Seaſons? If their Influence is felt only at certain times, and when the Particles, which are emitted from them, fall upon us, how can the Aſtrologer know the preciſe time when that will happen, to foretell their Effects? If their Influence be continually regular, from whence come that prompt and active Force, ſo as to pierce through the vaſt extent

extent of Air, and make its way through all Matter that would ſtop or divert its Courſe, and join itſelf to the Quickneſs of our Paſſions, from whence the principal Actions of our Lives have their Source and Spring? For, if the Stars direct all our Sentiments, and govern our whole Conduct, their Influence muſt needs act with as much Rapidity, as our Will, ſeeing it is they which determine it; ſo that when a Lover reſolves to forſake his Miſtreſs, on account of a favourable Glance ſhe beſtows on his Rival, the Influence muſt be as quick as the Lady's Glance, and the offended Lover's Thought; as it is that which puts the one upon her Coquetry, and the other into a Fit of Diſdain or Deſpair; for Aſtrologers pretend, that even the minuteſt of our Actions are governed by the Stars; conſequently the Broils and Reconciliations of Lovers muſt be directed by them. And that indeed is one of the Maſter-Pieces of their Craft, and gains them the moſt Reputation in the World; every Lover has a Mind to know, whether or no his Miſtreſs be faithful to him; the Fair Sex are ſtill more curious than we are; and theſe Figure-flingers find no where ſo much Practice as among Lovers and their Ladies. Judicial Aſtrology impoſes upon People as much as Love does; and I think myſelf obliged in Conſcience to adviſe young Ladies to lay as little Streſs upon the Predictions of Aſtrologers, as they would do upon the Oaths of a faſhionable Coxcomb.

SECT. IV. *That Comets are no certain Preſages of future Events.*

YOU promiſed me, Madam, that you would read, *Bayle's Various Thoughts upon Comets*, atten-

attentively over, as ſoon as you were got through that charming Book, intitled, *Converſations concerning the Plurality of Worlds* *, which, you ſay, makes a Proficiency in Aſtronomy ſo eaſy to you. If you do ſo, the agreeable *Fontenelle* will furniſh you with previous Lights to diſcover the true Meaning of the learned and profound Mr. *Bayle*; and thus being made an Aſtronomer by the former, you will eaſily diſcover the Nullity of aſtrological Influences from the latter. He will ſhew you demonſtratively that Comets (which there is ſo much Noiſe about) are only common Phœnomena in the Courſe of Nature, and that they have no more Influence than the Stars or Planets. You will be convinced, when you have read his *Various Thoughts*, that it is no more ſurprizing, that Misfortunes ſhould happen after the Appearance of a Comet, than after the Riſing or Setting of the Sun; ſeeing, according to the common Courſe of Nature, there happen great Calamities every Year, in one Part of the World or other. *It is probable*, ſays this illuſtrious Author †, *that at whatever Hour a* Pariſian *looks out of his Window upon* le Pont Michael, *he will ſee People paſſing in the Street; and yet the Looks of this* Pariſian *has no Influence upon the People that paſs therein; every Perſon would paſs along juſt the ſame, as if the honeſt Man had never looked out of his Window. Thus a Comet has no more Influence upon Events; every Thing would have happened juſt as it did, though no Comet*

* I have omitted making a particular Diſſertation upon Aſtronomy, becauſe it is impoſſible for me to ſay any thing of the heavenly Bodies, that can come near the Beauty and Perſpicuity, that there is in thoſe Converſations. They that would learn ſo much Aſtronomy as is proper for Gentlemen and Ladies to know, may find abundant Satisfaction in that agreeable Book. I have endeavoured in theſe Diſſertations to imitate that Work, for which I have as great a Veneration, as *Statius* had for the *Æneid*.

† Bayle's Penſées diverſes ſur les Cometes, Tom. I. p. 42.

Comet had ever appeared, ſeeing its Influence operates not on human Affairs.

It would be eaſy to prove, that it is a Falſhood to ſay, that more ill Accidents fall out in thoſe Years wherein Comets appear, than at other times; and to be convinced of the uſual Courſe of Things, a Man needs only make an Eſtimate from Hiſtory, of what remarkable good or evil Events have been brought about upon the Earth in the Space of fifteen or twenty Years, immediately after the Appearance of a Comet; and he will find, by comparing them with fifteen or twenty other Years, at the greateſt Diſtance from any ſuch Appearance, that the Ballance will be nearly equal.

As for the Opinions of ſome Hiſtorians and Poets, who were great Admirers of Prodigies, I have ſhewn, in my firſt Diſſertation, how little regard ought to be paid to them. For indeed, if we were to attend all the Stories, which ſome weak People (who are but little acquainted with the modern experimental Philoſophy) fondly relate, we might with the ſame reaſon give Credit to the ſuperſtitious Fables of old Women; thirteen, or any other odd Number that Chance to ſit down together at a Table, the Overturning of a Salt-ſeller, or the Cracking of a Looking-Glaſs, are with ſome People Omens of the moſt dangerous Conſequence. But in Matters of Philoſophy, the Opinion of a *Bayle* or a *Gaſſendi* is preferable to the Teſtimony of twenty Hiſtorians, who know nothing of the Nature of Comets, but what they have read in other Hiſtorians as ſuperſtitious as themſelves; and we may obſerve, that the beſt Authors are generally the leaſt addicted to take Notice of Prodigies.

SECT.

SECT. V. *Of the Knavery and cheating Tricks uſed by Aſtrologers.*

THE Aſtrologers themſelves are ſo little perſuaded of the Reality and Verity of the Rules of their Art, that they reciprocally treat one another as Cheats and Impoſtors.

Cardan, that famous Aſtrologer, cried out mightily againſt a Set of cheating Raſcals, whom he accuſes of having ſpoiled and corrupted Judicial Aſtrology, by their Impoſtures and Folly. He pretends, that they fathered many Things upon *Ptolomy*, which are none of his. But this Reproach of *Cardan* is very merry and remarkable, for no body has invented more new Whims, which are no where to be found in *Ptolomy*'s Works, than he has done *.

Morinus, another Aſtrologer, a mortal Enemy to *Gaſſendus* (who laughed at his Predictions, and ſet the Falſhood of that Science in a clear Light) had a mind to eſtabliſh his ſhattered Reputation at *Gaſſendus*'s Expence. To do this, he made choice of a time, when that Philoſopher was very much incommoded with a dangerous Defluxion of Humours upon his Lungs; and thinking that he could not be cured, he had the Impudence to ſpread and publiſh in print, that *Gaſſendi*, who had

* *Cardan* was the Victim of his own Vanity. He calculated his own Nativity, and predicted his own Death at a certain Time; when the appointed Time drew near, and *Cardan* perceived no Signs of any Sickneſs, in order to preſerve his own Reputation, and that of Judicial Aſtrology, he ſtarved himſelf to Death. *Scaliger* and *Thuanus* vouched for the Truth of this Fact. The ſame *Cardan* likewiſe calculated his Son's Nativity, with a great deal of care. He advertiſed him in a long Writing what his Fate ſhould be, but took not the leaſt Notice, that he ſhould be hanged at the Age of twenty-four for poiſoning his Wife.

had made ſuch a Ridicule of Aſtrology, would die about the End of *July*, or the Beginning of *Auguſt* in the Year 1650. The Aſtrologer thought he ſhould ſtrike and terrify the Philoſopher by that Prediction; but he, not content with confuting Judicial Aſtrology by Reaſon and Argument, gave ocular Proof of the Falſity and Vanity thereof. For he recovered his Strength ſo well, that by the time the Aſtrologer had condemned him to fall a Sacrifice, for vilifying his Art, he never had his Health better in his whole Life. If *Gaſſendi* had chanced to have died, what Reputation, Madam, muſt the Aſtrologer have gained? And what a Triumph would they have made, who love to be cajoled by idle Chimeras? It is no extraordinary Thing, if theſe cheating Star-gazers and roguiſh Fortune-tellers ſhould ſometimes hit upon an Event, by gueſſing at Things with a ſhameleſs Confidence; it happens ſometimes that they blindly predict the Truth. What a ſtupid Archer, ſays *Tully*, muſt he be, who ſhoots a whole Day together, and does not ſometimes hit the Mark. An Almanack-maker predicts the Death of ſome crowned Head in *Europe*; if he happens to die, all the World ſpeaks of that Almanack; if he does not die, nothing is ſaid of it, no more than of many others, which are made in different Countries, in which other as notable Lyes had been predicted. Permit me, Madam, in concluding this Diſſertation, to adviſe you to deſpiſe all thoſe Sciences heartily, in which there is as little Certainty and good Senſe, as there is in Judicial Aſtrology.

A CRITICAL Examination of the Remarks OF THE Abbé *D'OLIVET*, of the *French* Academy,

Concerning the

THEOLOGY of the *Greek* Philoſophers:

WHEREIN

Many OBJECTIONS of this Academician againſt Mr. BAYLE are occaſionally anſwered.

SIR,

'YOU are deſirous that I ſhould ſend you the critical Examination which I have made of the Remarks upon *the Theology of the* Greek *Philoſophers*, I know not how to refuſe your Requeſt; therefore what follows is the Treatiſe which you deſired with ſo much Earneſtneſs. Do not imagine, that becauſe I criticiſe Abbé *D'Olivet*, I have not that Eſteem for him, that his

'his Talents and fine Qualities deſerve at our 'Hands; I look upon him as a Man of Learning, 'who does Honour to his Country, and as an ex- 'cellent Tranſlator. The Love of Truth only 'has determined me to vindicate Mr. *Bayle*, whom 'he has abuſed moſt unmercifully in many Places. 'Nor is it the Deſire of criticiſing an Academi- 'cian, who has gained a Reputation in the Re- 'publick of Letters, nor the Deſire of ſhining at 'the Expence of a famous Author, that has cauſed 'me to take my Pen in Hand. You will quickly 'perceive this by the Manner wherewith I have 'oppoſed the Opinions of Abbé *D'Olivet*. I have 'forborn as much as poſſible, not to let fall any 'Expreſſion too keen; however, as in the Heat 'of Diſputation our Imagination is too apt to lead 'us aſtray, I beſeech you, if you find in my Cri- 'ticiſm any Terms or Expreſſions, which ſeem 'unbecoming the Regard that the Abbé deſerves, 'to attribute them to Inadvertency. As to the 'Difference that there is between my Sentiments 'and his, I will leave you to judge which are moſt 'probable. I muſt ſuppoſe myſelf very far from 'being infallible; Experience has convinced me, 'and does convince me every Day, that every 'Man is too full of himſelf. Judge therefore 'between us impartially of this my Performance, 'without being biaſſed by Friendſhip. For what- 'ever your Determination may be, I ſhall con 'tinue to be, with the greateſt Reſpect and Since- 'rity,

Your very humble, &c.'

SECT.

SECT. I. *Of the Works which may be uſeful to underſtand the Theology of the ancient* Greek *Philoſophers.*

THE Abbé *D'Olivet* pretends, that in order to explain the Theology of the *Grecians*, we ſhould adhere chiefly *and with great Scrupuloſity to* Cicero *, *becauſe of all the Ancients, he has written beſt thereupon; there is nothing reached us upon that Subject, but the* Timæus *of* Plato, *and therein we meet with nothing but a particular Opinion. The little we meet with elſewhere, ſhould be looked upon as Fragments only; nay, we have Reaſon to ſuſpect, that even theſe are maimed or falſified; and Fragments can give no true Reſemblance of the Totality of a Syſtem, which ſuppoſes Variety of Principles.*

I cannot comprehend how the Abbé could advance ſo many ſtrange Paradoxes in the Compaſs of a few Lines. We have nothing according to him, *but the* Timæus *of* Plato, *wherein one Opinion only is explained, nothing but mutilated or falſified Fragments.* Before we examine what thoſe Works are, which he treats as worthleſs Fragments, let us view the entire Books which are ſtill remaining.

The Poem of *Lucretius* will allow us room to judge of the Opinions of *Democritus* and *Epicurus*. Have we not explained therein a particular Opinion full as amply as in the *Timæus of* Plato? The Abbé had no Ground to reject an Author more ancient than *Cicero*, ſince it is pretended that this Orator † reviewed that Work. In ſhort, be this

as

* Remarks on the Theology of the *Greek* Philoſophers, placed at the Beginning of the Tranſlation of the Dialogue of *Cicero*, concerning the Nature of the Gods, by the Abbé *D'Olivet*, p. 53.

† Titus Lucretius poeta naſcitur, qui amatorio poculo in furorem

as it will, it is certain we have in *Lucretius* the Syſtem of the *Epicurean* Philoſopher, as well explained at leaſt as that in the *Timæus* of *Plato*.

Will not the eight Books of *Ariſtotle*'s Phyſicks, and thoſe of his Metaphyſicks, ſerve to inform us of the Theology of the *Grecians?* This Philoſopher in ſeveral Places thereof refutes the Opinions of the Philoſophers, who preceded him, or were his Cotemporaries. He ought to have been as well acquainted with them, as *Cicero*, who did not live till ſome Ages after; at leaſt *Ariſtotle* had his own proper Syſtem, as may be learned from his Writings.

The Work, which *Xenophon* has compoſed under the Title of *Memorable Things of* Socrates, ought to be looked upon as a Book from whence may be gained great Light into the Theology of the Ancients. We have the Opinion of *Socrates* concerning the Nature of the Soul, the Being of God, *&c.* at length. We have here then a fourth Syſtem explained at large; for tho' *Plato* has borrowed many Things from *Socrates*, he yet differs from him in many Points; for the Abbé *D'Olivet* affirms, that *Plato* did not ſend human Souls into the Body of Beaſts; but according as they were good or bad, he ſuppoſed that they tranſmigrated into other human Bodies, wherein they were more or leſs happy. On the contrary, *Socrates* affirms * the Souls

rorem verſus, cum aliquot libros per intervalla inſaniæ conſcripſiſſet, quos poſtea Cicero emendavit, propria ſe manu interfecit, anno ætatis 44. Euſeb. p. 160. Whether what *Euſebius* ſays is true or not, it is certain that *Lucretius* died before *Cicero*, for this latter, writing to his Brother, makes an Elogium upon the Work of this Poet. Lucretii Poemata, ut ſcribes, non ita ſunt multis luminibus ingenii multæ tamen artis. M. Cicero ad Q. fratrem, Lib. II. Epiſt. II.

* I tell you, *Cebes*, for Inſtance, that the Souls of intemperate, brutal and laſcivious Men, and who obſerve no Rules of Decency, enter into the Bodies of Aſſes, or ſuch like Animals. Does

Souls of wicked Men entered into the Bodies of Brute-Animals.

Beſides theſe, there are many excellent Works, which will inform us of the Theology of the *Greeks*. *Plutarch*, who has wrote a particular Treatiſe of the Opinions of the Philoſophers, ought to be conſulted. Were *Porphyry*, *Plotinus*, who defended the Opinions of the ancient Philoſophers againſt the Fathers of the Church, ignorant thereof? Dares any body advance ſo ſtrange a Paradox?

The firſt Teachers of Chriſtianity, who attacked the *Pagan* Theology with ſo much Strength and Advantage, did they fight againſt Chimeras, and Monſters of their own Brain? Could theſe extenſive Genius's be ignorant of the Opinions which they attacked? Theſe great Men have left many very conſiderable Works, wherein the different Syſtems of the *Grecian* Theology are perfectly explained and refuted. How many excellent Things are to be met with relating to this Subject in the Apologies of *Juſtin Martyr*, and in the ſame Father's Exhortation to the *Greeks*; in the ſeveral Treatiſes of *Tertullian*, in the Oration of St. *Athanaſius* againſt the *Gentiles*, in the City of God of St. *Auguſtine*, in the *Stromata* of *Clemens Alexandrus*, and in the Works of ſeveral other Authors, ſuch as *Athenagoras*, *Hermias*, *Arnobius*, *Lactantius*, and *Euſebius*, wherein almoſt

Does not this Opinion ſeem to you to be probable? *Cebes.* Without doubt, *Socrates*, I think ſo. *Socrates.* And tho' Souls who have been fond of nothing but Injuſtice, Tyranny, and Rapine, will tranſmigrate into the Bodies of Wolves, Hawks, and Kites; can Souls of ſuch a Nature have any other Body fall to their Lot? *Cebes.* I think, *Socrates*, this is out of the Queſtion. *Socrates.* The ſame may be ſaid of the reſt; they will go into Bodies of Animals of a different kind, which ſhall be moſt ſuitable to their natural Diſpoſition. *Plato* in *Phædo*, quoted by *Pere Mourgue*, Tom. I. p. 495.

all the different Theological Syſtems of the *Greeks* are related and refuted. The *Cynick* Philoſophers take up the twentieth Chapter of the fourteenth Book of this Work; thoſe who, as the *Stoicks*, have admitted the Soul of the World, the twelfth of the fourth Book. Thoſe who have added ſome Modification to this Syſtem, and who were of Opinion, that the Souls of reaſonable Creatures were Parts of the Deity, the ninth of the fourth Book. Thoſe who held, that there were different Gods who preſided over the different Parts of the World, the tenth of the ſame Book. In the ſecond of the eighth Book, we ſee how *Plato* had acquired the Knowledge which rendered his Opinions leſs different from Chriſtianity than thoſe of the other Philoſophers. The Changes and Corrections which *Porphyry* had made in the Syſtem of *Plato*, are in the thirtieth Chapter of the tenth Book.

I confine myſelf to this ſmall Number of Examples, which ſhew the Uſefulneſs of the Book, entitled, *The City of God, for the Knowledge of the Theology of the ancient* Greeks. This Work of St. *Auguſtine* would doubtleſs have been the moſt eſſential that we have, if Time had not ſpared the Diſcourſe which *Theodoret* has made againſt the *Greek* Philoſophers. The Work of this Father is conſiderable enough to make a ſmall Volume in Folio, in which there is no Syſtem of the *Pagan* Theology, which is not related and refuted at large, with all poſſible Eloquence and Judgment. I have at this Inſtant *Theodoret* before me, and I am not afraid to advance, that the ſecond Diſcourſe concerning the *firſt Principle*, his third upon *Angels, upon the Gods and Dæmons*, his fourth on *Matter and on the World*, contain more eſſential Matters to enable us to judge of the Theology of the *Greeks*,

than in the whole Work of *Cicero* concerning the Nature of the Gods.

The Abbé *D'Olivet*, perhaps, will ſay, that *Cicero*, having lived before the Authors of whom I am ſpeaking, his Authority ought to be preferred to theirs. To this I anſwer, that tho' I ſhould allow, that we ought to prefer *Cicero* to all theſe ſage Writers, it will not thence follow, that we ſhould not conſult them, and look upon them as of no Value. Becauſe one good Author has treated upon a Subject, it is abſurd to aſſert that we ſhould take no notice of ſeveral others, who have alſo ſpoken in a very clear, very ample, and very rational Manner. What ſhall we ſay of a Man, who going to clear up a Point in *Roman* Hiſtory, ſhall content himſelf with conſulting *Livy* only, and will not vouchſafe to examine what *Plutarch* and other Hiſtorians have ſaid on that Subject? Doubtleſs his Conduct would be blamed, and his Prejudice cenſured. But I go ſtill farther, and I maintain, that the Antiquity of *Cicero* ought not to give him any Preference; for the Time elapſed between him and the other Authors is not very conſiderable.

When the Fathers of the Church wrote againſt the Theological Syſtems of the *Grecian* Philoſophers, the Diſciples of theſe very Philoſophers ſtill formed a conſiderable Body. Paganiſm, ſtill ſubſiſting, had in them zealous Defenders. The Followers of *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *Epicurus*, *Zeno*, were the greateſt Enemies of Chriſtianity; and could they be leſs verſed in the Opinions of their Maſter than *Cicero*? And could the Fathers, who attacked them, be leſs acquainted with their Tenets? Without doubt they had the ſame Means of being informed thereof as *Cicero* himſelf; the public Schools had been as open for them as him, the Voyage to *Athens* and *Greece*, had not been denied them, and three hundred Years, which were paſſed

ſince the Death of *Cicero*, did not prevent their Knowledge of the Opinions of the Philoſophers, whoſe Writings were ſtill extant at large, and whoſe Diſciples formed a numerous Sect. It is about two hundred Years ſince the Death of *Calvin*, and would it not be abſurd to pretend, that Mr. *de Boſſuet* and Mr. *Claude* were much leſs acquainted with the Opinions of this Divine, than Cardinal *Richlieu*, and Mr. *Martet*, becauſe theſe firſt Authors lived ſeveral Years after the latter? For we are not ſpeaking here of Perſons who were Co-temporaries. *Plato* died about three Centuries before *Cicero*, which is exactly the Caſe of Mr. *Claude*, who had no more ſeen *Epicurus*, *Plato*, *Ariſtotle*, *&c.* than the great Reformer *Calvin*, *Beza*, *Zuinglius*, &c.

The Opinion which I maintain againſt the Abbé *D'Olivet* is ſo clear and evident, that it ſeems plain to me, it would be loſt Time to ſay any thing farther about it. Two eſſential Reaſons have obliged me to be ſo prolix in my Proofs. The firſt is, that it being my Intention to compile a Work which may be uſeful to thoſe who are deſirous to know the ancient Theology of the *Greek* Philoſophers, I thought it my Duty to point at the principal Sources from which ſufficient Light may be gained in the Purſuit of that Enquiry. The ſecond is, that it was neceſſary to ſhew the Validity of the Authors, whoſe Opinions I ſometimes maintain, in Oppoſition to thoſe of *Cicero*, and becauſe it was proper for me to ſhew, that the Authorities on which I depend were taken from compleat valuable Books, and not from mutilated and falſified Fragments.

I now come to Works leſs conſiderable than thoſe already mentioned. As they are very uſeful to underſtand the Theology of the *Grecians*,

I ſhall examine whether they ought to be looked upon as imperfect Fragments, which cannot truly repreſent the Totality of a Syſtem. The Book of the Soul of the World and of Nature, written by *Timæus* of *Locris*, is eſteemed by the Learned as a golden Book *, which contains the pureſt Doctrine of the ancient Philoſophers. *Plato*, having appropriated to himſelf the Subject of this Book, was deſirous of compiling another far more extenſive, but has in the Judgment of many ingenious Men, fallen greatly ſhort of his Original †; he has added to the beautiful Sentiments, which he borrowed from his Author, the idle Chimeras and whimſical Viſions of the *Egyptians*. The Work of *Timæus* of *Locris* is the moſt excellent Treatiſe of the *Pythagorean* Philoſophy ‡, which has been handed down to us; for it contains a compleat Account of the Principles of that Syſtem. For what Reaſon then could the Abbé *D'Olivet* beſtow the Title of a Fragment thereon, and aſſert, that it had either been maimed or corrupted? Is it becauſe it's Bulk is not very conſiderable? How many excellent Works ancient and modern, are as conciſe as this? The beſt Book of Philoſophy ever yet publiſhed, is the ſhorteſt of all; it is the Treatiſe which Mr. *de Maupertuis* has written upon Attraction. The Authenticity of the Treatiſe of

* Vere aureus libellus, & purioris priſcorum philoſophorum doctrinæ pulcherrimum μνημόσυνον, ſuperioris vero diſputationis a Platone copioſe de natura perſcriptæ verum autographum. Th. Gale, in Argument. Lib. Timæi Loc. p. 1.

† Hoc tamen notandum Platonem ad doctrinam amplificandum, fœda quædam commenta ex Ægyptiorum ſcholis putida quadam diligentia, illuc congeſſiſſe, quæ commodius & modeſtius hic notantur a Timæo; veluti ſunt nugæ περὶ μετ. φύσ. ως in quibus, ſane nimius eſt Plato. Id. ibid.

‡ Fuit autem Timæus Locrus Pythagoreus Philoſophus, purioris philoſophiæ, ut apparet, peritiſſimus; ut non immerito eum quaſi archetypum in phyſicis rebus explicandis ſibi propoſuerit Plato, id. ibid.

Timæus the *Locrian*, is proved by the Attestation of all succeeding Ages to this very Day; a few Years after it was composed, *Plato* mentioned it with Honour *. The first Fathers of the Church, when they attempted to confute the Writings of the Philosophers, very often cite † the Treatise of *Timæus* the *Locrian*. *Jamblicus* makes mention thereof ‡, and what is still more remarkable, he takes notice of it's Conciseness; a certain Proof that it was always the same as we have it at this Day.

* Τίμαιός τε γάρ ὅδε εὐνομωτάτης ὢν πόλεως, τῆς ἐν Ἰταλίᾳ Λοκρίδος, οὐσία καὶ γέναι οὐδενὸς ὕστερος ὢν τῶν ἐκεῖ τὰς μεγίστας μὲν ἀρχάς τε καὶ τιμὰς ἐν τῇ πολεῖ μετακεχειρίσται φιλοσοφίας δ' αὖ, κατ' ἐμὴν δόξαν, ἐπ' ἄκρον ἀπάσης ἐάλυθε.

Nam & Timæus hic cum esset e Locris civitate in Italia, optimis legibus fundata, neque quoquam civium aut divitiis, aut genere inferior, summos in ea civitate & honores & magistratus gessit, & ut ego arbitror, ad summum in omni philosophia fastigium pervenit. *Plato* in Timæo, p. 4. It is proper to observe in this Place, that some Authors would have it, that *Timæus* was cotemporary with *Plato*; others affirm, that he died a short Time after *Plato* was born. But be that as it will, it is very certain, that these two Philosophers lived very nearly at the same Time.

† Τίμαιος ὁ Λοκρὸς ἐν τῷ φυσικῷ συγγάμματι κατὰ λέξιν ὠδέμοι μαρτυρήσει. Μία ἄρ' ἀπάντων ἐστὶν ἀγένητος. εἰ γὰρ ἐγένητο, οὐκ ἂν ἦν ἔτι ἀρχά· ἀλλ' ἐκεῖ ἀ ἐξ ἄρ' ἀ ἄρχα ἐγένετο.

Timæus Locris in libro de natura his verbis mihi feret testimonium unum principium omnium est infectum. Si enim esset factum non esset utique amplius principium; sed illud ex quo factum est principium, vel ex quo tanquam principio factum est. Clem. Alexandrianus Stromatum, Lib. V. p. 508.

‡ Τίμαιος τ' οὖν ὁ Λοκρὸς, ἐν τῷ περὶ φύσεως κόσμου καὶ ψυχᾶς, (ἀφ' οὗπερ ἐφοδιάσθαντα Πλάτωνα τὸν διὰ τοῦτο φερώνυμον Τίμαιον συντάξαι λέγουσιν; ὧν ἐστι καὶ ὁ τοὺς Σίλλους ποιήσας Τίμων λέγω οὕτως,

Πολλῶν δ' ἀργυρίων ὀλίγην ἠλλάξατο βίβλον
Ἔθεν ἀφορμηθεὶς τιμαιογραφεῖν ἐπεχείρει)

Quare Timæus Locrus in libro de natura mundi atque anima, ex quo instructum Platonem Timæum cognominem composuisse ferunt nonnulli, inter quos etiam est Timon Syllographus, ita scribens:

Magno nummorum, numero parvum emit librum,
Unde materiam nactus, aggressus est Timæum scribere.

Jambl. in Nicomachi Arithmet. p. 102.

Day. Let us deſcend to more modern Times, and we ſhall ſee, that the Book in Queſtion was perfectly known to *Suidas* *. In ſhort, all *Plato's* Commentators †, ancient as well as modern, have ſpoke thereof; what more then can be wanting to prove, that the Work of *Timæus* the *Locrian*, cannot be looked upon without manifeſt Injuſtice as a maimed and corrupted Fragment of no Manner of Service to underſtand the Theology of the ancient *Greek* Philoſophers?

To *Timæus* the *Locrian*, I may add *Ocellus Lucanus*, another celebrated *Pythagorean*, whoſe Treatiſe we yet poſſeſs concerning *Nature and the Univerſe*; it is in great Eſteem; and it is particularly very uſeful for the Knowledge of the ancient Theology of the *Greeks*. I might with greater Eaſe have proved the Authenticity of this Work, than that of *Timæus* the *Locrain*; but I ſhall only obſerve, that the conſtant and repeated Atteſtation of all ſucceeding Ages are in favour of this as well as the other. *Philo Judæus*, an ingenious Writer ‡, has

* Τίμαιος Λοκρὸς, φιλόσοφος πυθαγόρειος, μαθηματικὰ, περὶ φύσεως, περὶ τοῦ πυθαγορείου βίου.

Timæus Locrus, philoſophus Pythagoreus, mathematica de natura de vita Pythagoræ, Suidas in Lexic.

† Καὶ γὰρ καὶ αὐτὸ τοῦ Πυθαγορικοῦ Τιμαίου γράμμα περὶ φύσεως τὸν Πυθαγορικὸν τρόπον διατάττεται. ὅθεν ἀφορμηθεὶς ὁ Πλάτων Τιμαιογραφεῖν ἐπιχείρει, κατὰ τὸν Συλλογράφον. ὃ καὶ προϋπήξαμεν, σῶν ὑπομνημάτων, ἵν' εἰδῶμεν γνώσεως τίνα μὲν ὁ Πλάτων Τίμαιος λέγει ταῦτα ἐκείνῳ, τίνα δὲ προσέθηκε, τίνα δὲ καὶ διάφωνα.

Et enim liber Timæi Pythagorei de natura Pythagorico more diſponetur, unde materiam nactus Plato, Timæum ſcribere aggreſſus eſt ſecundum ſyllographum, quem librum etiam commentariis noſtris præfiximus, ut noſcere poſſimus quænam Platonis Timæus tradit illi conſentanea, quænam addidit, quænam etiam diſſentanea. *Proculus Diadochus in commentario in Timæum Platonis.*

‡ Ἔνιοι δ' οὐκ Ἀριστοτέλη τῆς δόξης εὑρετὴν λέγουσιν. ἀλλὰ καὶ τῶν πυθαγορείων τινάς. ἐγὼ δὲ καὶ Ὠκέλλου συγγράμματα, Λευκανοῦ γένους, ἐπιγεγραμμένα περὶ τῆς τοῦ παντὸς φύσεως, ἐν ᾧ ἀγένητόν τε καὶ ἄφθαρτον, οὐκ ἀτιμάζεται μόνον, ἀλλὰ καὶ δι' ἀπόδειξιν κατασκευάζεται τὸν κόσμον εἶναι.

Cæterum

juſtly obſerved, that thoſe who believe *Ariſtotle* to have been the firſt Philoſopher who aſſerted the Eternity of the World, *à priori & à poſteriori*, are deceived, becauſe *Ocellus Lucanus* has ſaid in his Treatiſe of the Univerſe, that it is without Beginning, and will never have an End. *I believe*, adds this *Jew*, *that the Eternity of the World was derived from the Doctrine of the ancient* Pythagoreans. This ſingle Remark of *Philo* proves the Uſefulneſs of the Treatiſe of *Ocellus Lucanus*, and alſo it's Antiquity; for he expreſly affirms, that he had read it. *Hobæus* ſpeaks of it in like manner: The moſt learned Moderns have beſtowed great Praiſes thereon, and *Picus Mirandulus* * has thought differently on this Subject from the Abbé *D'Olivet*.

The Commentary which *Salluſt* the *Cynick* Philoſopher has left *concerning the Gods and the World*, has been injudiciouſly placed in the Rank of Fragments, ſince it appears at this Day an intire Piece, and ſuch as it was firſt compoſed, if we may give any Credit to the Opinions † of *Suidas* and *Photius*‡.

We have yet another Commentary on the Nature of Gods, by a *Greek* Philoſopher called *Cornutus*, or according to others *Pharnutus*. *Porphyry* teaches us‖, that he gladly adopted his Explanations of the poetical Allegories. *Theodoret* * takes notice of

Cæterum ſunt qui tradunt opinionis hujus non Ariſtotelem primum auctorem, ſed Pythagoreos quoſdam fuiſſe. At mihi ocelli, genere Lucani, inſcriptum de univerſi natura commentarium oblatum eſt, in quo quidem mundum eſſe ingenitum & nunquam interiturum non ſolum protulit, verum etiam exquiſitiſſimis rationibus comprobavit. Philo Judæus in libro de mundo non interituro, p. 607.

Cur & Ocellus idem Lucanus in libro de mundo, teſtimonio etiam ipſe Platonis, eminentiſſimus, Joannes Picus Mirandulus, &c. Lib. I. contra Aſtrologos, p. 79.

† Photius, in Biliotheca, Cod. CCXLII.

‡ Suidas, Lexicon.

‖ Ὅθεν ἐν θυμιάμασι μὲν, &c. Porphir. Lib. de Ant. Nympharum, p. 262.

* Καὶ ἰσῶτος ὁ Φιλόσοφος τὴν Ἑλληνικὴν Θεολογίαν ξυντεθεικὼς Cor-

of the Theological Work of this *Greek*; *Suidas* mentions it with Honour; for what Reaſon then ſhould it be looked upon as a uſeleſs, and perhaps a corrupted Fragment? I now proceed to Father *Hardouin*, without taking notice of all the Works of the ancient Philoſophers yet remaining; a Man who would have it, that *Virgil*'s *Æneis* was written in the Beginning of the fourteenth Century, by a *Benedictine* Monk, who has given to all the Poems of the ancient *Romans* * Authors of the ſame Kind, who pretends, that the Works of the Fathers of the Church, and particularly thoſe of St. *Auguſtine*, were made by a Society of Atheiſts and Deiſts † with a Deſign to overturn Chriſtianity: In ſhort, a Man who has written a pretty large Book in *Folio*, to prove ‡, that *Arnaud Paſcal* ‖,

Cornutus philoſophus Græcanicam Theologiam compoſuit. Theodoret in ſecund. ſermone de princip. p. 28.

* Proh! quod adminiculis fulta Æneis eſt, ut ſincera ac genuina Virgilii lucubratio fuiſſe credatur decem teſtimoniis innumeris Ovidii, Juvenalis, Statii, Silii Italici, Martialis, Propertii, Quintiliani, Aſconii, Pediani, Taciti in Dialogo de oratoribus, aliorumque, ut eos qui eccleſiaſtici dicuntur ſcriptores, omittamus, qui plurimi certe ſunt, ſed æque ſuppoſititii, proxime ſequentis ævi, & fabricæ. Hardouini opera varia, &c. Pſeudo Virgilius, ſive obſervationes in Æneidem, p. 282.

† Incredibile ac ſimile portenti eſt, quantam falſorum ſcriptorum ſegetem de rebus, tùm ſacris, tum profanis, execranda & deteſtabilis una quædam, ut cæteras ſileam, ante annos fere quingentos officina effuderit. Hardouini Chronologiæ ex nummis antiquis reſtitutæ Proluſio, de nummis Hadrian, p. 68.

‡ Rarius apud Arnoldum, tametſi fuit is Janſenianæ factionis ſuo tempore primipilus, impium illud placitum de Deo, ante vel veritate intelligibili entium occurrit conceptis verbis, ſive quoniam cautior ille & conſideratior fuit; ſive demum quod ſatis & ſatius eſſe duxit ac multo conſultius, in Gallicum ſermonem transferre Latina quædam opuſcula, in quibus ea impietas diſerte adſtruitur. Hardouini opera varia, &c. Athei detecti, p. 160.

‖ Sequitur qui celebritate famæ nihilo inferior prioribus fuit Blaſius Paſcal, ex Avernia Claromontanus, cujus ex ſcriptis unum eſt ſolummodo ex quo excerpta quædam exhiberi locus poſtulet. Titulus eſt: Mr. *Paſcal*'s *Thoughts upon Religion and ſeveral other Subjects.* ---- in multis locis: ---- pro Deo habet veritatem intelligibilem. Idem ibid. p. 198.

Father *Thomaſſin* *, ——— † *Ambroſe Victor*, ‡ *Des Cartes*, were perfect Atheiſts, and more dangerous than *Spinoſa*. If this Man has not ſpared the Works of ſome of the ancient Philoſophers, it is no Wonder, and can give neither Surpriſe nor Scandal. When once we are convinced that an Author has loſt his Senſes, there is nothing ſo romantick that may not be expected from him: The Abbé *D'Olivet*, how much a Friend ſoever he may ſeem to Father *Hardouin*, has too much good Senſe to have had any Regard to his Syſtem; a Syſtem ſo juſtly ridiculed by Men of Letters; though there is always ſome wrongheaded People, who are raſh and ſilly enough to defend the moſt deſperate Cauſes, yet nobody has been ſo fooliſh hitherto as to defend his. I therefore cannot comprehend what could prevail upon him to aſſert, that we ſhould examine the Theology of the *Greek* Philoſophers concerning the Nature of the Gods, only by the Writings of *Cicero*. Am I deceived,

* Si quis velit omnia quæ ſunt ab eo (Thomaſſino) impie de eo argumenta ſcripta repreſentare, tria ipſa quæ edidit Theologicorum dogmatum volumina, ſunt exſcribenda. Idem ibid. p. 21.

† Offert ſe nobis in ſecundo loco, qui, occulto ſuo nomine, metu fortaſſis publicæ animadverſionis, Ambroſium victorem ſe voluit nuncupari, P. Andreas Martin, e congregatione Oratorii in Gallia edidit, ille philoſophiam, ut appellat Chriſtianam, falſa profecto appellatione, ſi ſumus nos Chriſtiani. Idem, ibid. p. 6.

‡ Ne quid intentatum infernus relinqueret, quod non ad eccleſiæ fidem ſi fieri poſſet convellendam adhiberet, novæ Theologiæ hoc eſt Janſenianæ, coævam adjecit, & adjutricem eorumdemque conſiliorum ſociam ac participem, novam philoſophiam, Carteſia nam ab auctore Renato Carteſio appellatam quos innumeros habet hoc ævo ſequaces & aſſeclas: miſeros ſane ſi ſe non intelligunt ἀθεότητα defendere; miſeriores ſi intelligunt. Idem ibid. p. 198.

Father *Hardouin* has joined to all theſe pretendrd Atheiſts, *Nicole Janſenius Quenel*, *Antony le Grand*. Was not this Jeſuit truly worthy of a diſtinguiſhed Place in Bedlam? I refer my Readers to what I have ſaid upon the Syſtem of this Enthuſiaſtical Viſionary in my *Cabaliſtick Letters*, and in the *Secret Memoirs of the Republick of Letters*.

ceived, and has Abbe *D'Olivet* unfortunately eſpouſed the chimerical Viſions of his Friend? What he ſays of the Works of *Ariſtotle*, which I ſhall examine hereafter, has given ground enough for ſuch a Suſpicion; however I declare once more, I cannot imagine, ſo wiſe a Man as the Abbe *D'Olivet* ſhould be drawn into ſuch unaccountable Extravagancies. However that be, he muſt give me leave to purſue a contrary Conduct, in endeavouring to explain the different Syſtems of the Ancients. I ſhall run them over as ſuccinctly as I poſſibly can; and to keep Abbe *D'Olivet* always in ſight, I ſhall obſerve the ſame Order, in which he has placed them.

SECT. II. *Of the Syſtem of* Thales.

A *CRITICK*, ſays the Abbe *D'Olivet*, in ſpeaking of Mr. *Bayle*, *would infer that* Cicero, *when he affirms, that* Thales *made an intelligent Principle preſide over the Formation of the Univerſe, was greatly deceived, or otherwiſe if that had been the real Opinion of* Thales, Cicero *had conſequently fallen into a manifeſt Contradiction, becauſe a few Lines after, he ſays,* Anaxagoras *was the firſt Philoſopher, who attributed the Arrangement of Matter to an intelligent Being.* Let us ſee what Mr. *Bayle* himſelf ſays with regard to *Thales*; let us hear his own Words, and then we will examine the Criticiſm of the Abbe *D'Olivet*, and afterwards conſider what Mr. *Bayle* might have replied thereto; 'I ſhall be too tedious, 'ſays he, if I ſhould relate all the Teſtimonies 'which eſtabliſhed the one or the other of theſe 'Truths, or even both; I. That *Anaxagoras* ad-'mitted an Intelligence which had put Matter in

‘ Motion, and formed the World by the Choice
‘ of *Homogeneities*; II. That he was the firſt Phi-
‘ loſopher that advanced this Syſtem. It is ſuf-
‘ ficient to point out *Plato*, *Tertullian*, *Clement* of
‘ *Alexandria*, *Euſebius*, *Themiſtias*, St. *Auguſtine*,
‘ *Theodoret*, *Proclus*, *Simpliciu*. I ſhall not do the
‘ ſame with regard to *Cicero*; I ſhall quote his own
‘ Words, becauſe they will furniſh us with Mat-
‘ ter for an Examination. *Inde Anaxagoras*, ſays
‘ he, *qui accepit ab Anaximene diſciplinam*; *primus*
‘ *omnium rerum deſcriptionem et modum, mentis in-*
‘ *finitæ vi ac ratione deſignari ac confici voluit. In*
‘ *quo non vidit, neque motum ſenſui junctum et con-*
‘ *tinentem in infinito ullum eſſe poſſe, neque ſenſum*
‘ *omnino quo non ipſa natura pulſa ſentiret. Deinde*
‘ *ſi mentem iſtam quaſi animal aliquod eſſe voluit,*
‘ *erit aliquid interius ex quo illud animal nomina-*
‘ *tur. Qui autem interius mente? Cingitur igitur*
‘ *corpore externo. Quod quoniam non placet, aper-*
‘ *ta ſimplexque mens nulla re adjuncta quæ ſentire*
‘ *poſſit, fugere intelligentiæ noſtræ vim et notionem*
‘ *videtur.* It is a little ſurpriſing, that *Cicero* gives
‘ this Priority to the Philoſopher *Anaxagoras*, ſince
‘ he had juſt been ſaying that *Thales* had ac-
‘ knowledged an Underſtanding or a God which
‘ had formed all Things from Water. *Thales*
‘ *Mileſius, qui primus de talibus rebus quæſivit,*
‘ *aquam dixit eſſe initium rerum, deum autem, eam*
‘ *mentem, quæ ex aqua cuncta fingeret.* Is it poſ-
‘ ſible that *Cicero* could ſo ſoon have forgot his
‘ own Words? Can we imagine that it was his
‘ meaning, that *Thales* gave to God nothing but
‘ the Power of converting Water into other Bo-
‘ dies; but that *Anaxagoras* made God to be
‘ the Author of that Order and beautiful Propor-
‘ tion which reigns in the World? I can ſee no-
‘ thing at all likely in this, and I ſhould rather

‘ ſuſpect

'ſuſpect the Paſſage to be corrupted than admit-
'ted; the Confuſion and Obſcurity, which are
'viſible in the following Words, may ſerve to
'confirm my Conjecture. But be this as it will,
'I would not have the Teſtimony of *Cicero*, be
'a Counterbalance to all the celebrated Writers
'of Antiquity, who unanimouſly affirm that *A-*
'*naxagoras* is the firſt, who joined an efficient
'Cauſe, to the material one, that is to ſay, who
'acknowledged an Underſtanding, as the Author
'of the Wiſdom ſo evident in the Frame of
'the Univerſe. St. *Auguſtine* ſets but little Va-
'lue on the Teſtimony of *Cicero*, except in that
'Place, where he relates the Opinion of the Phi-
'loſophers of the Sect of *Ionia*, and though he
'agrees with *Cicero*, with relation to the reſt,
'he contradicts him in plain Terms, with regard
'to *Thales*. *Iſte autem Thales, ut ſucceſſores eti-*
'*am propagaret rerum naturam ſcrutatus, ſuaſque*
'*diſputationes literis mandans eminuit —— aquam*
'*putavit rerum, eſſe principium, et hinc omnia ele-*
'*menta mundi ipſumque mundum, et quæ in eo gi-*
'*guntur exiſtere. Nihil autem huic operi, quod*
'*mundo conſiderato, tam admirabile aſpicimus, ex*
'*divina mente præpoſuit.* Obſerve that *Cicero*
'in another Book excludes *Thales* from the Prio-
'rity, and gives it clearly and abſolutely to the
'Philoſopher *Anaxagoras*.

'The *Jeſuit Leſcalopier* endeavours to recon-
'cile this Contradiction, by ſuppoſing that *Anaxa-*
'*goras* was the firſt who publiſhed this Doctrine,
'and the Philoſophers his Predeceſſors were con-
'tented to teach it to their Auditories in pri-
'vate. This Explanation is far from being good;
'for ſince they knew the Opinions of the Pre-
'deceſſors of *Anaxagoras*, and in what they dif-
'fered from each other ſince, I ſay, they knew

'that,

'that, and that *Anaxagoras* was the firſt that 'publiſhed it in his Books, might they not have 'known likewiſe, what they had taught relat-'ing to the efficient Cauſe of the World? As 'for the Objections againſt the Doctrine of this 'Philoſopher, contained above in the Paſſage of '*Cicero*, I refer you to St. *Auguſtine* for a ſolid 'Refutation.'

The Abbe *D'Olivet*, deſirous of refuting Mr. *Bayle*, and of proving that *Thales* had acknowledged a Mind or Underſtanding which had formed all Things out of Water, ſays thereupon *: *Let us ſee firſt of all, if we ought to ſuſpect* Cicero *of being deceived, when he ſays* Thales *acknowledged an intelligent Principle. I might directly anſwer, that his Authority alone is ſufficient to Counterbalance the Silence of other Writers. When we have a good poſitive Argument concerning a like Fact, there is no occaſion to make uſe of a Negative.*

It is not true that *Cicero*'s Authority forms a poſitive Argument about the Subject in Queſtion; nor is it more ſo that other Writers have kept Silence, with Relation thereto: For on the contrary, a great Number who wrote both before and after *Cicero*, have expreſsly affirmed that *Anaxagoras* was the firſt who allowed an intelligent Being, who, by putting Matter in Motion, had formed the World. To aſſert that any Man was the firſt who maintained an Opinion, is it not equivalent to ſaying, that there was no Writer before, who had aſſerted the ſame thing? But many have gone yet farther, and have ſaid in direct, clear, and very expreſs Terms, that *Thales* did not admit any intelligent Mind in the Formation of the World. *Theodoret* is very explicit and deciſive upon this Subject; he reproaches the

* D'Olivet Theolog. des Philoſoph. Grecs. p. 59.

the *Greeks*, that *before* Anaxagoras *all the Philoſophers had allowed nothing but Matter, which was concerned in the Formation of the Univerſe, and that they could not raiſe their Thoughts above material Things, which fell under the Examination of their Senſes.* Obſerve that in the Place where *Theodoret* thus explains himſelf he mentions the Opinion of other Philoſophers, who maintained that an intelligent Mind preſided over the Formation of the Univerſe, and that he does not ſo much as ſpeak one ſingle Word about *Thales*; but how is it likely that he ſhould ſpeak of him, ſince, in a Senſe, he had expreſsly excluded him by Name, in ſaying that *Anaxagoras* was the firſt who had admitted an intelligent Being, to be the efficient Cauſe of the Arrangement of Matter. Mr. *Bayle* has taken Notice of this Paſſage of *Theodoret*, but he has abridged it too much, I ſhall quote him more at large *, becauſe it is abſolutely neceſſary when we are treating about a Queſtion of this Nature. Inſtead of three Lines, I ſhall tranſcribe ten or a dozen; and thoſe who underſtand *Greek* or *Latin*, may ſee the Quotations at the Bottom of the Page.

St. *Auguſtine* is ſtill more particular then *Theodoret*, if it is poſſible he can be ſo. He needed only have conſulted this Father of the Church, to clear up the Contradiction which is met with in

* Ἐπεὶ καὶ Ἀναξαγόρας ὁ Ἡγησιβούλε ὁ Κλαζομένιος, τῶν πρὸ αὐτὸν [γεγενημένων] φιλοσόφων, οὐδὲν περιττότερον τῶν ὁρωμένων γνῶναι ὅτων, πρῶτος νοῦν ἔφησεν ἐφεστάναι τῷ κόσμῳ, καὶ τοῦτον ἐκ τῆς ἀταξίας ἀγαγεῖν τὰ στοιχεῖα καὶ Πυθαγόρας δὲ ὁ Μνησάρχε, ἀρχὴν τῶν πάντων ἔφησε τὴν μονάδα.

Quandoquidem et Anaxagoras Hegeſibuli filius Clazomenius, primus inquit mentem mundo inſediſſe, unamque hanc elementa de confuſione in ordinem diſpoſuiſſe; cum ſuperiores Philoſophi nihil ultra materiam, præterque ea quæ oculis videntur, excogitaſſent. Pythagoras autem Mneſarchis filius, principium rerum omnium monada, hoc eſt unitatem, eſſe dixit. Theod. ad Græcos infidel. Serm. II. de princip. p. 24. Edit. Colon.

in *Cicero*; a Contradiction ſo manifeſt, that it evidently ſhews the Place where it is found to have been altered and corrupted by the Tranſcribers, as I ſhall ſoon make appear, even by the Authority of *Cicero* himſelf, and by a kind of involuntary Acknowledgment of the Abbe *D'Olivet*. But firſt let us hear St. *Auguſtine* pronounce the Sentence of Condemnation upon *Thales:* We have ſeen an Abridgment of what he ſaid, in the Paſſage which I have related from Mr. *Bayle*; but it will be proper to hear his Words at large. If Mr. *Bayle* could have foreſeen the Chicanery that would have been made uſe of hereafter againſt him, he would not have abridged the Paſſages which he quoted in ſo conciſe a manner; I ſhall therefore do, what he actually ſhould have done, and with a greater Pleaſure, becauſe this Paſſage of St. *Auguſtine* is ſufficient to give an exact Inſight into the Syſtem of Theology, maintained by the *Italian* and *Ionick* Sect, that is to ſay, the two moſt ancient Sects of *Greece*. 'Among the 'Monuments of the *Greek* Tongue, which is 'looked upon, *ſays this Father* *, as the fineſt of

* Quantum enim adtinet ad litteras Græcas, quæ lingua inter cæteras gentium clarior habetur, duo Philoſophorum genera traduntur; unum Italicum, ex ea parte Italiæ quæ quondam magna Græcia nuncupata eſt; alterum Ionicum, in eis terris, ubi et nunc Græcia nominatur. Italicum genus auctorem habuit Pythagoram Samium, a quo etiam ferunt ipſum philoſophiæ nomen exortum. Nam cum antea ſapientes appellarentur, qui modo quodam laudabilis vitæ aliis præſtare videbantur; iſte interrogatus quid profiteretur, philoſophum ſe eſſe reſpondit, id eſt, ſtudioſum vel amatorem ſapientiæ, quoniam ſapientem profiteri, arrogantiſſimum videbatur. Ionici vero generis princeps fuit Thales Mileſius, unus illorum ſeptem qui appellati ſunt ſapientes. Sed illi ſex vitæ genere diſtinguebantur, et quibuſdam præceptis ad bene vivendum accommodatis: iſte autem Thales ut ſucceſſores etiam propagaret, rerum naturam ſcrutatus, ſuaſque diſputationes litteris mandans eminuit; maximeque admirabiles exſtitit, quod aſtrologiæ numeris comprehenſis defectus ſolis

'of all Languages, there are two Sects of Philoſophers; one is called the *Italian* from that 'Part of *Italy*, which was formerly called *Græcia* '*Magna*, and the other *Ionick*, from the Country 'which ſtill retains the Name of *Greece*; the *Ita*'*lian* Sect had *Pythagoras* for it's Author, from 'whom the very Name of a Philoſopher is deriv'ed. For inſtead of thoſe who made profeſſion of 'a more rigid Virtue than others, and were called 'Sages or wiſe Men, *Pythagoras* being aſked what 'he was, anſwered, that he was a Philoſopher, 'that is to ſay, a *Lover of Wiſdom*, thinking 'that their Arrogance was too great, who pre'tended to be actually Wiſe. *Thales* the *Mi*'*leſian*,

ſolis et lunæ etiam prædicere potuit. Aquam tamen putavit rerum eſſe principium, et hinc omnia elementa mundi ipſumque mundum et quæ in eo gignuntur, exiſtere; nihil autem huic operi, quod mundo conſiderato tam admirabile adſpicimus, ex divina mente præpoſuit. Huic ſucceſſit Anaximander ejus auditor, mutavitque de rerum natura opinionem. Non enim ex una re, ſicut Thales ex humore, ſed ex ſuis propriis principiis quaſque res naſci putavit. Quæ rerum principia ſingularum eſſe credidit infinita, et innumerabiles mundos gignere, et quæcumque in eis oriuntur; eoſque mundos modo diſſolvi, modo iterum gigni exiſtimavit, quanta quiſque ætate ſua manere potuerit, nec ipſe aliquid divinæ menti in his rerum operibus tribuens. Iſte Anaximenem diſcipulum et ſucceſſorem reliquit: qui omnes rerum cauſas infinito aeri dedit, nec deos negavit, aut tacuit: non tamen ab ipſis aerem factum, ſed ipſos ex aere ortos credidit. Anaxagoras vero ejus auditor harum rerum omnuim, quas videmus, effectorem divinum animum ſenſit; et dixit ex infinita materia quæ conſtaret ſimilibus inter ſe particulis, rerum omnium genera pro modulis at ſpeciebus propriis ſingula fieri, ſed animo faciente divino. Diogenes quoque Anaximenis alter auditor aerem quidem dixit rerum eſſe materiam, de qua omnia fierent, ſed eum eſſe compotem divinæ rationis, ſine qua nihil ex eo fieri poſſet. Anaxagoræ ſucceſſit auditor ejus Archelaus: etiam ipſe de particulis inter ſe ſimilibus, quibus ſingula quæque fierent, ita omnia conſtare putavit, ut in eſſe etiam mentem diceret, quæ corpora æterna, id eſt, illas particulis conjungendo et diſſipando ageret omnia. Socrates hujus diſcipulis fuiſſe perhibetur, magiſter Platonis, propter quem breviter cuncta iſta recolui. St. Auguſt. de Civit. Dei. Lib. VIII. Tom. VII. Cap. II. p. 191. Edit. Bened. Sti. Mauri. Pariſ. 1685.

'*leſian*, one of the ſeven wiſe Men of *Greece*, 'was the chief of the *Ionick* Sect. The other 'ſix rendered themſelves reſpectable by the external Regularity of their Lives, and by certain Precepts of Morality; but *Thales* was addicted more particularly to the Study of Natural Philoſophy, with a Deſign to encreaſe the 'Number of his Diſciples, and to lay the Foundation of a School, which might ſubſiſt after 'his Deceaſe. He committed his Opinions to 'Writing, and compiled ſeveral Works; but 'that which gained him the greateſt Reputation, 'was that by the Aſſiſtance of Aſtronomical Numbers he predicted the Eclipſes of the Sun 'and Moon. However he maintained that Water was the Principle of all Things, of the Elements of the World, of the World itſelf, and 'of all the Productions thereof, without allowing the Univerſe to be conducted by any intelligent Nature or Mind. *Anaximander*, one 'of his Diſciples, was his Succeſſor; but he did 'not follow his Steps in all Things, nor maintain the ſame Opinions: For he did not allow 'as his Maſter had done, that Water was the 'Principle of all Things; but his Opinion was, 'that every thing was derived from its own particular Principle; thus according to him the Principles 'of Things were infinite, and produced an innumerable Variety of Worlds, which were ſucceſſively brought to a Period, and revived again, 'after having finiſhed the Time of their Duration. He would not allow God to have any 'Share in theſe Tranſactions. His Diſciple and 'Succeſſor was *Anaximenes* who affirmed, that the 'Air was boundleſs, and pretended that it was 'the Cauſe of all viſible Things. He did not 'deny the Exiſtence of the Gods; but he believed

'lieved they derived their Origin from the Air. '*Anaxagoras*, a Diſciple of *Anaximenes*, aſſerted 'that a divine and immortal Spirit was the Cauſe 'of all the viſible Beings which exiſt; he ſaid, 'that all Things were made every one accord-'ing to its Kind of infinite Matter, compoſed 'of ſmall Particles like to each other; but that 'the Spirit of God was the Agent that produced 'them. *Diogenes*, another Diſciple of *Anaxi-'menes*, acknowledged, that the Air was in re-'ality the Matter from whence all Things were 'formed, but that it was endued with a divine 'Underſtanding, without which it had no Power 'of producing any thing. *Archelaus*, treading in 'the Steps of his Maſter *Anaxagoras*, ſaid like-'wiſe, that all Things were formed of theſe 'ſmall homogeneous Particles, and that there was 'an intelligent Mind, which joined them together, 'and actuated theſe eternal Bodies; that is to ſay, 'theſe ſmall Particles thereby compoſing and 'forming the whole viſible World. *Socrates* was 'his Diſciple, and the Maſter of *Plato*.'

I believe nothing can be more plain and particular concerning the Subject in Queſtion; for St. *Auguſtine* expreſly aſſerts, that *Thales* would not allow any intelligent Being to have had any Concern in the Formation of the World; and what Likelihood can there be, that this Father, who wrote againſt the Pagan Philoſophers, who had Materials enough to have refuted his Aſſertion, and who even had threatned to do it, ſhould advance a Fact with ſuch Aſſurance, which might have been ſo eaſily refuted, had it been falſe? For what Reaſon ſhould *Theodoret* have run the ſame Riſk? But there is ſtill another Writer more ancient than *Theodoret* and St. *Auguſtine*, of whom *Bayle* does not make the leaſt mention, who reproaches

proaches the *Greek* Philosophers with the same Thing; I mean St. *Justin*, a Philosopher and Martyr. *Thales*, says he *, *who was the first who taught Philosophy publickly among the* Greeks, *borrowed from* Homer; *his Opinion concerning the first Principles and whereas* Aristotle *afterwards pretended that the first Cause of all Beings were God and Matter*, Thales, *the most ancient of the Philosophers, asserted on the contrary, that Water was the universal Principle, and the sole Cause of the Universe. He says that from Water all other Beings derive their Origin, and that all the different Bodies having been produced by Water, were resolved into Water again. Two Conjectures prevailed on* Thales *to maintain this Opinion: The first is, that the Generation of all Animals proceeds from a humid Cause; the second is, that all Plants are nourished and augmented by Humidity, and that when that fails they wither and perish.*

To

* Θαλῆς γὰρ ὁ Μιλήσιος ὁ πρῶτος παρ' αὐτοῖς τῆς φιλοσοφιὰς ἄρξας, τὴν πρόφασιν παρ' αὐτοῦ λαβων, τας πρώτας αυτοῦ περὶ αρχῶν αθετήσει δοξας· αυτοῦ γαρ Αριστοτέλες Θεὸν καὶ υλην αρχὰς εἶναι τῶν πάντων εἰρηκότος, ὁ πρεσβυτατος τῶν κατ' αυτοὺς απάντων Θαλῆς αρχὴν τῶν ὄντων ὕδωρ εἶναι λεγει εξ ὕδατος γὰρ φησι τὰ πάντα εἶναι, καὶ εἰς ὕδωρ ἀνα λευσθαι τα πάντα. σοχάζεται δὲ, πρωτον μεν, ἀπ' τοῦ πάντων τῶν ζώων τὴν γονὴν αρχὴν οὖσαν· υγρὰν εἶναι δεύτερον δὲ ὅτι παντα τὰ φοτὰ υγροῦ, τρεφται καὶ καρποφορεῖ, αμοιροῦντα δὶ τὸ υγροῦ, ξεραίνεται. εἶθ' ὥς περ μὴ αρκούμενος αἷς σοχαζεται, καὶ τὸν Ομηρον ὡς ἀξιπιστον μαρτύρεται οὕτως λέγοντα,

Ὠκεανὸς, ὅς περ γένεσις πάντεσσι τέτυκται.

Thales namque Milesius, qui primus apud illos philosophari cœpit occasione et obtentu ab ipso Homero sumpto primarias ejus de principiis abolebit opiniones. Cum enim Aristoteles primordia rerum omnium deum et materiam esse dicat, antiquissimus philosophorum omnium Thales ipse, originem rerum aquam esse censet. Nam ex aqua, ait constare omnia, atque in aquam dissolvi omnia: duplici conjecturâ ductus: prima quod genitura animantium omnium principium, et causa humida est: secunda quod plantæ omnes humore et foventur et fructificant; humore autem destitutæ exarescunt. Ex inde, quasi conjecturæ istæ satis non essent, Homerum insuper ut idoneum testem citat, ita dicentem.

Oceanum rerum, genuit qui cuncta parentem.

Sti. Justini Martyr. ad Græcos Cohortatio, p. 7.

To ſupport theſe Conjectures Thales *made uſe of the Authority of* Homer, *who affirms that the Ocean is the Univerſal Father of all different Subſtances.* It will not be improper to obſerve here, that *Plutarch* ſays the ſame thing as St. *Juſtin*, upon the Conjectures of *Thales*, and even adds a third: what follows is the Senſe of his Words. *Thales grown old returned to the City of* Mileſia, *where he maintained that all things were compoſed of Water, and that they all would be reſolved into Water again. He founded his Conjecture upon the following Reaſons; for obſerving that the Semen is the Principle of all Animals, which Semen being humid, he thought it moſt likely, that all other things had Humidity for their Principle. Secondly, that all ſorts of Plants are nouriſhed with Moiſture without which they produce no Fruit, and when they are deprived of that they wither and die. Thirdly, that the Fire of the Sun itſelf, and of the Stars, is nouriſhed and maintained by Vapours proceeding from the Waters, and conſequently all the World muſt in like manner be ſupported. For the ſame Reaſon* Homer *maintains, that all viſible Things are produced by Water* *.

After ſo great a Number of Authorities ſo ſtrong and ſo expreſs, how could the Abbe *D'Olivet* affirm, that *Cicero* ſtood alone againſt *the Silence of the Writers?* There never was an Author more expreſsly contradicted then *Cicero* upon this Occaſion, and there never was any room to deny, that it had not been for a conſiderable Time and even for ſeveral Ages, before it had been committed to writing, ſince *Plato*, as Mr. *Bayle* has very well obſerved, had directly aſſerted that *Anaxagoras* was the firſt who allowed that an intelligent Being was the Cauſe of the Formation of the

* *Plutarch's* Opin. of the Philoſ. Lib. I. Chap. III.

the World, and that he had ſaid nothing which reſembled the Opinion of *Thales*.

Let us now come to another Objection of the Abbe *D'Olivet* *, *An Anſwer*, ſays he, *which I can by no means allow that it is falſe that all the other Writers are ſilent upon this Head.*

Ariſtotle *tells us, that the Philoſophers allowed, there was an intelligent Being diffuſed through the Univerſe, and that this perhaps was the Reaſon which had prevailed upon* Thales *to aſſert, that every Thing was full of Gods.* Plutarch *informs us, that God is the Soul of the World according to* Thales. *We ſee in the Philoſopher's Hiſtorian, that* Thales *believed the World to be animated; that he ſaid that God was the moſt ancient of all Beings, becauſe he was uncreated, and that the World is the moſt beautiful Production, as being the Work of God.*

The Abbe *D'Olivet* ſeems to me too much prejudiced in favour of his Objections, in looking upon them to be unanſwerable. If he would have given himſelf the trouble of conſulting the Paſſage of *Ariſtotle*, which he points at, but does not quote, becauſe he ſeems to have had very good Reaſons to the contrary, he might have ſeen that the Queſtion is no more, about an *intelligent Being, which preſided over the Formation of the World*, than about the *Grand Imam* of *Mecca*. *Ariſtotle*, ſpeaking of the Philoſophers, who allowed there was a vivifying Soul, diffuſed throughout the Univerſe, ſays †, that perhaps it was this Opinion that cauſed *Thales* to aſſert that all the Univerſe was full

* D'Olivet Theologie des Philoſophes Grecs, &c. p. 59.

† Καὶ ἐν τῷ ὅλῳ δέ τινες οὖσαν (ψυχὴν) μεμίχθαί φασιν· ὅθεν ἴσως καὶ Θαλῆς ᾠήθη πάντα πλήρη θεῶν εἶναι.

Sunt et qui in toto univerſo permiſtam ipſam (animam) inquiunt eſſe. Quocirca forſitan et Thales omnia plena Deorum eſſe putavit Ariſtot. de Anima, Lib. I. Cap. V.

full of Gods. The Syſtem of the Ancients concerning the Soul of the World, is preciſely the ſame as that of *Spinoſa*. I would aſk the Abbe *D'Olivet*, if he believes this *Jew* had any Thought of an intelligent Being, who preſided over the Formation of the Univerſe, and who actually preſerves the Order and Harmony ſo viſible therein? The Philoſophers, who heretofore admitted the Soul of the World, and thoſe who at this Day allow the general and only Subſtance of *Spinoſa*, which produces all the different Modifications, have looked upon this Soul, and regarded this Subſtance, as a Being which acts without Knowledge, which gives Life to all the different Modifications which forms and receives them, without any Knowledge: This is what I ſhall make appear very ſoon; but though it ſhould be true, as it is not, that *Ariſtotle* had ſaid, that there were Philoſophers before *Thales*, who pretended that an *intelligent Being* was diffuſed through the Univerſe, would it thence follow, that the ſame *Ariſtotle* had ſaid, that *they made him preſide over the Formation of the Univerſe*, nor even that this would be a natural Conſequence of their Principle? *Ariſtotle* himſelf admitted an intelligent Being, at the ſame time that he aſſerted the World was eternal.

I ſhall now reply to what the Abbe *D'Olivet* has aſſerted, founded as he thinks upon the Authority of *Plutarch* and *Diogenes Laertius*. Mr. *Bayle* had obviated theſe two Objections, and I am aſtoniſhed, that they ſhould be again made uſe of, after they had been ſo evidently refuted. 'If they alledge *, ſays this great Critick, the 'Words of *Diogenes Laertius*, I anſwer, that *Plu-*

'*tarch*

* *Bayle*'s Critical Dictionary at the Article *Thales*, Remarks B. & C.

'*tarch* makes no uſe of them when he quotes 'the ſame Anſwer from *Thales*. He does not 'ſuppoſe that this Philoſopher had alledged the 'Reaſon which has lately been mentioned; why 'the World is the moſt beautiful of all Things: 'he ſays, that *Thales* being to anſwer this Que-'ſtion *what is the moſt beautiful of all Beings*, 'anſwered, *the World; for every thing that is re-'gular is a Part of the World.' Quid pulcherrimum? Mundus; omnes enim ejus partes ordine aptæ ſunt.* And as for the Anſwer to the Queſtion, if God knew the evil Actions of Mankind; there are thoſe who attribute it not to *Thales*, but to *Pittacus*. See *Theon* in Chapter V. of his *Progymnaſmata*, *p.* 67 & 77. of the *Leiden* Edition 1626. ——— If they reply, that *Plutarch* and *Diogenes Laertius* agree very well in another Point, which is 'that *Thales*, giving the Reaſon why God is the 'moſt ancient of all Beings, alledges that God 'is uncreated, or that God had no Beginning; I ſay 'that this is no poſitive Proof, that he attributed the 'Formation of the World to God; have there not 'been Philoſophers, who though they owned on 'the one hand that there are Gods, denied on the 'other that the Gods had made World? — We 'are not to ſeek for the true philoſophick Sentiments 'of the Philoſopher *Thales*, in the Diſcourſe and 'Converſation of *Thales*, one of the ſeven wiſe 'Men of *Greece*. He might have ſaid in this 'laſt Character, many things which he would not 'ſay in his philoſophical Auditory. He ſpoke of 'nothing but Water, when he explained the Ge-'neration of the World as a Philoſopher; he did 'not add the Operation of God to that of the 'Water. But when he looked upon himſelf as 'one of the wiſe Men, whoſe ſententious Diſ-'courſes might ſerve for the Corrections of Man-

'ners,

'ners, and be ſpread among the common People, 'he thought himſelf obliged to conform to the 'Opinions of Theologers. Obſerve that the Te-'nets of the *Pagan* Philoſophers were connected 'together very ill, and were ſo inacurate, that 'from the Hypotheſis of the Exiſtence of a God, 'it did not follow that he had any Share in the 'Adminiſtration of the World; and from the 'Hypotheſis of his Providence, it did not follow 'that he had reduced the Chaos into Order or 'created the Univerſe. They were allowed to 'ſay, that the Gods governed the World, though 'produced and taken out of the Boſom of the 'Chaos, in the ſame manner as corporeal Sub-'ſtances. Hence, as it was believed, that the 'Soul of Man, according to their Syſtem, was 'formed out of the more ſubtile Parts of the 'Blood, they might ſay that *Jupiter*, *Venus* and '*Mercury* were produced from the leſs groſs Par-'ticles of the Chaos.'

I ſhall here add to the convincing Reaſons of Mr. *Bayle*, that *Cicero* ſays preciſely the ſame thing with regard to the Sentences which are alledged from the Philoſophers. According to him *, we ought not to judge of their Opinions by any unconnected Words; but by the Chain of their Principles, and the Totality of their Syſtems.

As for thoſe who have admitted Gods, and yet would not allow them to preſide over the Formation of the World, *Epicurus* may be reckoned one. The *Epicureans* acknowledged there were

* Non igitur ex ſinguli vocibus philoſophi ſpectandi ſunt, ſed ex perpetuitate atque conſtantia. Cicer. Tuſculan. Diſputat. Lib. V. Cap. X.

A little before the ſame Cicero had ſaid: atqui his capiunter *imperiti*, & propter hujuſmodi ſententias iſtorum hominum eſt multitudo. Acutè autem diſputantis illud eſt, non quid quiſque dicat, ſed quid cuique dicendum ſit videre. Id. ibid.

Gods; but ſo far from attributing the Arrangement of Matter to them, they aſſerted, that the Gods themſelves had been formed by the Atoms, when theſe minute Particles, laying hold of each other, had produced the Univerſe. It would be eaſy for me to prove that ſeveral other Sects, who admitted the Exiſtence of Gods, ſuppoſed they had their Origin, when the Arrangement of Matter took Place, and fell into the Regularity it is now in; for as to the Creation of this ſame Matter out of nothing, by an intelligent Being, not one of the ancient Philoſophers had the leaſt Idea thereof, either becauſe it ſeemed to them abſolutely impoſſible, it being their Opinion, that ſomething * could not be made out of nothing, even by a Divine Power; or that the Devil, if we may credit a *German* Profeſſor †, had maliciouſly put this Opinion into their Heads. However, I can hardly perſuade myſelf, notwithſtanding the magiſterial Aſſertion of this Divine, that this wicked Spirit had ſo direct an Influence over the firſt Principle of the Theology of the *Grecians*; I ſhould rather chuſe to blame the Weakneſs of human Underſtanding, which cannot of itſelf, and without the Aſſiſtance of Divine Revelation, proceed ſo far as to diſcover certain abſtract Truths.

* Principium hinc cujus nobis exordia ſumet.
Nullam rem è nihilo gigni divinitus unquam
Quippe ita formido mortales continet omnes,
Quod multa in terris fieri cœloque tuentur
Quorum operum cauſas, nulla ratione videre
Poſſunt, at fieri divino numine rentur.
Tit. Lucret. Cor. Lib I. Verſ. 150. & ſeq.

† Gentilibus omnibus, perſuaſum fuit deo materiam increatam, ab æterno coextitiſſe. Tetigi hoc in ſchediis Hiſt. Sect. XXXVIII. Tit. O. & cauſas duas expoſui, quibus a ſatana mendacium hoc perſuaderi ſibi fuerint paſſi, unam quod ne adeo quidem crederent ex puro nihilo poſſe, alteram quod exiſtimarent, niſi materia detur, quæ ſit independens, principium mali, fore ut deus habeatur auctor malorum. Diſſertat. XII. Stoicis materiam principium mali, a Theſſal. XII. Auctore M. Jac. Thomaſio p. 162.

I ſhould not forget before I proceed any farther to wipe off the Reproach of the Abbe *D'Olivet* againſt Mr. *Bayle*, who charges him with giving *a forced Senſe* * *to the Paſſages he quotes, and to take a ſecret Pleaſure, in encreaſing the Number of the materialiſt Philoſophers, in placing* Thales *among thoſe who attribute the Formation of the Univerſe to Matter only, without the Concurrence of an intelligent Cauſe.* As to the Reproach of giving a forced Senſe to the Paſſages, I ſhould ſpend Time to no purpoſe if I dwelt any longer on Mr. *Bayle*'s Juſtification; and for his taking Pleaſure, as they pretend, in encreaſing the Number of materialiſt Philoſophers, I demand why the Abbe *D'Olivet* did not aſſert the ſame thing of St. *Auguſtine*, *Theodoret*, and St. *Juſtin*. It is plain the ſame Zeal which urged him to ſpeak injuriouſly of Mr. *Bayle*, was evaporated when he came to treat of Authors who had been dead thirteen or fourteen Centuries. And yet theſe are the Perſons he ſhould have exclaimed againſt; if Mr. *Bayle* has fallen into an Error, theſe are the Perſons who have laid the Foundation thereof. Could the Abbe *D'Olivet* be ignorant, that we ought not to judge from deceitful Appearances, of the Sentiments of a Man of Honour, much leſs make uſe of theſe Appearances, for a Pretence to cry down his Integrity? But this is not the Place for me to make Repriſals upon the indiſcreet Management, and free Manner, wherewith the Abbe *D'Olivet* often ſpeaks of Mr. *Bayle*; I ſhall have better Opportunities, and much more eſſential than this, and I am in reality much more mortified for the Abbe *D'Olivet*'s Conduct than that of his Adverſary.

I am now going to perform my promiſe, and to ſhew, that it is evident from the Teſtimony

* D'Olivet, Theologie des Philoſophes Grecs, &c. p. 60.

of *Cicero*, and from the Acknowledgment of the Abbe *D'Olivet*, that the Paſſage of the Book of the Nature of the Gods, which has given riſe to the Difficulty ſo judiciouſly taken Notice of by Mr. *Bayle*, has been manifeſtly altered and corrupted. *Cicero* explains himſelf in the following manner, in his Academical Queſtions, where he repeats preciſely the ſame thing from the Syſtems of the *Grecian* Philoſophers, that he had wrote in his Book of the Nature of the Gods *. *Thales, the Father of the Philoſophers, and one of the ſeven wiſe Men of* Greece, *maintains that all Beings, had been produced by Water.* Anaximander *his Diſciple did not adhere to this Opinion; but he pretended that Infinity was the Source of all the different Subſtances.* Anaximenes, *who ſucceeded him, aſſerted, that the firſt Principles of all Things was the Air, which he affirmed to be infinite, though the various Productions which proceeded therefrom were finite; he would have it that the Air alſo produced the Water, Earth, and Fire, and theſe laſt the Elements of all Bodies.* Anaxagoras *maintained that Matter was infinite, and conſiſted of ſmall homogeneous Particles, which at firſt were a confuſed undigeſted Maſs, and were afterwards put in order by a divine Underſtanding.*

Theſe are all the Theological Syſtems concerning the Formation of the Univerſe. *Cicero*, when he mentions *Thales*, does not ſays one Word which means that this Philoſopher had allowed

* Princeps Thales, unus è ſeptem, cui ſex reliquos conceſſiſſe ferunt primos, ex aqua dixit conſtare omnia. At hoc Anaximandro populari & ſodali ſuo non perſuaſit, is enim infinitatem naturam dixit, è qua gignerentur omnia: Poſt ejus auditor Anaximenes, infinitum aera, ſed ea quæ ex eo orirentur, definita: gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex his omnia. Anaxagoras materiam infinitam, ſed eas particulas, ſimiles inter ſe minutas: eas primum confuſas, poſtea eas ordine deductas mente divina. Cicero Academ. Quæſtion. Lib. IV. Cap. XXVI.

n intelligent Being to have formed the Univerſe. He ſpeaks of the Corrections which were made o his Syſtem, by his Diſciple *Anaximander*, who s it is agreed on all hands, did not admit of any ntelligent Being. Can it poſſibly be ſuppoſed, hat if *Thales* had actually allowed a divine Cauſe o have preſided over the Arrangement of Matter, *Cicero* would not have taken Notice that *Anaxi-mander* had rejected this Cauſe as well as he had done the univerſal Principle Water. To ay the Truth, when this Paſſage is confronted with that of the Book of the Nature of the Gods, t is impoſſible not to perceive that this laſt has been corrupted. And how ſhould it be other-wiſe, ſince we cannot comprehend the meaning of the two following Lines, and which however ought to make but one only intire Senſe, with thoſe that give riſe to the Difficulty in Queſ-tion! Let us hear the Abbe *D'Olivet*, who can-not accuſe himſelf of being an incompetent Wit-neſs. *Nothing remains*, ſays he, *but to explain the laſt Phraſe of* Cicero, *which contains the Refuta-tion of* Thales, *it appears a little defective; how-ever one may gueſs at the Opinion of* Velleius, &c. I am afraid that the Abbe *D'Olivet* is as bad a Gueſſer on this Occaſion, as on that wherein he judges of the ſecret Pleaſures of Mr. *Bayle*. But be this as it will, he owns the Paſſage in Queſtion ſeems a little defective. The Preſident *Bouhier* explains himſelf more freely, and owns that all Interpreters have perceived that this Paſſage was corrupted, and that ſeveral Words are wanting therein. What! Is the Zeal of the Commenta-tors ſo very ſtrong, and has he ſuch great Power over the beſt Genius's, that he ſo far blinds them, as to oppoſe a maimed and falſified Paſſage to the Authority of five or ſix ancient Authors, and

three Fathers of the Church, who have been in the Judgment of all the World the greateſt Genius's of the Primitive Church, and who have oppoſed with the greateſt Strength the *Pagan* Philoſophers their Cotemporaries? When I conſider the daring Enterprize of the Abbe *D'Olivet*, I am no longer ſurprized that he has laid it down as a fundamental Law *: *that a Tranſlator ought to act according to the Rules of a Knight-Errant, and be always ready to break a Lance in the Defence of the Honour of his Original.* Unhappily for the Gentlemen the Knight-Errant Tranſlators, they happen ſometimes to meet with Adverſaries, who are ſo ill natured as not to confeſs willingly, that the Defects of their Original are Beauties; eſpecially when theſe Defects are manifeſt Contradictions, cauſed by the Error of the Tranſcribers, and proved by the Authority of the moſt celebrated Writers.

I perceive that it muſt be very troubleſome to the Abbe *D'Olivet* to have made all theſe fine Diſtinctions to no manner of purpoſe, by which he pretends to eſtabliſh, that *Thales* † *intended to ſpeak of an intelligent Being; which being united to Matter made but one therewith, directing its Operations; in the ſame manner as the Soul, being joined to the Body, makes but one Man, and directs all the Actions of the Man. But* Anaxagoras *underſtood it of an intelligent Being abſolutely diſtinct and ſeparate from Matter, as we ſhall ſee by and by. Thus the former found in the ſame Whole, both the material and the efficient Cauſe; whereas the latter made them actually diſtinct. Theſe two Opinions are intirely different, the firſt having been taught*

* D'Olivet Remarques ſur la Theologie des Philoſoph. Grecs. p. 106.

† Id. ibid. p. 61.

taught by Thales, *and the ſecond by* Anaxagoras ; *therefore* Cicero *had ſufficient reaſon to acknowledge them for the Authors of two different Syſtems.* All theſe Conjectures are witty enough, but manifeſtly falſe. If they might have been looked upon as true, the ancient Authors would not have failed to have mentioned them ; whereas they have ſaid directly the contrary. Here therefore we may apply the Maxim of the Abbe *D'Olivet* ; when there is a poſitive Argument, we are under no Obligation to produce a Negative.

SECT. III. *Of the Syſtem of* Anaximander.

*ANAXIMANDER**, the Son of *Praxides*, was a *Mileſian*, and *Thales* was both his Maſter and Friend. We have ſeen that he did not adopt the Opinions of *Thales*, and that he maintained that all things were produced by Infinity. *Cicero* informs us †, that *he believed the Gods derived their Being from ſome other, that they were born, and ceaſed to be in long Intervals of Time ; and that there were innumerable Worlds.* *Cicero* afterwards obſerves, that it is a ridiculous thing to allow the Being of a God, and deny his Eternity ; he doubtleſs had Reaſon on his Side, and it is impoſſible to advance a more evident Abſurdity,

* ΑΝΑΞΙΜΑΝΔΡΟΣ Πραξιάδου, Μιλήσιος. οὗτος ἀρχὴν καὶ στοιχεῖον τὸ ἄπειρον εἰρηκὼς ἀέρα, ἢ ὕδωρ ἢ ἄλλο τι. καὶ τὰ μὲν μέρη μεταβάλλειν, τὸ δὲ πᾶν ἀμετάβλητον εἶναι Anaximandro Mileſio Praxiades pater fuit. Hujus eſt illud, principium et elementum immenſum hoc, et infinitum eſſe, non tamen definiens aera, aut aquam, aut aliud quippiam ; partes quidem ejus immutari, totum vero immutabile eſſe.

Diog. Laert. de Vit. Philoſ. Lib. II. Segm. I.

† Anaximandri autem opinio eſt, nativos eſſe Deos, longis intervallis orientes occidenteſque, eoſque innumerabiles eſſe mundos ; ſed nos Deum, niſi ſempiternum intelligere qui poſſumus ?

Cicer. de Nat. Deorum, Lib. I. Cap. X.

dity. Without giving myſelf any Trouble of confuting ſo evident a Falſity, I ſhall only obſerve that *Anaximander* did not make uſe of any divine Underſtanding in the Formation of the Univerſe, which is an Aſſertion, which nobody pretends to conteſt; nevertheleſs he allowed the Exiſtence of the Gods. And why might not his Maſter *Thales* have done the ſelf ſame thing, might he not have ſpoken, in very lofty terms concerning the Deity, and yet have made him of no conſequence in explaining the Syſtem of the Univerſe? The Belief of the Diſciple is more than a ſtrong Preſumption for that of the Maſter.

A very ſhort Paſſage of *Plutarch* *, for it contains no more than theſe Words, *Anaximander believed the Stars to be the cœleſtial Gods*, has very happily aſſiſted the Abbe *D'Olivet* in explaining what theſe innumerable Words were, that *Cicero* informs us were the Gods of *Anaximander*. *Plutarch*, ſays he, *facilitates the Underſtanding of this Opinion, when he informs us, that the Gods of* Anaximander *were the Stars* †. I. *If this Philoſopher does not attribute Innaſcibility to his Gods, it is becauſe he did not look upon, and could not look upon the Stars as any thing more than the Works of Nature.* II. *If he believes* that his Gods were born and died after long Intervals of Time, *it was becauſe Aſtronomy, yet very imperfect, had diſcovered the Appearance of new Stars, though but ſeldom, and after long Intervals of Time, and likewiſe perhaps they might have loſt the Sight of ſome others that had been anciently diſcovered.* III. *If he ſays alſo, that* there are Worlds and innumerable Worlds, *he ſpeaks as the generality of other Philoſophers, who thought that all the Stars were ſo many Worlds inhabited by living Creatures.*

I

* *Plutarch*'s Opinions of the Philoſoph. Lib. I. Cap. VII.

† *D'Olivet* Remarques ſur la Theolog. des Philoſ. Grecs, p. 63.

I ſhould have been glad to have conſulted the Commentaries of the Jeſuit *Leſcalopier* to have given me ſome Light into this Affair, if the Abbé *D'Olivet* had not derived one Part of the *Ideas* which he has had concerning the Gods of *Anaximander* from thence; but I could not ſatisfy myſelf therein: That which gave Birth to this Curioſity, is a Reproach which the Partiſans of this Jeſuit made to a learned Academician. *The Piece*, ſay they *, *that the* Abbé *D'Olivet has given us on the Theology of the* Grecian *Philoſophers is very curious, and written with as much Diſcernment as Clearneſs and Politeneſs; but we ought to be ſo juſt to Father* Leſcalopier, *as to ſay, that though we ſhould only patch together all that this Father has ſaid of the Sentiments of the Ancients concerning Divinity, it would alone make a conſiderable Volume.* The ſame Authors had aſſerted a little before in ſpeaking of the Criticiſms of the Abbé *D'Olivet*, on the Commentaries of this Father, *it is very well known, that no Authors meet with worſe Treatment than thoſe who have been moſt pillaged by the Critick himſelf.* It is very eaſy to underſtand what is meant by this laſt Phraſe, and that the Abbé *D'Olivet* is accuſed of abuſing the Authors whoſe Aſſiſtance he had condeſcended to make great uſe of. I ſhould not have taken any great notice of this Reproach, becauſe I am acquainted with the Inſincerity and Impudence of the Writers, from whence it proceeds; I ſhould even have been very far from giving any Credit thereto, having not been able to gain the Work of Father *Leſcalopier*. However, one thing has prevented me from rejecting it as a manifeſt Calumny, which is, that I have Proofs, which I ſhall give the Publick every

* Journaliſtes des Trevoux, in the Memoirs of *November* 1721, Article XCIII.

Time, and as often as the Abbé *D'Olivet* ſhall deſire it; that though he has taken ſeveral excellent Things from the Works of Mr. *Bayle*, he has nevertheleſs treated him injuriouſly and in a ſhocking and unpolite Manner; and what is ſtill worſe, at the ſame time, that he thought his Opinions good enough to adopt for his own, he ſometimes employed them ſimply and ſuch as he found them, and ſometimes adorned them and dreſs'd them up in an academical Stile. This is a ſufficient Diſguiſe at firſt Sight, but when we come to compare them with the Original they are eaſily known: As to the Quotations which we meet with in the Work of the Abbé *D'Olivet*, three Quarters of them may be met with in the Articles that Mr. *Bayle* has made upon ſeveral Philoſophers in his Dictionary; every one may find out the Truth of what I aſſert. In Reality, what Eſteem ſoever I may have, I cannot help obſerving *en paſſant*, that to borrow the Riches of a Man, to make uſe of them to gain Advantage therefrom, and then to treat him injuriouſly, is not the Part of a good Chriſtian, *aliquando bonus dormitat Homerus*, the greateſt Men ſometimes forget themſelves. If the Abbé *D'Olivet* had been a *Janſeniſt*, he would have allowed me to ſay, that we ſee in him *the Example of a righteous Man, who is void of Grace.*

SECT. IV. *Of the Syſtem of* Anaximenes.

ANAXIMENES, Son of *Euriſtratus*, was a *Mileſian**, as *Thales* and *Anaximander*. He was a Diſciple of the latter, and ſome believe he was likewiſe a Diſciple of *Parmenides*; he ſaid, that the

* Ἀναξιμένης Εὐρυστράτου Μιλήσιος, ἤκουσεν Ἀναξιμάνδρου τοῦ Πραξιάδου καὶ τοῦτον φασί τινες ἀκοῦσαι αὐτοῦ. οὗτος ἀρχὴν ἀπεφήνατο καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον.

Anaxi-

the Air and Infinity were the Principles of all other Beings. I ſpeak in the Stile of *Diogenes Laertius*, but we ſhall ſee very ſoon, if what he has aſſerted has met with any Contradiction: However, I ſhall obſerve before-hand, that theſe two Principles by Turns produced and abſorbed all other Principles of a different Nature. This Syſtem conſidered in this Light would greatly reſemble that of *Spinoſa*, but we ſhall find it much more perfect, if we ſeek after the Opinions of *Anaximenes* in ſeveral other Authors who have made mention thereof; for according to the Manner in which *Diogenes Laertius* explains himſelf, it ſhould ſeem that *Anaximenes* believed without any Manner of Doubt two Principles, *the Air, and the Infinity of Nature*; however, *Ariſtotle* and all his Commentators place *Anaximenes* among the Philoſophers, who have admitted but one ſole and only Principle. *Plutarch* ſays the ſame thing, and blames *Anaximenes* in expreſs Terms, for having admitted and eſtabliſhed one Principle alone. It is impoſſible, ſays he *, that there ſhould be but one only Principle of all Things, which is Matter; for there is an abſolute Neceſſity of having Recourſe to ſome efficient Cauſe: for otherwiſe it is like a Man having a ſufficient Quantity of Silver to make a Vaſe, when the efficient Cauſe is wanting, which is the Workman; the ſame may be ſaid of Copper, Wood, and all other Materials. *Cicero* obſerves, as a thing certain, that it was the Belief of *Anaximenes* †, that the Air was infinite, and that it produced all

Anaximenes, Euryſtrati filius, Mileſius, Anaximandri auditor fuit. Quidam & Parmenidem audiviſſe aſſerunt. Hic initium dixit aëra, & infinitum. Diog. Laert. de Vit. Philoſoph. Lib. II. Segm. 3.

* *Plutarch* of the Opinions of the Philoſophers.

† Anaximenes, infinitum aëra, ſed ea quæ ex eo orirentur definita, gigni autem terram, aquam, ignem, tum ex his omnia. Cicer. Quæſt. Academ. 4. Cap. XXXVII.

other different Beings, but not in an infinite Number; that from the Air, the Earth, Fire and Water have their Originals, and that these had formed in their Turns all other Bodies, of what kind soever.

The Abbé *D'Olivet* makes no mention of the Difference which is to be found between *Diogenes Laertius* and other Authors: Perhaps it is because neither the Jesuit *Lescalopier* nor Mr. *Bayle* have made any mention thereof; nevertheless, it has been observed by *Isaac Casaubon* *; and there is no other Method of justifying the Mistake of *Diogenes Laertius*, than by laying it upon the Transcribers; those who understand *Greek* will readily perceive what an easy Matter it is, that they should have committed a Fault in this Phrase, which is the Ground of the Opposition to be met with between *Diogenes Laertius*, and the other Authors: οὗτος ἀρχὴν ἀέρα εἶπε, καὶ τὸ ἄπειρον But let this be as it will, it is not less certain, that *Anaximenes* asserted, that the Air, which he held to be infinite, was the sole and only Principle of all other Beings; he bestowed the Name of God on the Air, thus infinitely extended.

Cicero explains this Affair in a very obscure Manner; it is impossible to comprehend his Meaning, especially when we compare the Passage of his Book on the Nature of the Gods, with that which I took notice of above, which is very clear and plain: *Anaximenes*, says he, *pretends that the Air is God, that it is produced, that it is immense and*

* Duo ergo videtur Anaximenes agnovisse principia, aërem & infinitatem natura, quam solam Anaximander esse dixit è qua omnia gignerentur. Atqui ex Aristotelis interpretibus in primum ἧς ἰκῆς ἀπροάσεως, intelligimus, Anaximenem inter eos fuisse qui unicum ponerent rerum omnium principium. Quin Cicero quoque & Plutarchus idem scribunt. Isaac. Causab. in Not. ad Diogen. Laert. Lib. II. Segm. 3. Not. 2.

and infinite, that it is always in Motion. How is it poſſible that *Anaximenes* would have aſſerted ſo many Things which evidently deſtroy each other? If the Air is infinite, if it is the Cauſe of all other Beings, if it is the Source from whence they flow, how is it poſſible that itſelf ſhould have been produced by any elſe? If it was produced by any other Principle, then it will follow, that the Air was not the firſt, that it was neither eternal nor neceſſary. But if this is not the Caſe, then it could not be produced, and is conſequently eternal. Beſides, whatever is immenſe and infinite, cannot be produced, becauſe the Principle which ſhould produce it muſt be either finite or infinite; if it is finite, it is impoſſible that Infinity ſhould proceed from a finite Cauſe. Here we may very aptly apply that well known Axiom, *Nemo dat quod non habet*; and if the Principle is infinite, it cannot produce a ſecond infinite. It is abſurd and fooliſh to ſuppoſe the contrary, for two infinite material Beings are of all other Suppoſitions the moſt contrary to good Senſe.

All the Explanations by which the Abbé *D'Olivet* pretends to terminate the Oppoſition of *Cicero* to himſelf, and to clear up the Obſcurity which is evident in the whole Paſſage of his Book of the Nature of the Gods, are nothing but meer Imaginations and groundleſs Conjectures, invented at Pleaſure. Let us firſt enquire after what he ſays in *Cicero*'s Juſtification; and that we may not overlook his Reaſons, I ſhall quote his own Expreſſions at length *. *How could* Anaximenes *aſſert, that the Air was God, at the ſame time ſuppoſe that itſelf was produced? It is much in the ſame Senſe, that* Anaximander *affirmed it of the Stars; and*

* *D'Olivet* Remarks on the Theology of the *Grecian* Philoſophers, &c. p. 68.

and becauſe he would have the Air to be the firſt Emanation of the eternal Subſtance. My Meaning is as follows.

All the Ancients believed the Eternity of Matter, but the greateſt Part of them conſidered it, before the Formation of the World, as nothing but a rude and ſhapeleſs Maſs, rudis indigeſtaque moles. This is what they call the Chaos. Some affirmed, that there was a natural and ſpontaneous Motion, whereby it at length fell into a regular Order, and by little and little became what we now behold. Others would not allow this moving Faculty, but aſſociated an intelligent Being therewith, who impreſſed a Motion thereon, and reduced it into Order. Theſe are, if I am not miſtaken, the two principal Sources from whence the Natural Philoſophy of the Ancients flowed; nor is it neceſſary to remark in this Place into what Number of Rivulets they were divided.

Anaximenes therefore, when he reaſoned about *the ſecond State of Matter, when it was changed from a Chaos into a regular Form, believed that at firſt it became Air; that conſequently the Air, which then comprehended every Thing that was material, was infinite; and that the Air being modified, produced Earth, Fire and Water, from whence all particular Beings had their Riſe. Such was, I dare venture to ſay, the Genealogy of his Hypotheſis. By which one may perceive, how he came to ſay that the Air was produced and yet believed it to be infinite, and gave it the Appellation of God, preferably to the other three Elements, which he believed to be limited and finite, the Air being the total and immediate Reſolution of the unproduced Subſtance; whereas the three other Elements were only Modifications of the Air; I ground this Explanation on a Paſſage of the Academical Queſtions.*

I acknowledge with the Abbe *D'Olivet*, that all the Ancients believed the Eternity of Matter, ſome of whom imagined that it had a natural and ſpontaneous Motion, by which, the Motion ſtill continuing, it arrived by little and little to the State wherein we now behold it; and that others not believing that it had the Power of moving itſelf, joined an intelligent Being thereto, who impreſſing Motion thereon, had diſpoſed it into the Order it now hath. But I deny, and I have ſufficient Reaſon for my Denial, that *Anaximenes* thought Air had been produced by another Matter, and that he believed nothing which had any relation with the unformed and indigeſted Maſs, which when brought into Order from a confuſed Chaos, conſtituted the four Elements. From what Book, or what Author ancient or modern, could the Abbe *D'Olivet* extract any thing like it? All that he ſays is *gratis dictum*, and without the leaſt Proof to ſupport his Aſſertion. All Authors ſay in expreſs Terms, that the only Principle which he admitted was the Air, which he ſuppoſed to be infinite, and the Cauſe of all other Beings. Therefore if he had believed that this Air had been made of any prior Matter, then this Matter ſhould have been conſidered as the true and firſt Principle. Common Senſe will ſhew that *Anaximenes* looked upon the Air in the ſame Light as *Epicurus* and *Democritus* did the Atoms, that is to ſay, as Particles extremely fine and fluid, which laying hold of each other had formed all other Beings, but which owed their Origin to themſelves, as having exiſted in all times paſt. All the Explanations then of the Abbe *D'Olivet* become quite uſeleſs, and it is abſolutely impoſſible to comprehend how *Anaximenes* could affirm, that the Air was the firſt Principle of all other

other Beings, and yet that God was the Producer thereof.

The Paſſage out of the Academical Queſtions, by which the Abbe *D'Olivet* pretends to explain the other in the Book of the Nature of the Gods, does nothing but render it more unintelligible; for *Cicero*, ſpeaking very clearly in the former, only ſays, that *Anaximenes, a Diſciple of* Anaximander, *aſſerted the Air to be the Principle of all other Beings, and that it was the Air that had formed the Water, the Earth and Fire.* There is no more mention made in all this, *of the Air which was formed of the firſt Matter, when the Chaos* was brought into Order and Regularity, nor of all the reſt of the groundleſs Suppoſitions of the Abbe *D'Olivet*, than of canonizing St. *Paris* at *Rome*, and of acknowledging the Pope's Supremacy at *Amſterdam*. How then can he pretend to prove by this Paſſage, that *Cicero* was not deceived, or that the Tranſcribers have not maimed theſe Works, when they have made him ſay, that *Anaximenes* aſſerts the Principles of all other Beings, to be a Principle which had been produced, and that this Principle was God? Mr. *Bayle* was well aware that this Paſſage could not be ſupported, and he has refuted it from another of St. *Auguſtin*, which perfectly well explains the Syſtem of *Anaximenes*. 'There have been, 'ſays he *, great Philoſophers, who have ſuppoſed 'them to have been produced by a Being, which 'was not God. *Anaximenes omnes rerum cauſas 'infinito aëri dedit, nec deos negavit aut tacuit: 'non tamen ab ipſi aërem factum ſed ipſos ex aëre 'ortos credidit.* One may better underſtand the 'Opinion of *Anaximenes* by theſe Words of St. *Auguſtine*,

* *Bayle's* Critic and Hiſtor. Dictionary Art. *Jupiter*, Remark IX.

'*Auguſtine*, than by thoſe of *Cicero*. *Anaximenes aëra deum ſtatuit, eumque gigni, eſſeque immenſum et infinitum et ſemper in motu.* There 'is no Appearance that *Cicero* has given a good 'Account of the Sentiments of this Philoſopher; 'for ſince *Anaximenes* beſtowed the Nature of 'the Principle of all Things upon the Air, that 'is Immenſity and Infinity, we muſt believe that 'he ſuppoſed it to be eternal and uncreated, and 'that if he beſtowed the Title of God thereon 'agreeable to this Notion, he did not believe 'the Generation of God, in this Reſpect. There'fore when he ſays, that infinite Air was the 'Cauſe of all other Beings, he did not attribute 'thereto the Name and the Nature of God, in 'the ſame Senſe, that he attributed it to the 'Gods, who according to him derived their Ori'gin and Exiſtence from the Air. Perhaps what 'follows may be his true meaning. He was de'ſirous, in order to avoid all Diſputes about Words, 'to call the immenſe and infinite Air God, 'which he looked upon as the Principle of all 'Things, but he did not pretend that *Saturn*, '*Rhea*, *Jupiter*, *Juno*, *Neptune*, *Minerva*, and 'the reſt of the Gods, which they worſhipped in 'the Time of *Paganiſm*, to have been this Air, 'or that they had produced it. He pretends on 'the contrary, that this Air was their Principle, 'as well as that of all other Beings, of which 'the Univerſe conſiſts; he beſtowed on this Prin'ciple a perpetual Motion, and from thence one 'may conclude, that he took it for an emanent 'Cauſe, which produced of itſelf an infinite Num'ber of Effects, without end and without ceaſing, 'and he reckoned among theſe Effects, not only 'the Stars and Meteors, Plants, Stones and Me'tals, but alſo Gods and Men. Such an Opinion

'as,

'as this was the Foundation of *Spinoſiſm*; for 'according to this, God, or the eternal and ne- 'ceſſary Being of *Anaximenes*, was the only Sub- 'ſtance, whereof the Heavens and the Earth, the 'Animals, *&c.* were nothing but Modifications.'

Who could have believed that this learned and ingenious manner of Reaſoning, whereby Mr. *Bayle*, ſupported by the Authority of St. *Auguſtine*, unravels the Syſtem of *Anaximenes*, could have put the Abbe *D'Olivet* out of Temper? However nothing is more true, and he literally follows the Maxim, which he laid down, that a Commentator ſhould be always ready, to *break a Lance* in favour of his original Author; but in this Caſe he only takes up his to be a Second in the Duel; *I oppoſe*, ſays he *, *the Authority of* Cicero, *to that of a learned Man, againſt whom I cannot help being fired with the Zeal of a Tranſlator. For he dares advance that* there is no likelihood, that *Cicero* had given a true Report of the Opinion *of* Anaximenes; *and all this upon the Credit of the Words of St.* Auguſtine, *taken from his Treatiſe of the City of God.*

To this I anſwer, without examining to the Bottom of his Thoughts, that in an Affair of this Nature, the Authority of St. Auguſtine *perhaps is not ſufficient to charge* Cicero *with being in an Error.*

Is it not very wonderful that the Abbe *D'Olivet* ſhould think it ſtrange, that in a Caſe which relates to the Deciſion of the Theology of the *Greeks*, he ſhould oppoſe the Authority of St. *Auguſtine* to *Cicero*, becauſe he has laid it down as a Maxim, that we ought to examine the Opinions of the ancient Philoſophers, by what *Cicero* only

* *D'Olivet*'s Remarks upon the Theolog. of the *Grecian* Philoſop. *&c.* p. 67.

only has ſaid concerning them? As I think I have proved that the Fathers of the Church, who have written againſt theſe very Philoſophers, ought to be carefully conſulted, I ſhall content myſelf with joining the Authority of *Lactantius* to that of St. *Auguſtine*; and the rather, becauſe Mr. *Bayle* has made no uſe of him, either through Forgetfulneſs, or becauſe he thought he had no occaſion to quote him. *Cleanthes*, ſays he *, *and* Anaximenes *have affirmed in their Writings, that the Air was the ſupreme God: their Opinion is perfectly agreeable to that of* Virgil, *when he expreſſes himſelf in the following Terms: the Almighty Father of the Air, all Things that exiſt, deſcends in a fruitful Shower into the Boſom of his Spouſe, the Earth, and mingling itſelf with all Bodies, both nouriſhes and gives them new Life.* This agrees extremely well with the Suppoſition of Mr. *Bayle*. *Anaximenes* called the Air the ſupreme God, the ſovereign Being, the Author of all the different Subſtances: *Æthera dicebat eſſe ſummum Deum.* Thus, when he ſaid, as the learned Critick obſerves, the infinite Air was the Cauſe of all other Beings, and the Gods themſelves had been created, he only means the ſubaltern Gods, ſuch as *Jupiter*, *Juno*, and the reſt of the *Pagan* Deities, and not the neceſſary Being, the eternal Principle, that is the Air, on which he beſtows the Name of the ſupreme God, *ſummus Deus*.

Let us actually compare the Paſſage of St. *Auguſtine* with that of *Lactantius*, and we ſhall diſcover in an inſtant the Relation they bear one to

* Cleanthes et Anaximenes æthera dicunt eſſe ſummum Deum. Opinioni poeta noſter adſenſit:

Tum pater omnipotens fecundis imbribus æther,
Conjugis in græmium lætæ deſcendit; et omnes
Magnus alit magno permiſſus corpore fœtus.

Lactant. Firmian. Lib. I. de falſa Religione, Cap. VI. p. 91. Edit. Lipſiæ. 1698.

to the other. *Anaximenes* aſſerted, that *infinite Air was the Cauſe of all other Beings; he did not deny that there were Gods, but he believed they were generated by the Air*, that is to ſay, according to *Lactantius*, of the ſupreme God. I perceive nothing more clear than this Paſſage of St. *Auguſtine*, nothing more obſcure, more unintelligible, and more abſurd than the Words of *Cicero*; nevertheleſs the Abbe *D'Olivet*, believing that he ought to be fired with the Zeal of a Tranſlator, anſwers Mr. *Bayle*, without examining his Thought, that in a Matter of this Nature the Authority of St. *Auguſtine* is not ſufficient to accuſe *Cicero* of being deceived. It muſt be owned the Zeal of the Tranſlator is very ſtrong, when he is determined not to examine whether the Tranſcribers of his original Author, have made any Blunder or not. Perhaps *Cicero* might not be deceived but they may have foiſted in ſome Expreſſion, or omitted ſome Words, which render what he has ſaid ridiculous. And why pray may not this have actually been the Caſe, ſince in the four or five Lines, before this Paſſage, we meet with very groſs Miſtakes of the Tranſcribers? I have already remarked, that the Preſident *Bouhier* has complained of this very thing, as well as the reſt of the Commentators: But here is ſtill ſomething more; this worthy Magiſtrate, who has been ſo great an Honour to his Country and the *Belles Lettres*, has already proved to a Demonſtration, that that which immediately follows the Paſſage which Mr. *Bayle* had attempted to reſtore, by another of St. *Auguſtine*, was maimed and falſified. *This whole Paſſage*, ſays the illuſtrious Magiſtrate, *in the Condition it is now in, is quite unintelligible.* After this he endeavours to reſtore the true reading: And by whoſe Authority? By that of St.

Auguſtine,

Auguſtine * ; *this learned Father*, ſays he, *has not only related the Text of* Cicero, *in the manner it ſhould be*; *but he has taken Pains to explain a very obſcure Subject, and which without his Aſſiſtance could not have been eaſily underſtood. This will appear from his Commentary. And it is very ſurprizing, that neither Father* Læſcalopier *who has quoted the former, nor Mr.* Davis, *have made any uſe thereof to reſtore this Paſſage of* Cicero *to its ancient Purity.*

For what Reaſon did the Abbe *D'Olivet* not feel the Zeal of a Tranſlator againſt the Preſident *Bouhier?* Why does not he anſwer, that in a Subject of this Nature the Authority of St. *Auguſtine* is not ſufficient to accuſe *Cicero* of being deceived? Perhaps it may be becauſe of the excellent Remarks which this great Man has permitted to be printed in the Tranſlation, which the Abbe *D'Olivet* has given the Publick, of the three Books of the Nature of the Gods. If this is the Motive of his Silence, I cannot but approve of it, and the Publick has never had a better Recompence for ſuppreſſing a wretched Criticiſm. The learned Notes of the illuſtrious Preſident never fail of adding a new Luſtre to the Work which they accompany. In a word, by thus allowing a due Merit to the Remarks, I would not be thought at all to leſſen the Value of the Tranſlation? and I here declare, once for all, that I make a great Difference between the Abbe *D'Olivet* the moſt eloquent and faithful Tranſlator, and the Abbe *D'Olivet* as an injurious Critick of Mr. *Bayle*, who has never given him the leaſt Cauſe of Complaint.

SECT.

* Note I. upon the XIth Chap. of the 1ſt Book Des Entretiens ſur la Nature des Dieux. Tom. I. p. 358.

SECT. V. *Of the System of* Anaxagoras.

I SHALL not insist long on the System of *Anaxagoras*; I have already spoken sufficiently thereof in the Sections of *Thales* and *Anaximenes*, where I have often had Occasion to remark, that he was the first who acknowledged how absurd it was that Matter had the Power of moving itself, and of falling into that Order and Regularity we now behold it, without the Assistance of an intelligent Being. The Work which he has written, concerning the Formation of the Universe, begins with these Words *, *all Things lay blended and confounded with each other until a Spirit caused their Confusion to cease.* It was *Diogenes Laertius* who has preserved *Anaxagoras*'s own Words. *Aristotle*, *Cicero*, *Plutarch*, all clearly inform us, that this Philosopher, rising far above his Predecessors, had introduced a Spirit or Mind, who reduced the Chaos into Regularity and Order. It is altogether useless to repeat here that none of the ancient Philosophers ever said any thing of the Creation of Matter; thus the intelligent Being of *Anaxagoras* only puts that Mass into Order, which was coeternal with itself.

The Abbe *D'Olivet* seems to think, that since *Anaxagoras* has admitted a Spirit, in the Formation of the Universe, he was acquainted with

* Καὶ πρῶτος τῇ ὕλῃ νοῦν ἐπέστησεν, ἀρξάμενος οὕτω τοῦ συγγραμματος, ὅ ἐστιν ἡδείῳ καὶ μεγαλοφρόνως ἡρμηνευμένον. Πάντα χρήματα ἦν ὁμοῦ εἶτα νοῦς ἐλθὼν αὐτὰ διεκόσμησε. παρ, ὁ καὶ νοῦς ἐπικλήθη, καὶ φησι περὶ αὐτοῦ Τιμὼν ἐν τοῖς Σίλλοις οὕτω. Primus hic materiæ, quam *Hyle* appellant mentem adjecit, in principio operis sui suavi ac magnifica oratione sic scribens: Omnia simul erant, deinde accessit mens, eaque composuit, quamobrem et mens sive animus dicitur Simon hoc ipsum de Anaxagora fatetur, in Sillis. Diogen. Laert. Lib. II. Segm. 60.

with its Spirituality, and did not allow of a corporeal God, as almoſt all the reſt of the other Philoſophers did. Several Paſſages of the Abbe *D'Olivet*'s Work ſhew that he is perſuaded, that the Spirituality was known to ſome of the Ancients, in the ſame manner as it is now underſtood by our Metaphyſicians, in which he is very greatly deceived; for by the Word Spirit, the Philoſophers, as well as the *Romans*, have underſtood a ſubtile, igneous, extremely fine Matter *, which indeed had an Underſtanding, but was at the ſame time truly extended and conſiſted of different Parts. Thus when the Abbe *D'Olivet* ſays, when he ſpeaks of *Anaxagoras* †, *the Notions begin already to be unravelled* —— *they have the Idea of Spirituality, they acknowledge an infinite Spirit, whoſe Power acts upon Matter, whoſe Wiſdom endues it with a Regularity and Order.* He is remarkably miſtaken. He does not fall into a leſs Error, when he aſſerts that the *Timæus of Plato*, wherein the Sentiments of *Pythagoras* are explained, contains an Idea *of a ſpiritual Subſtance.* Neither *Plato*, nor *Pythagoras* before him, had any Notion of a Subſtance *entirely ſpiritual*; they have allowed an eternal intelligent Being, and if you pleaſe infinite, which however conſiſted in a ſubtile Matter. Since the Abbe *D'Olivet* had undertaken to explain the Theology of the ancient *Greek* Philoſophers, with relation to the Ideas they had of the Deity, it behoved him to prove what he advanced with ſo much Confidence, could he be

* Others comprehended that the intelligent Being could not be material, and that it was abſolutely neceſſary, to diſtinguiſh it from every thing that was material ---- an Opinion ---- which includes the Idea of Spirituality --- *Cicero* acknowledges elſewhere that we cannot form an Idea of a being purely ſpiritual, but that we could not poſſibly repreſent God otherwiſe. Theologie de Philoſophes Grecs. p. 133.

† The ſame, p. 72.

be ignorant that his Opinion, is rejected by all thoſe who underſtand the Opinion of the Ancients? And why would he have us believe merely upon his own Authority, that the *Grecian* Philoſophers had an Idea of a Subſtance *entirely ſpiritual*, when it is as clear as the Day, that all the primitive Fathers of the Church have made God corporeal, that their Doctrine has been handed down among the *Greeks*, even to theſe laſt Centuries, and that it was not rejected by the *Romans*, till about the Time of St. *Auguſtine*; nay, even this Saint has talked upon this Subject in a very confuſed manner, and has often advanced Opinions which deſtroy each other.

I ſhall now do all that lies in my power, and what the Abbe *D'Olivet* himſelf ought to have done; I ſhall enquire what the Spirituality is, which he affirms was known to the Ancients, and I ſhall prove, I hope to a Demonſtration, 1. That the *Grecian* Philoſophers never had an Idea of a Subſtance, which at this Day we call *entirely Spiritual*. 2. That all the Fathers of the Church, down to the Council of *Nice*, and even ſeveral Years after, have had very different Notions from thoſe now in Vogue, of what we call Spirituality. 3. The Opinion, which attributes Extenſion to God, has not been entirely condemned except by the *Carteſians*, and that it is at this Day held by the *Grecian* Church, wherein it paſſes for the conſtant Doctrine of the primitive Fathers of the Church.

SECT.

SECT. VI. *By the Word Spirit all the Philoſophers equally underſtood a ſubtile Matter. An Explanation of the Syſtem of* Plato. *The Signification of the Word* ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ.

IN order to make a ſound Judgment, concerning the Term *Spirit*, and in what Senſe it ought to be underſtood, in the Works of the Ancients, and to determine its true Signification; it will be neceſſary to give heedful Attention, to the occaſion of uſing thereof, and to what purpoſes they have employed this Word. They were but very little accuſtomed to make uſe of this Word, to expreſs the Idea of a Being purely intellectual, as we underſtand it at this Day, or as thoſe applied it who did not acknowledge any Deity, or who only admitted the Exiſtence of one to deceive the People, or to have nothing to fear from the Magiſtrates. The Word *Spirit* is to be often met with in *Lucretius* *, who uſes it inſtead of the Word Soul. That of *Intelligence* is employed to the ſame purpoſe: *Virgil* † uſes it to ſignify the Soul of the World, or that ſubtile and intelligent Matter, which being diffuſed through all its Parts, directed and animated the whole.

* Paſcit amore avidos inhians in te Dea viſus;
Eque tuo pendit reſupini ſpiritus ore.
Lucret. Lib. I. Verſ. 38.
Nunc animum atque animum dico conjuncta teneri
Inter ſe, atque unam naturam conficere ex ſe.
Id. Lib. III. Verſ. 137.
Præterea gigni pariter cum corpore, et una
Creſcere ſentimus, pariter ſeneſcere mentem.
Id. Lib. III. Verſ. 445.

† Spiritus intus alit, totamque infuſa per artus
Mens agitat molem, et magno ſe corpore miſcet, &c.
Virg. Æneid. Lib. VI. p. 725.

Know firſt, that Heaven, and Earth's compacted
Frame,
And flowing Waters, and the ſtarry Flame,
And both the radiant Lights, one common Soul
Inſpires, and feeds, and animates the whole.
This active Mind infuſed through all the Space,
Unites and mingles with the mighty Maſs.
Hence Men and Beaſts the Breath of Life obtain;
And Birds of Air, and Monſters of the Main.
The æthereal Vigour is in all the ſame,
And every Soul is filled with equal Flame.

This Syſtem of *Virgil* was in part the ſame, as that of the ancient *Pythagoreans*. The *Stoics*, who properly ſpeaking were nothing but reformed *Cynicks*, brought it to Perfection; they gave the Name of God to this Soul, they looked upon it as intelligent, and they called it the *intellectual Spirit*; does not it hence follow that they had an Idea of a *Subſtance entirely ſpiritual?* Not at all, any more than *Spinoſa* had, or at leaſt not a jot more. The Abbe *D'Olivet* will permit me to take Notice of the Opinion of a learned Jeſuit, who may be looked upon without Flattery, as one of the fineſt Genius's in *Europe*, and who beſt underſtood the Philoſophy of the Ancients. *They thought they had done ſome mighty Matter* *, ſays this Jeſuit ſpeaking of them, *when they choſe the moſt ſubtile Body*, viz. *Fire, to ſerve for the Intelligence or Soul of the World, as may be ſeen in* Plutarch; *we ought to be acquainted with their Language, for in ours the Word Spirit ſignifies an incorporeal Subſtance, and on the contrary in theirs, it may be proved that a Thing was corporeal, be-*
cauſe

* Plan Theologique de Pythagoriſme, &c. par le Pere Mourques, &c. Tom. I. p. 27.

cauſe it was a Spirit — I am obliged to make this Obſervation, becauſe without it, thoſe who ſhall read with the Eyes of the Moderns, the Definition of God in Plutarch, in the manner of the *Stoics:* That God is an intellectual and igneous Spirit, who being without Form can change himſelf into whatever Thing he pleaſes, and aſſume the Likeneſs of all other Beings, *would believe that the Terms* INTELLECTUAL SPIRIT, *determines the Signification of the following Term, to a Fire purely Metaphorical.*

Thoſe who are unwilling to ſubmit to the Opinion of a learned modern, perhaps will not refuſe to allow the Authority of an ancient Author, who may be ſuppoſed to be well acquainted with the Opinions of the Philoſophers, ſince he has written an excellent Treatiſe upon that Subject, which, though very conciſe, is nevertheleſs very clear. It is *Plutarch* of whom I am ſpeaking. He ſays in expreſs Terms, *that* Spirit * *is nothing elſe but a* ſubtile Matter, *and he ſpeaks of it, as of a thing well known and acknowledged by all the Philoſophers. Our Soul,* ſays he, *which is Air, keeps us alive; thus Spirit and Air preſerve all the World in being; for Spirit and Air are two Words which ſignify the ſame thing.* I believe nothing can be required more ſtrong, and at the ſame time more clear than this Expreſſion. Will any one ſay that *Plutarch* was not acquainted with the true meaning of the *Grecian* Terms, and that the Moderns now alive, had a better Knowledge of it than he? Such an Abſurdity may indeed be advanced, but will any one give Credit thereto, I do not mean among the Learned, but even among

* *Plutarch*'s Opinions of the Philoſophers, Lib. I. Cap. III.

Perſons who have but a ſlight Tincture of the *Belles Lettres* and Philoſophy?

Plato of all the ancient Philoſophers was one who ſeemed to have the trueſt Idea of real Spirituality: But when we examine with due Attention the Conſequence and Connection of his Opinions, we ſhall clearly ſee that by the Word *Spirit* he meant nothing elſe but an igneous, ſubtile and intelligent Matter. Without this, how are we to underſtand * that God had thrown out of his Boſom *the Matter wherewith he formed the Univerſe?* Can we place Matter in the Boſom of a Spirit? Is there Extenſion in a Subſtance entirely ſpiritual? *Plato* had borrowed this Idea from *Timæus* of *Locrius* †, who ſays, *that God, being deſirous to take out of his Boſom a very beautiful Son, produced the World, whoſe Duration will be eternal, becauſe it is not the Property of a good Father to put his Child to Death.* It is proper to obſerve here that *Plato*, as well as *Timæus* his Guide and Model, having equally admitted the Co-eternity of

* See Diſſertation III. Sect. VIII. of the foregoing.

† Δηλεόμενος ὦν ἄριστον γενναμα ποιεῖν τοῦτον ἐποίησεν θεὸς γενητὸν, τὸν ποκα φθαρησόμενον ὑπ' ἄλλω αἰτίω ἔξω τῶ αὐτὸν συντεταγυῖαν θεῶ, εἴ ποκα δήσετο αὐτὸν διαλυεῖν· ἀλλ' οὐ γὰρ ταγαθῶ γίνομαι ἐπὶ φθορὰν γνησιατῶ καλλίσω διαμένει ἔρα, τὶς ἐσσὺ ὢν, ἀφθαρτῶ καὶ ἀνωλεθρῶ καὶ μανάμιῶ. κράτιστος δὲς γενητῶν ἐπεὶ ὑπὸ τῶ κρατίστω αἰτίω γένετο, ὀφειρῶντος οὐκ εἰς γειρόκνατα παρα δεγνατα, ἀλλ' ἐς τὰν ἰδέαν καὶ ἐς τὰν νοατὰν ουσαν Quum igitur Deus vellet pulcherrimum fœtum producere hunc effecit Deum genitum, nunquam corrumpendum ab alia cauſa, præterquam a Deo qui ipſum compoſuit, ſi quando voluerit ipſum diſſolvere. At non eſt boni genitoris, ad ſui fœtus, et pulcherrimi quidem illius, perniciem impelli. Permanet igitur mundus conſtanter talis qualis eſt creatus a Deo, ab omni corruptione liber et interitu, beatus, optimus rerum omnium genitarum: quandoquidem ab optimæ cauſa extitit, proponente ſibi non exemplaria quædam manuum opificio edita, ſed illam ideam intelligibilemque eſſentiam.

Timæi Locri de Anima Mundi, p. 546. in Opuſcul. Græc. &c.

of Matter * with God, it will thence follow that Matter had from all Eternity ſubſiſted with the ſpiritual Subſtance, and had been envelopped therein. Is not this to give the Idea of a ſubtile Matter of a fine Principle, which comprehended the material Seed of the Univerſe?

We may conclude from certain Paſſages of the Book of *Timæus* of *Locris*, that Matter had a moving Power eſſentially in itſelf †, that it put itſelf in Motion, and aſſumed different Forms, before God had given it that which it now bears. Theſe were the vague and indeterminate Forms which gave riſe to the Idea of God, and influenced him to give it one that was beautiful and determinate. This is the ſame Idea on which *Plato* afterwards beſtows the Name of the *Word*, of *Underſtanding*, and of *Reaſon*. In his dark and obſcure Diſcourſes, he produces a ſecond God, which was an Emanation of the firſt, and he alſo deifies the Univerſe. Thus to the ſupreme God, that is to ſay, to the igneous and intelligent Matter, which had from all Eternity preſerved in its Bo-

* Ἀμορφον δὲ καθ' αὑτὰν, καὶ ἀσχημάτιστον, δεκομέναν δὲ πάσαν μορφάν. τὰν δὲ περὶ τὰ σώματα, μισεπὰν εἶμεν, καὶ πᾶς πάσας φυτίω. Hanc vero materiam aiebat eſſe ſempiternam, nec vero mobilem: et ab omni forma et figura per ſe immunem, et liberam, quaſlibet tamen formas recipientem. Id. ibid. p. 544.

† Περὶ ὧν ὠράνον γενέσθαι, λέγα ἦμεν ἰδέα τε καὶ ὕλα, καὶ θεὸς δημιουργὸς τῶ βελτίονω. ἐπεὶ δὲ τὸ προτέρυτερον καὶ πρᾶτον ἐστὶ τῶ ὑστέρω, καὶ τὸ τεταγμένον πρὸ τῶ ἀτάκτω, ἀγάλλετο ὢν ὁ θεὸς, ἰδὼν τὰ ὕλαν δεχομέναν τὰν ἰδίαν καὶ ἀλλοιουμέναν, πανοίως μὲν, ἀτάκτως δὲ, ἐθέλειν ἐς τὰξιν αὐτᾶν ἄγεν, καὶ ἐξ ἀοριστίων μεταβολᾶν, ἐς ἀριθμίναν καταστᾶσαι· ὁμόλογα γὰρ δικαιότερα τῶ σπουδαίω γίγνεσθαι, καὶ μὴ κατ' ἐναντίον πρὸς δέχεσθαι. Antequam igitur cœlum extaret, ratione erant formæ et materia, et quidem Deus ille erat meliorîs opifex. Quandoquidem igitur antiquius juniore præſtantius eſt, et id quod ordinatum eſt inordinato. Deus quum nimium bonus ſit, et videret materiam recipere formam, et alterari varie quidem, ſed tamen inordinate: vidit quoque opus eſſe ut eam ipſe in ordinem reduceret, et ex indefinitis mutationibus ad certam definitamque conſtitueret. Id. ibid. p. 543.

ſom the Seed of the material Univerſe, he aſſociated two ſubaltern Deities, which had truly and properly been produced; but which nevertheleſs were of the ſame Nature with the ſupreme God, the one being an Emanation of his Underſtanding, and the other proceeding from and having been thruſt out of his Boſom.

The primitive Chriſtians being deſirous to make uſe of every thing in their Power to overthrow Paganiſm, though they could gain great Advantages from the Syſtem of *Plato*, they endeavoured to find out the Doctrine of the Trinity in the three Gods of that Philoſopher, they tortured all his Writings to make them confeſs the ſacred Truths of our Holy Religion. This is in part the Cauſe of the manifeſt Contradictions, which are to be met with in the Works of the primitive Fathers, who were Admirers of the Tenets of *Plato:* Some of them interpreting a Paſſage of the *Timæus*, or ſome other Work of *Plato*, in one manner, and others in a Senſe quite different. This blind Zeal of theirs produced infinite Diſorders, and *Tertullian* * complains, that all the Hereticks derived their Errors from the Books of *Plato*. He had reaſon for his Aſſertion, in as much as this Philoſopher had hurt true Chriſtianity in the firſt Centuries in like manner as *Ariſtotle* had in the latter: This Preceptor of *Alexander* the Great having had a caſting Voice in all the Councils for above three hundred Years †.

I

* Doleo bona fide Platonem omnium Hæreticorum condimentorium factum. Tertul. de Anima, Cap. XXIII.

† In che haveva una gran parte Ariſtotele coll' haver diſtincto eſſattament tutti generi di cauſe, a cui ſe egli non ſi foſſe adoperato, noi mancaremo di molti articoli di fede. Fra. Paolo, del Concilio Tridentino, Hiſt. Lib. III. p. 234.

I ſhall obſerve here *en paſſant*, a Matter ſingular enough, which was not obſerved by the Abbe *D'Olivet*, when he publiſhed his Remarks on the Theology of the *Greeks* for the firſt time. He acquaints us, that being terrified with the Difficulties which he had in unravelling the confuſed Syſtem of *Plato*, he beſought the Abbe *Fraguier* * to take this Office upon him, who complied with his Requeſt, and communicated an Abſtract of the Opinions of *Plato*. Unhappily for the Abbe *D'Olivet* he had printed it in his Work, probably without ſhewing it to his Friend Father *Hardouin:* This *Jeſuit* made another Criticiſm, which was printed in his Miſcellaneous Works, in which he pretends to prove plainly that *Plato* was an Atheiſt, that all that he has advanced might have been ſaid by a *Spinoſiſt*, and that the Abbe *Fraguier* had not underſtood the real Opinion of that *Greek* Philoſopher. This is a Diſpute on a Point of Authority which I ſhall leave the Abbe *D'Olivet* to decide when he ſhall judge moſt proper. As for me, who am acquainted with that ſort of People whom Father *Hardouin* would convict of *Atheiſm*, I look upon what he has writ againſt *Plato*, as a certain Mark, that this Philoſopher had better Ideas of the Deity, and leſs imperfect, than all the other Philoſophers who went before him.

I meet with a great Number of convincing Proofs in *Tertullian*, that *Plato* was never acquainted with the real Spirituality. This ancient Divine lets us know how the Word Spirit muſt be interpreted in the Works of this Philoſopher; I ſhall here make ſome Remarks, which ſhall put this Queſtion quite out of Diſpute.

Tertullian, as well as the other Fathers of the Church, who lived about the ſame time, called God an immaterial intellectual Spirit, though he

* D'Olivet Theologie des Philoſophes Grecs, &c. p. 108.

actually made him material, as you ſhall ſee in a ſhort time. They ought therefore to have known in what Senſe the Word *Spiritual* ſhould have been taken, and that he did not deſign thereby a Subſtance without Extenſion, without Parts, which occupies no Place, in a Word, ſuch as at this Day we believe real Spirituality to conſiſt in; but he underſtood by that Word an igneous, ſubtile, and intelligent Matter. This being inconteſtibly the Caſe, let us ſee the Reproach of *Tertullian* with regard to *Plato*; *he accuſes him with having granted ſo much of a divine Nature to the Soul, that he rendered it equal to God. He pretends*, ſays he, *that it is innate* *, *which is an Attribute of the Deity alone, who alone by his own Nature enjoys an Eternity* à parte ante, & a parte poſt; *he would have it to be immortal, incorruptible, immaterial, in the ſame Manner with God himſelf. He affirms, that it is inviſible, ineffable, uniform, rational and intellectual. What could he give more to the Soul, if he believed it to be God? As for us, who allow of no equal with the Deity, we believe that the Soul had a Beginning; and if it becomes immortal it is nevertheleſs capable of ſuffering.* Who can doubt, that if *Tertullian*, who believed and ſtrenuouſly maintained, *that God was corporeal* †, *though he was*

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* Primo quidem oblivionis capacem animam non credam, quia tantam illi conceſſit divinitatem, ut Deo adæquetur. Innatam eam facit, quod & ſolum armare potuiſſem ad teſtimonium planæ divinitatis; adjecit immortalem, incorporalem, incorruptibilem, quia hoc & Deum credidit, inviſibilem, ineffigiabilem, uniformem, principalem, rationalem, intellectualem. Quid amplius proſcriberet animam, ſi eam Deum nuncuparet? Nos autem qui nihil Deo appendimus hoc ipſo, animam longe infra Deum expendimus quod natam eam agnoſcimus, ac per hoc dilutioris divinitatis, exilioris felicitatis ut ſtatum non ut ſpiritum; & ſi immortalem ut hoc ſit divinitatis, tamen poſſibilem ut hoc ſit nativitatis. Tertullian. de Anima, Cap. XXIV.

Tertul. adverſ. Prax. Cap. VII.

† Quis autem negabit Deum eſſe corpus, etſi Deus ſpiritus? ſpiritus etiam corpus ſui generis in ſua effigie.

a Spirit, all Spirit being Body, and having a Form and Shape proper to itſelf; who can doubt, I ſay, that if *Tertullian* had believed *Plato* had admitted the Soul to be an impaſſible Subſtance, and void of Extenſion, or ſpiritual in the ſame Senſe, that we at this Day hold it to be, he would not have explained himſelf otherwiſe, and that he would have reproached *Plato* for giving to the Soul, and to God, a Nature different from what they really have? Who can doubt but he would have exclaimed againſt his daring to give an immaterial Subſtance to the Soul, when God himſelf was only a Body? He would have equally condemned the Idea which *Plato* had of the Nature of the Deity, and that of the Soul; but on the contrary, he only endeavours to prove, that he was in an Error in making the Eſſence of a human Soul, equal to the Eſſence of God.

The Authority of an ancient *Greek* Author, whom we cannot ſuppoſe to have been ignorant of the true Signification of the Word ἀσώματον, that is to ſay, *incorporeal*, and who has himſelf given us the Explanation thereof, is ſtill more deciſive than that of *Tertullian*. *Origen*, for I am going to ſpeak of this learned Man, explains this Word by the Terms *ſubtile Matter* *, and *Air extremely Light*. He obſerves in the ſame Place, that the Word ἀσώματον, incorporeal, is not to be found in any Place of the ſacred Writings †. We

* At oſtendemus in ſequentibus animam licet incorporalem ſtatuere videatur, talem tamen reſpectu craſſiorum corporum ab eo prædicari revera corpore præditam decerni; quemadmodum vel ex priore capite librorum *de princip.* perſpicuum eſt, ubi vocis hujus ἀσώματον exponens accipi docet pro eo quod non eſt ſimile huic noſtro craſſiori & viſibili corpori, ſed quod eſt naturaliter ſubtile, & velut aura, tenue. Originis in ſacras ſcripturas Commentaria, &c. *Pet. Daniel Huetius*, &c. Notis & obſervationibus illuſtravit, Tom. I. Quæſt. IV. de Deo, p. 29.

† Appellatio ἀσωματον apud noſtros ſcriptores eſt inuſitata & incognita. *Origen in Poem.* ad Lib. de Princ.

ſhall ſee hereafter the Belief of this Father of the primitive Church more at large concerning the Spirituality of God; it will be ſufficient to know at preſent what the moſt ſkilful of the *Greeks* ſaid of the Senſe of this Word, and what they meant by the Term *incorporeal.* This Difficulty being cleared up, we ſhall ſee how the Thought of *Cicero* is to be explained, and how we ſhould underſtand the Word ἀσώματον, which he makes uſe of in his Writings, when he ſays that *Plato, having made God incorporeal, he has ſpoken of a Being which cannot exiſt.* It is not that *Cicero,* or *Velleius* whom he makes ſpeak, thought that *Plato* wanted to introduce a Deity without Extenſion, impaſſible, abſolutely incorporeal, and ſpiritual in the ſame Senſe, that we now underſtand it; but he thought it ſtrange that he had not given a Body and a determinate Form to the *Spirit,* that is to ſay to the *Intelligence compoſed of a ſubtile Matter,* which he admitted to be the ſupreme God; for all the Sects who acknowledged the Exiſtence of Gods indued them with Bodies. The *Stoicks,* who explained themſelves in the ſublimeſt Manner concerning the ſubtile Eſſence of that God, however confined him to the World, which ſerved him inſtead of a Body. It is concerning the depriving him of a groſs and material Body, that he makes *Velleius* ſay, that if the God of *Plato* is incorporeal, he ought to have no Perception, nor yet to be ſuſceptible either of Wiſdom or Pleaſure. All the ancient Philoſophers, except the *Platonicks,* believed that a Spirit without a Body could be ſenſible of neither Pleaſure nor Pain, therefore it was natural for *Velleius* to look upon *Plato's* incorporeal God, that is, who only conſiſted of a ſubtile Matter, which conſtituted the Eſſence of Spirits, as a God incapable of Pleaſure, Wiſdom, or any Senſation.

I cannot better explain my Meaning than by placing here the original Paſſage of *Cicero*; thoſe who do not underſtand *Latin* will pardon me for once, if I place the Quotation in the Text of my Work. *Jam de * Platonis inconſtantia longum eſt dicere, qui in Timæo, patrem hujus mundi nominari neget poſſe; in legum autem libris, quid ſit omnino Deus, inquiri oportere non cenſeat. Quod vero ſine corpore ullo Deum vult eſſe, ut Græci dicunt ἀσώματον id quale eſſe poſſit, intelligi non poteſt; careat enim ſenſu neceſſe eſt, careat prudentia, careat voluptate; quæ omnia una cum Deorum notione comprehendimus. Idem & in Timæo dicit, & in legibus, & mundum Deum eſſe, & cœlum, & aſtra, & terram, & animos, & eos, quos majorum inſtitutis accepimus; quæ & per ſe ſunt falſa perſpicue & inter ſeſe vehementur repugnantia.*

SECT. VII. *The primitive Fathers of the Church were not acquainted with perfect Spirituality.*

SINCE I have promiſed to ſhew, that the primitive Fathers of the Church had no Ideas more perfect of the Spirituality of God than the *Platonick* Sect, and that they have looked upon it as conſiſting of a ſubtile Matter, a refined Fire, a ſplendid Light; I ſhall now proceed to perform my Engagement. We have ſeen *Origen*'s Explanation of the Word ἀσωμασία, which is the Incorporeality of the *Greeks*; and this might have been ſufficient to prove the Idea which he had of ſpiritual Subſtances: However, I ſhall examine in a more extenſive manner what his Opinion was concerning the Eſſence of ſpiritual Subſtances. He

* Cicer. de Natura Deorum, Lib. I, Cap. XII.

has told us himſelf, that *all Spirit* *, *according to their moſt exact and ſimple Notion of this Term, is a Body.* Hence it appears, that according to this Definition he muſt have believed, that God, Angels, and Souls were cōrporeal; and this in reality was his Belief, and the learned Mr. *Huet* gives an Account of all the Reproaches that *Origen* † has received on this Occaſion. He endeavours to wipe off ſome Part of them; but yet he readily owns that it is certain, that this ancient Father acknowledged, that it did not at all appear from Scripture ‡, wherein the Eſſence of the Deity conſiſted. The ſame Mr. *Huet* likewiſe agrees, that he believed Angels ‖ and human Souls were compoſed of a ſubtile Matter, which he calls ſpiritual, with regard to that of which the Body conſiſts; it therefore follows neceſſarily from thence

* Πᾶν πνεῦμα, εἰ καὶ λεπτότερον ἐπινοοῖμεν. τὸ πνεῦμα σῶμά τι ὑπάρχειν. Origen in Joan. T. XIV. p. 215.

† Deo corpus ab Origene adſcriptum fuiſſe nonnulla perſuadere poſſunt. Primum argumentatio illa, quam e Lib. III. περὶ ἀρχῶν adducit Hieronymus *Epiſt.* LIX. *ad Avit. Cap.* III. qua animam corpore carituram demonſtrare ſtudet Adamantius, quia ſancti Deo ſimiles futuri ſunt, juxta illud Chriſti; *Ut quo modo ego & tu ſumus, ſic & iſti in nobis unum ſint.* *Huet. Origeniam,* Lib. II. Quæſt. I. Art. V. p. 28.

‡ Quæ cùm ita ſint, hæc tamen ſcribit Origenes in Proem. Libror. περὶ ἀρχῶν: *Deus quoque quomodo intelligi debeat, inquirendum eſt, corporeus, an ſecundum aliquem habitum deformatus, an alterius naturæ quam corpora ſunt, quod utique in prædicatione noſtra manifeſte non deſignatur.* Id. ibid. p. 30.

‖ In his ſecum licet pugnare videatur Origines, facile tamen diſcordantes loci conciliantur: nam angelos ita corporeos eſſe vult, ut ſpiritales nihilo minus eſſe velit, quod ſpiritus nihil ſint aliud quam ſummæ exiguitatis corpora, cujuſmodi ſunt angelica; aſſerit quippe loco ſupra allato *materialem ſubſtantiam hujus mundi ſpiritalis corporis indumentis vel angelos Dei, vel filios reſurrectionis exornare*; ut hominem quoque corpora poſt reſurrectionem ſpiritalia fere declarat *Paulus* I. *Cor.* 15. 44. Angelos porro cum propter eximiam corporum ſubtilitatem ſpiritales dixerit, incorporeos quoque quodammodo, καὶ κατὰ χρῆσιν, dici poſſe cenſuit, habita præſertim corporum noſtrorum ratione quæ craſſa ſunt. *Id.* Quæſt. V. *de Angel.* Art. V.

thence, that he has likewiſe admitted a ſubtile Eſſence in the Deity, for he ſays in expreſs Terms *, that the Nature of human Souls, is the ſame as that of God. Then, if the human Soul is corporeal, God likewiſe muſt be corporeal too. The learned Mr. *Huet* has carefully related ſome Paſſages of the Works of *Origen*, which ſeem directly oppoſite to thoſe for which he has been condemned; but the Terms which *Origen* makes uſe of, are ſo expreſs, and the manner in which this learned Prelate vindicates him is ſo weak, that one may eaſily ſee, that the Province he has entered into of a Commentator, puts Weapons in his Hands to defend the original Author, though he is almoſt convinced that St. *Jerom*, and the reſt of the Criticks, had reaſon to maintain that *Origen* had no better Notions of the Spirituality of God, than of that of human Souls and Angels.

Tertullian has been more explicit than *Origen* with relation to the Corporeality of God, which however he calls ſpiritual, in the ſame Senſe that this Word was made uſe of among the Ancients. *Who can deny*, ſays he †, *that God is not a Body, though he is alſo a Spirit; every Spirit is a Body, and has a Form and Shape proper to itſelf.* We cannot, unleſs we will ſhut our Eyes againſt the Truth, avoid

* Deus igitur, cui anima ſimilis eſt juxta originem reapſe corporalis eſt, ſed graviorum tantum ratione corporum incorporeus. *Hieronymus* præterea, *Cap.* III. memoratæ *ad Avitum Epiſtolæ*, ait Originem ad extremum Libri III. περὶ ἀρχῶν hæc intuliſſe: *Et erit Deus omnia in omnibus, ut univerſa natura corporea redigatur in eam ſubſtantiam quæ omnibus melior eſt, in divinam ſcilicet, qua nulla eſt melior.* Et ſub finem ejuſdem epiſtolæ refert Originem, *Lib.* IV. περὶ ἀρχῶν *conjungere omnes rationabiles naturas, id eſt patrem, & filium, & ſpiritum ſanctum, angelos, poteſtates, dominationes, cæteraſque virtutes, ipſum quoque hominem ſecundum animæ dignitatem unius eſſe ſubſtantiæ.* Id ipſum ex ejus doctrina conſequi probat Theophilus Alexandrinus I. Paſch. *Id.* Quæſt. I. de Deo, Art. V.

† I have quoted this Paſſage of *Tertullian* in the preceding Chapter.

avoid ſeeing, by the Confidence wherewith *Tertullian* declares his Sentiments, that he ſuppoſes this Matter altogether inconteſtible, and that this was the Opinion of all the *Latin* Church. If this had not been the Caſe, if the reſt of the Fathers and Biſhops had been acquainted with the *perfect Spirituality* of God, they muſt doubtleſs have looked upon *Tertullian* as a Heretick. I deſire to know, if at this time a-day they would not excommunicate from all Chriſtian Communions a Man who ſhould boldly maintain, that *God is corporeal?* I likewiſe aſk, if an Author would not be eſteemed as a Madman, who ſhould confidently aſſert, that *no Perſon can deny God to be corporeal*, and who would attempt to prove this Error, according to the common Senſe and received Notions of all Mankind, or rather by this Axiom ſuppoſed to be eſtabliſhed, that *every Spirit is corporeal?* If the Opinion of *Tertullian* was not the Opinion of all his Co-temporaries, we muſt neceſſarily conclude that this learned Man was very fooliſh.

There is but one Method of ſhewing, that the Belief of *Tertullian* was not the ſame as that of the *Latin* Church, which is to prove, that they have condemned the Sentiments of this Father; but this is ſo far from being the Caſe, that we have Witneſſes, and inconteſtible Witneſſes, who inform us, that they have acted quite otherwiſe. *Tertullian*, ſays St. *Auguſtine* *, *maintains, as it appears by his Writings, not only that human Souls were corporeal, but that God was corporeal likewiſe. And yet it does not appear that this Opinion has cauſed him to be looked*

* Tertullianus ergo, ſicut ejus ſcripta indicant, dicit immortalem quidem, ſed eum corpus eſſe contendit, neque hanc tantum, ſed ipſum etiam Deum corporeum eſſe dicit, licet non effigiatum, nec tamen hinc hæreticus creditur factus. *Auguſt.* Lib. *de Hæreſ.*

looked upon as a Heretick. However ſtrong and deciſive this Paſſage may be thought, there is another of the ſame Father, which is yet more ſo *. *It is not becauſe* Tertullian *has ſuppoſed God to be corporeal, that he was accounted a Heretick, but becauſe he fell into the Errors of the* Cataphrygæ, *which he had formerly refuted with good Succeſs. He maintained, contrary to the Apoſtolick Doctrine, that ſecond Marriages were Concubinages, and that they ought to be prohibited.* Can one poſſibly imagine, that if the Belief of the *Latin* Church concerning the Nature of the Deity had not been the ſame as that of *Tertullian*, they would not have declared him an Heretick; ſince he was the ſame Perſon whom they had expelled from their Society, and deprived him of the Communion for having maintained that ſecond Marriages were neither lawful nor innocent. Would it in theſe modern Times have been thought leſs contrary to *the Apoſtolick Doctrine*, to pretend that no Perſon ought to marry twice, than to maintain that *God is corporeal*, and that *every Spirit is a Body?* If they had formerly believed what we actually believe at this Day, for what reaſon would not they have done what we ſhould now do with regard to a Man, who ſhould boldly maintain the Opinion of *Tertullian?* Were they more modeſt and cautious in the firſt Centuries of the Church in declaring People Hereticks, than they have been in the latter? Not at all; the ſingle Opinion which prohibited ſecond Marriages was ſufficient to gain them that Title. Is it not then as clear as the Sun at Noon-day, that if they did not beſtow it on thoſe who maintained, that *God was*

* Non ergo ideo Tertullianus factus hæreticus, ſed quia tranſiens ad Cataphrygas, quos ante deſtruxerat, cœpit etiam ſecundas nuptias *contra Apoſtolicam doctrinam*, tamquam ſtupra damnare, & poſtmodum etiam ab ipſis diviſus, ſua conventicula propagavit. Id. ibid.

was incorporeal, becauſe every Spirit was a Body, they followed an approved Opinion, and aſſerted nothing contrary to the *Apoſtolick Doctrine.*

However, there is a certain Monk who has taken it into his Head to prove that *Tertullian*, though he did actually believe human Souls to be corporeal, had nevertheleſs acknowledged the *perfect Spirituality of God.* He would have it, that this ancient Father looked upon the Terms Subſtance and Body, as ſynonimous Terms; thus, when he ſays, *who can deny God to be a Body*, is the ſame as if he had ſaid, *who can deny God to be a Subſtance* *? As for the Words ſpiritual and incorporeal,

* Subſtantivum et corporale idem eſſe apud Septimium, *quis enim*, inquit, *negabit Deum corpus eſſe*, etſi Deus ſpiritus eſt, ſed aliud eſt ſpirituale apud auctorem, et aliud incorporale: ſicut enim incorporale eſt, quod inane, vacuum et vanum eſt: ita corporale eſt quidquid ſubſtantivum eſt, id eſt reale, ſibi conſtans et per ſe ſubſiſtens; adeo ut ſpiritus poſſit eſſe corpus, ſpirituale poſſit eſſe corporale. *Sed et inviſibilia* habent *apud Deum et ſuum corpus et ſuam formam*, id eſt ſolidam et realem eſſentiam, *quanto magis quod ex* ſubſtantia miſſum eſt, *ſine ſubſtantia non erit*, id eſt ſine corporea, ſeu ſolida et ſubſiſtente natura? Liquet igitur per corpus intelligendum eſſe ipſum ſubſtantivum, et qui alterius generis eſt divina ſubſtantia, adeo ut reſpecta creatæ ſubſtantiæ, quæ mutationibus ſubſtat et accidentibus, recte dixerit *Lib.* VII. *de Trinitate Cap.* V. Deum abuſive dixi ſubſtantiam: ſic et apud auctorem *Deus ſpiritus eſt corpus ſui generis*, id eſt ſubſtantia ſui ordinis, tam ab aliis diſtincta quam ſuper alias ſublimata: quocirca non debuit urgeri de nomine Septimius, mens enim ſana, et in ambiguo nomine inculpata, *Auguſt. Epiſt.* CLVII. de Orig. Animarum. Ubi cum dixiſſet animas *Tertullianus* eſſe incorporeas, addit: *Neque hoc ſomniaſſe Tertullianum mirandum eſt, qui etiam ipſum Creatorem Deum non eſſe corpus opinatur, nec ſolum corpus, ſed et ſpiritum. Idem Lib.* II. *de Anim. et ejus Orig. Cap.* V. At vero *Lib.* X. *de Geneſ.* ad Litt. C. 26. *Ad hoc*, inquit, *nunquam cogeretur, ſi aliquid cogitare poſſet quod ſit, corpus non ſit.* Satis apte ſi modo vis non fiat in verbis: revera enim Septimius per corpus nihil aliud intellexit quam quod reale eſt, ſolidum et ſubſtantivum, ut ſi quis nomine offenditur *ſententiam teneat et linguam corrigat. Tertullianus redivivus ſcholiis et obſervationibus illuſtratus*, &c. auctore *P. Georgie Ambianate, Minorita Capucino*, Pariſiis apud ſuos Profeſſore Theologo, Obſervationis in Librum adverſus *Praxeam*, Cap. Septimium, Tom. I. p. 215. col. 2.

poreal, the ſame Monk ſuppoſes that *Tertullian* made uſe of them in a quite oppoſite Senſe. That *incorporeal*, has the ſame meaning as *nothing*, a *Vacuum*, the Privation of all Subſtance; that ſpiritual on the contrary ſignifies a Subſtance, which is not material. Thus when *Tertullian* affirms, that *every Spirit is a Body*, it is the ſame thing as if he had ſaid, that *every Spirit is a Subſtance.*

By ſuch ridiculous Diſtinctions as theſe, this Commentator pretends to refute the Reproaches of St. *Auguſtine* againſt *Tertullian*, for having believed that God was corporeal, and to juſtify thoſe Paſſages of this Father's Works, which bear very evident Marks of this Error. It is indeed ſingular enough, that this honeſt Monk ſhould aſſert or even imagine, that *Tertullian* was not acquainted with the true Import of the *Latin* Terms, and that he ſhould expreſs the Word *Subſtance*, by that of *Body*, and that of *nothing* by that of *incorporeal.* Was it becauſe all the Authors, *Greek* and *Latin*, who had preceeded this Father, had not determined in the Writings the true Signification of theſe Terms? I ſhould be willing enough to believe that Mr. *Huet* had this Monk in view, when he ridicules thoſe, who ſuppoſing *Tertullian* had made uſe of the Word *Body*, for that of *Subſtance*, pretended to prove *, that he did

* Deum corporalem eſſe abſque dubitatione decrevit Tertullianus, cum alibi tum adverſ. Praxeam Cap. VII. Quis enim negabit, inquit, Deum corpus eſſe, etſi ſpiritus eſt? Spiritus enim corpus ſui generis in ſua effigie, ſed et inviſibilia illa quæcunque ſunt, habent apud Deum et ſuum corpus, et ſuam formam per quæ ſoli Deo viſibilia ſunt, quanto magis quod ex ipſius ſubſtantia miſſum eſt, ſine ſubſtantia non erit? Quæ quamvis manifeſta ſint, in contrarium tamen ſententiam flectere conantur quidam, per corpus ſubſtantiam intelligi volentes, quaſi vero tam Latini ſermonis imperitus fuerit, et vocabulorum inops Tertullianus, ut rem per ſe extantem notare volens, non aliter appellare potuerit quam corpus. Idem de Deo ſenſerunt Valentinus,

did not believe, that God was corporeal. *It is out of doubt*, says he, *that this Father has fallen into this Error, and though he explains himself very clearly on this Head, there are nevertheless certain Persons, who are bold enough to undertake his Justification, as if* Tertullian *had not been sufficiently acquainted with the* Latin *Tongue, and had been so ignorant of the Words, that when he intended to speak of a thing, which is self existent, he could not have called it by any other Name, but that of Body.* The wonderful and fruitless Trouble which this Monk has given himself, in justifying *Tertullian*, makes me call to mind the Pains which certain modern *Platonicks* have taken, attempting to prove that *Plato* had believed the Creation of Matter. The learned *Fabricus* says, when he speaks of these Persons, *that they had undertaken to wash the Black-moor white.*

St. *Justin* has not more refined Ideas of the perfect Spirituality than *Origen* and *Tertullian*; he has said in express Terms, that *Angels* * were corporeal,

lentinus, Seleneus, et Hermias Galatæ, Andius, et ejus asseclæ Audiani (quos alii subinde Vadianos perperam appellarunt) et Ægyptii Anthropomorphitæ, de quibus infra diseremus.

Huet. Origen. Quæst. I. de Deo, Tom. I. p. 30.

* Θεὸς τὸν παντα κόσμον πεποίησας, καὶ τὰ ἐπιγεῖα ἀνθρώποις υποτάξας, καὶ τὰ οὐράνια στοιχεῖα εἰς ἄξιν κόρπων, καὶ ὡρῶν μεταβολαῖς κοσμήσας, καὶ θεῖον τοῦτον νόμον τάξας, ἃ καὶ αὐτάδι ἀνθρώπους φρίνει τὸν πεποιηκώς, τὴν μὲν τῶν ἀνθρώπων, καὶ τῶν ὑπὸ τὸν οὐρανὸν προνοίαν ἀγγέλοι παραβαίτες τὴν δὲ τὴν τάξιν, γυναικῶν μίξεσιν ἠτιτήθησαν, καὶ παῖδας ἐτεκνωσαν, οἵ εἰσι οἱ λεγόμενοι δαίμονες καὶ πρόσετι λοιπὸν ῥανοφώπειον γένος ἑαυτοῖς ἐδούλωσαν.

Deus qui mundum universum fecit, et terrena hominibus et celestia elementa subjecit, quæ et ipsa hominum gratia cum condidisse apparet propter frugum proventum, temporum etiam mutationibus exornavit divinamque hanc legem ordinavit, hominum ipsorum atque eorum quæ sub cœlo sunt, providentiam angelis ad hæc dispositis attribuit: angeli autem ordinationem sive dispositionem eam transgressi, cum mulierum concubitus causa amoribus victi, tum filios procrearunt eos qui Dæmones sunt dicti, atque insuper reliquum genus in servitutem suam redegerunt. Sti. Justin. Philos. et Mart. Oper. Apolog. I. p. 34. Edit. Colon. 1680.

poreal, and that the Crime of those which fell, was that of suffering themselves to be seduced by the Love of Women, and their having had carnal Knowledge of them. Certainly, it cannot be thought that any one can take it into his Head to attempt to spiritualize the Angels of St. *Justin*, he gives Proofs too glaring and strong of their Corporeality, than to admit thereof. As for the Nature of the Gods, this Father was no better acquainted with than that of any other spiritual Being. *Every Substance* *, says he, *which cannot be subjected to another, because of its Subtility, has nevertheless a Body which constitutes its Essence. If we say that God is incorporeal, it is not because he really is so, but because we are accustomed to appropriate certain Names to certain Things, to denote in the most respectful manner possible the Attributes of the Deity*——

Thus,

* Καὶ καθόλου εἰπεῖν, πᾶν ἐνούσιον τοῦτό τινος μὴ δυνάμενον κρατεῖσθαι, σῶμά ἐστι τῷ κρατοῦντι αὐτό. καὶ τὸ θεῖον φαμεν εἶναι ἈΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ, οὐχ ὅτι ἔσθεν ἈΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ ----- ἀλλ' ὥσπερ εἰώθαμεν ἐν τοῖς παρ' ὑμῖν τιμιωτέρῳ ὑλικοῖς ἀεὶ γεραίρειν τὸ θεῖον, οὕτως καὶ ἐν τοῖς ὀνόμασιν. οὐχ ὡς τοῦ Θεοῦ τοῦ τῶν δεομένου, ἀλλ' ἡμῶν τὴν περὶ αὐτοῦ ἔννοιαν αὐτοῖς ἐνδεικνυμένων --- ὡσαύτως δὲ ἐπειδὴ τὸ μὴ κρατεῖσθαι ὑπό τινος, τοῦ κρατεῖσθαι τιμιώτεροι ἐστι διὰ τοῦτο καλοῦμεν αὐτὸν ΑΣΩΜΑΤΟΝ.

Quidquid est substantiale, quod ab aliquo prehendi non potest, corpus ei est, quod id prehendit, et divinitatem dicimus esse incorpoream, non quod incorporea ---- sed quemadmodum soliti sumus in rebus materialibus, quæ apud nos sunt, pro stabilioribus deitatem cohonestare, ita etiam in nominibus facimus, non quod illis Deus indigeat, sed ut per eam nostram de ipso mentem declaremus ----- consimiliter vero quia non prehendi honorificentius est, id circo eum vocamus incorporeum. St. Justini, Philosoph. et Martyr. Oper. Quæst. Græcanicarum ad Christianos de Incorporeo et de Deo, &c. Lib. p. 203. et seq.

If any any should pretend, that this Work was not written by St. *Justin*, he may, if he pleases, follow the Steps of Father *Hardouin*, and call in Question all the rest of St. *Justin*'s Works; but it will turn out exactly the same thing, for then it will appear, that those Authors who lived a long while after St. *Justin*, and have borrowed his Name, had no true Idea of Spirituality.

Thus, becauſe the Eſſence of God is inviſible, and does not come within the reach of our Senſes, we call it incorporeal. If by Chance ſome one or other ſhould ſay, to excuſe the Error of St. *Juſtin*, that this Father, in maintaining that God was not *incorporeal*, attributed an Eſſence to him much more perfect than that of *Incorporeality*, I ſhould anſwer, that this Eſſence could never be the *true Spirituality*, becauſe he expreſsly excludes *Incorporeality* therefrom, and that every thing that is not *incorporeal* has no Affinity with, nor any relation to *true Spirituality*.

The moſt favourable Interpretation that can be given to the Opinion of St. *Juſtin*, is, that this Father, having the ſame Idea of *Incorporeality* as the reſt the Ancients had, that is to ſay, of a Matter extremely ſubtile; in maintaining that God was not *incorporeal*, he has affirmed and endeavoured to prove that his Nature was much more ſublime, than that of Angels and human Souls, that is to ſay, it conſiſted of a Matter, more igneous and more refined. St. *Juſtin* ſpoke according to the Belief of the Age in which he lived, in the ſame manner as we ſpeak according to that of ours. Though we maintain, that our Souls are ſpiritual, and that the Angels are incorporeal, we nevertheleſs make a great Difference between the Eſſence of theſe incorporeal Subſtances, and that of the Spirituality of God; but we take a great deal of care not to affirm, that God is not *incorporeal*.

Tatian, a Chriſtian Philoſopher, whoſe Works are printed at the End of thoſe of St. *Juſtin*, and who, according to ſeveral Authors, lived nearly about the ſame time as this Father, ſpeaks in the following Terms concerning the Spirituality of

of Angels and Dæmons *, *they have Bodies, which are not Bodies of Flesh, but of a spiritual Matter, whose Nature is the same as that of Fire and Air. These spiritual Bodies are imperceptible to all, except those to whom God has given the Power, and who are enlightened by his Divine Spirit.* One may judge by this Specimen what Ideas *Tatian* had of the *true Spirituality*. St. *Clement* of *Alexandria* † has said in express Terms, that God *is corporeal.*

After this it will be useless to relate what his Belief was concerning human Souls, and whether they were corporeal or not, for there cannot be the least doubt about that. As for Angels, he made them take the same sort of Pleasures as St. *Justin*; Pleasures, wherein the Body must as necessarily exist, as the Soul. *Lactantius* believed the Soul to be corporeal. After having examined all the Opinions of the Philosophers, as to the Matter wherein its Essence consisted, and having looked upon them all to be uncertain, he says ‡, *that they have all something of Truth in them, for the human Soul or the Principle of Life, being in the Blood, in the natural Heat and in the Spirit, derives*

* Δαίμονες δὲ παντες σαρκιον μὲν ȣ̓ κὲ τηνται, πνευματικὴ δὲ ἐστὶν αυτοῖς ἡ σύμπηξις ὡς πυρὸς ἀέρος. μόνοις δὲ τοῖς πνεύματι θεοῦ φρουρουμένοις ἐυσύνοπτα καὶ τῶν δ ι ό ων ἐστὶ σώματος. τοῖς λοιποῖς δὲ ȣδαμῶ, λόγῳ δὲ τοῖς ψυχικοῖς.

Porro Dæmones omnes, non carnea, sed spiritali concretione constant, qualis est ignis et aëris: quæ corporum constitutio a solis illis perspici potest, qui spiritu Dei muniuntur, non item a cæteris hominum, quos anima regit.

Tatiani Assyrii Oratio ad Græcos, &c. p. 154.

† Φᾶσιν σῶμα εἶδε θεὸν οἱ Στωικοὶ, καὶ πνεῦμα κατ' ȣ̓σίαν, ὥσπερ ἀμέλει καὶ τὴν ψυχὴν ἀντικρὺς πάντα ζαῦτα συρέσεις ἐν ταῖς γραφαῖς. Clem. Alexand. Strom. Lib. V. p. 252.

‡ Nec tamen in tantum falsos esse dicendum est, qui hæc senserunt, ut omnino nihil dixerint, nam et sanguine simul et calore et spiritu vivimus, sed cum constet anima in corpore his omnibus adunatis non expresserunt proprie quid esset, quia tantum non potest exprimi, quam videri. Lactant. de Officio Dei ad Demetrianum. Cap. XVIII. p. 653.

rives its Existence from them all: but that it is impossible for us to express the Nature which results from this Mixture, because it is much more easy to observe the Operations, than to define them. The same Author, having from these Principles established the *Corporeality* of the Soul, says *, *that it is in some inconceivable manner or other like to God himself.* The Consequence of his Opinion is that God is material, and yet perhaps, he neither perceived nor was sensible of his Error; for according to the Ideas of the Age in which he lived, which was that of *Constantine the Great, a Spirit was a Body consisting of a subtile Matter.* Thus, in saying that the Soul was a Body, and at the same time had something in it like God, he had no more intention of degrading the divine Nature, and the Spirituality of God, then we have at this Day, when we assert that the human Soul, being of a spiritual Nature, in some Sense resembles that of God.

St. *Gregory* of *Nazianza* has explained himself in the same terms, as the Fathers which went before him; and he has signified his Belief very clearly, that every Spirit was corporeal. *Can we,* says he †, *conceive of a Spirit, without conceiving Motion and Diffusion.* If any one will maintain that St. *Gregory* of *Nazianza* was acquainted with *pure Spirituality*, he should first prove that this Father did not understand the Signification of the most common *Greek* Words; for can a Substance without Extension, without Parts, which occupies no Place, can it I say have any thing common with *Motion*, since the determinate Idea of this Word necessarily imports that an extended

* Apparet animam nescio quid esse *Deo simile.* Id. ibid.

† Πνεῦμα νοήσεις δίχα φορᾶς καὶ χύσεως. Greg. Naz. Orat. XXXIV. p. 545.

ed Substance undergoes a Change from one Place to another? The Term *Diffusion* is still more expressive; every thing which is diffused is extended, every thing which is extended has Parts, and every thing which has Parts is necessarily a Body. For we are not talking here of an extended Being, of the Nature of the Vacuum of the *Epicureans*, which is nothing else but a total Privation of all Kind of Being; we are treating of a Substance which has Motion; and consequently passes from one Place to another, which is diffused, that is to say, spread in incorporeal Extension, if a Vacuum will be granted to exist.

I have made this Reflection, for the Sake of those who are not *Cartesians*; for those who are so, as they believe nothing can be extended but what is material, can find no excuse to justify the Opinion of St. *Gregory* of *Nazianza*. I shall quote likewise some other Passages of his Works, because this Father has been justly looked upon, by all the Learned, as one of the most subtile and most skilful Divines of all Antiquity; we cannot assert, without appearing ridiculous, that he did not understand the Force of the Terms which he made use of. He has often repeated * that the Essence of God was a *Light*, a very *sublime Light*. Though in some Places he has added the Word *incorporeal*, to the Epithets which he bestowed on this sublime Light, yet this does in no wise prove that he was acquainted with *pure Spirituality*. I have sufficiently shewn in what Sense the Word *incorporeal*, made use of by the Fathers, ought to be taken; we ought not to say that this Rule ought not to affect St. *Gregory* of *Nazianza*, as well as the rest of the Fathers; he tells us

* Φῶς ἡ παραδειχθεῖσα θεότης ἐπὶ τοῦ ὀρους τοῖς μαθεταῖς, μικροῦ στερρότερα της ὄψεως. Greg. Naz. Orat. XL. p. 640.

us himſelf, as I have already obſerved, that he was not exempt therefrom, and that he believed *every Spirit* to be a *Body*, becauſe he expreſsly maintains, that *we cannot have any Notion of a Spirit, without ſuppoſing Motion and Diffuſion.* This Opinion explains once for all the Idea that we ought to attach to the Word *Spirituality*, in the Works of St. *Gregory* of *Nazianza*.

The Fathers, who lived after the Time of St. *Gregory*, continued to have the ſame Ideas as he, concerning the Nature of Spirits, and the Eſſence of God, which they looked upon as a cœleſtial Light. What follows is a Paſſage from St. *John* of *Damaſcus* *, *when we ſee the Light which ſhines from Mount* Tabor, *we ſee the Father who is Light, and the Son who is Light, and the Holy Ghoſt who is Light.* I am now arrived at the eight Century of the Church, above three hundred Years after the *Nicene* Council. It now remains for me to ſhew, that the modern *Greeks* have entertained very nearly the ſame Ideas as the Ancients. Give me leave, firſt of all, to reſt my Opinion on the Authority of one of the moſt learned Men in *Europe* †. ‘ When I conſider, ſays he, the manner ‘ in which the Union of the two Natures in *Jeſus* ‘ *Chriſt* are explained, I cannot help concluding, ‘ that they have believed the Divine Nature to ‘ be corporeal ‡, *the Incarnation*, ſay they, *is a perfect*

* Lumen immutabile, verbum, lumen patris ingeniti, lumine tuo hodie viſo in Thabor, videmus patrem lumen, et lumen ſpiritum illuminantem omnem creaturam. Damaſcen. in Carm. Ap. Leon. Allat. in Not. ad Method. No. 148.

† Hiſtoire de Manichée et du Manichèiſme, par Mr. Beauſobre, Tom. I. p. 476.

‡ Eſt mixtura, qua penetrat natura ſpiritalis, ſubtilis, naturam materialem, corpoream, donec per ipſam totam diffundatur, totaque commiſceatur, neque remaneat locus ullus naturæ materialis vacuus naturæ ſpiritali. Eutych. Annal. Alex. Tom. II. p. 43. This is copied from *Damaſcenus* and other *Greek* Divines.

'*perfect Mixture of the two Natures; the ſpiri-*
'*tual and ſubtile Nature penetrates the material and*
'*corporeal Nature, even ſo far as to be diffuſed*
'*throughout this Nature, aud mixed entirely with*
'*it, inſomuch that there is no Place wherein the*
'*material Nature was void of the ſpiritual Na-*
'*ture.* As for me who conceive God to be a
'Spirit, I likewiſe conceive the Incarnation as a
'conſtant and irrevocable Act of the Will of the
'Son of God, whoſe Intention is to unite the
'human Nature to himſelf, and communicate
'thereto all the Perfections, which a created Na-
'ture is capable of receiving. This Explana-
'tion of the Myſtery of the Incarnation is ra-
'tional; but if I may venture to ſay ſo, either
'that of the *Greek* Fathers is nothing but a Heap
'of falſe Ideas, and Terms which have no
'Meaning, er elſe they have conceived the di-
'vine Nature as nothing elſe but a ſubtile Mat-
'ter.'

The great Man whom I have been quoting goes on ſo far as to ſhew the Belief of the modern *Greeks* concerning the divine Eſſence. He manifeſtly proves, that in the fourteenth Century it was neceſſary, according to their Principles, that they ſhould believe the Eſſence of God to be a ſublime Light, and only incorporeal in the Senſe of the ancient Fathers, that is to ſay having Extenſion, Parts and Diffuſion; in a Word, exactly the ſame that the *Greek* Philoſophers conceived the ſubtile Matter to be, which they called *incorporeal.* The Paſſage which I am going to cite is pretty long; but beſides being hiſtorical it is likewiſe ſo curious, that I am certain it will give Pleaſure to all my Readers. 'There aroſe,
'*ſays the illuſtrious Mr.* Beauſobre *, among the

* Hiſt. de Manichèe & du Manichèïſme, par Mr. *de Beauſobre*, Tom. I. p. 470.

'*Greeks* in the fourteenth Century, a violent 'Conteſt about a Queſtion much more curious 'than uſeful; that is, whether the *Light* that 'ſhone on the Perſon of *Jeſus Chriſt*, in the 'Transfiguration, was *a created or an uncreated* 'Light *. *Gregory Palamas*, a famous Monk of 'Mount *Athos*, maintained that it was *uncreated*, 'and *Barlaam* defended the other ſide of the Que-'ſtion. This gave occaſion to the convening of 'a Council †, held at *Conſtantinople* under *Andro-'nicus* the *younger*: *Leo Alatius*, who relates 'theſe Differences, judges that *Barlaam* and *Pa-'lamas* were both in the wrong, and makes on 'this account the following Diſcourſe.

'*It is then an Error* ‡ *to affirm that the Light 'which appeared on Mount Tabor* was not the 'Glory of the Divinity of *Jeſus Chriſt*, his own 'proper Light, that which proceeds from the di-'vine Eſſence, *or rather*, that which is *the 'only and the ſame thing with this Eſſence and not 'another. For this is what is affirmed very clearly 'by* Ephrem *the* Syrian, John *of* Damaſcus, Denis *the* Areopagite, Andrew *of* Crete, Coſmas *the 'melodious*, Maximus *the* Confeſſor, Syrillus *of* 'Alexandria, John Chryſoſtome, Gregory *of* 'Nazianza, Baſil *the* Great, *and* Athanaſius *of* 'Synnados. *In reality this Splendor, this Light, 'was the Divinity itſelf of the bleſſed Saviour, 'which being miraculouſly concealed till that Inſtant,*

'*for*

* He was afterwards Archbiſhop of *Theſſalonica*.

† See P. *Alexander* upon this Council. Sect. XIII. and XIV. Part I. p. 399.

‡ Error itaque fuerit aſſerere lumen illud in monte *Thabor* non fuiſſe Deitatis illius (Chriſti) gloriam & lumen proprium, lumenque ab eſſentia divina emanans, quod unum & idem cum eſſentia divina erat, nec aliud, ut aſſerunt apertiſſime patres, *Ephraem* Syrus, *Joannis* Damaſcenus, &c. *Leo Allat. de perpetuo conſenſ.* Lib. I. p. 837.

'*for fear leaſt his reſplendent Majeſty ſhould too*
'*much dazzle the Eyes of Mankind, appeared and*
'*ſhone in the Eyes of his Diſciples, when this mira-*
'*culous Concealment ceaſed.*

'It was objected to *Palamas*, that an *uncreated*
'*Light* could not be perceived by Eyes merely
'carnal. *Leo Allatius* takes away this Difficulty
'by ſaying, *that this would be true, if their Eyes*
'*had continued in their natural State; but when*
'*they were ſtrengthened by a divine Energy, nothing*
'*could hinder them* from ſeeing *even the Divinity it-*
'*ſelf, and the Glory of the Divinity, which is*, in rea-
'lity, *nothing elſe but God. This Notion is confirm-*
'*ed by the Proof of an unqueſtionable Fact; for the*
'bleſſed Virgin, *who according to the Hymns of*
'*the Church has been exalted into Heaven, both in*
'*Body and Soul, contemplates with her corporeal*
'*Eyes, God and the Eſſence of God, becauſe her*
'*Eyes are ſtrengthned by a divine Energy. All the*
'*Bleſſed after the univerſal Judgment will expe-*
'*rience the ſame thing, when they ſhall have reaſ-*
'*ſumed their Bodies, for they will then ſee with*
'*their bodily Eyes*, both the Glory of the Deity
'and the Deity itſelf. *There happened therefore*
'*in the Tranſfiguration of their* Lord a double
'Miracle: The firſt is, that he ceaſed to keep
'his Divinity concealed; the ſecond is, that he
'beſtowed Strength enough on the Eyes of his
'Diſciples for ſuch a Contemplation. Hence it
'appears, that *Barlaam* was juſtly condemned,
'becauſe *on the one hand he aſſerted that the Light*
'which ſhone forth in Jeſus Chriſt *was neither*
'*the divine Eſſence, nor an Emanation from that*
'*Eſſence; and on the other hand, their corporeal Eyes*
'were not capable of receiving the Faculty of ſee-
'ing the *Deity* himſelf. *Whence will follow*
'various Abſurdities in the Doctrines of the

'Church; for what will then become of the 'beatifick Viſion of the Saints in Heaven, *&c.*

'Now let us come to the Reflections of Mr. '*Beauſobre.* 'There are Bodies, *ſays he*, 'which by their Diſtance or their Minuteneſs are 'rendered inviſible; but there is nothing viſible 'which is not a Body, and the *Valentinians* had rea-'ſon to aſſert, *that every thing that is viſible is cor-'poreal, and of a certain Shape.* It is alſo neceſſary, 'that the Council of *Conſtantinople*, who made 'their Deciſion conformable to the Opinion of '*Palamas*, and agreeable to the Authority of a 'great Number of Fathers, that there proceeds 'from the divine Eſſence an *uncreated Light*, '*which is as it were his Clothing*, and which ap-'peared in *Jeſus Chriſt* at the Time of his Tranſ-'figuration; it is neceſſary, I ſay, that either the 'Council of *Conſtantinople* believed the Deity to 'be a luminous Body, or it it has eſtabliſhed two 'contradictory Opinions; for it is abſolutely im-'poſſible, that any viſible Light ſhould proceed 'from a Spirit, for if there did, the Divinity 'would conſequently be corporeal.'

SECT. VIII. *Of the Time when the pure Spirituality of God was known in the* Latin *Church.*

I Believe the Age of St. *Auguſtine* may be looked upon as the Time the Knowledge of pure Spirituality may be fixed. I ſhould be ready to acknowledge, that the Hereticks they had to encounter with, at this Time, and who admitted two Principles, the one good and the other evil, whom they pretended were equally material, tho' they beſtowed on the good Principle; that is to ſay, God the Name of incorporeal Light did not

a

a little contribute to diſcover the true Notions concerning the Nature of God. To oppoſe theſe Opinions with greater Advantage, they thought it beſt to ſupport the Diſpute with the Exiſtence of a Deity purely ſpiritual. They examined, if it were poſſible that his Eſſence might be incorporeal in the ſame Senſe that we underſtand this Word; and then they ſoon found, that it was impoſſible it ſhould be otherwiſe; upon which they condemned thoſe who had ſpoken thereof, in a different manner. They acknowledged nevertheleſs, as I have already proved by the Confeſſion of St. *Auguſtine*, that the Opinion which allowed God to have a Body, had not been looked upon as heretical.

Though the pure Spirituality of God was known in the Church, ſome time before the Converſion of St. *Auguſtine*, as it appears by the Works of St. *Jerome*, who reproaches *Origen*, for having attributed Corporiety to God; however this Truth had a great many Obſtacles to overcome in the Mind of the moſt learned Divines St. *Auguſtine* informs us *, that he had been kept in the Opinion of the *Manicheans*, for ſome time only, becauſe he found it difficult to comprehend the *pure Spirituality* of God; *this*, ſays he, *was the only and almoſt unſurmountable Cauſe of my Error*. Thoſe who have conſidered the Queſtion which embarraſſed St. *Auguſtine*, will not be ſurpriſed at the Difficulties which he met with; they know that notwithſtanding the Neceſſity of admitting a purely ſpiritual God, they never could perfectly reconcile a great Number of Ideas which ſeem contradictory. There is nothing can be more

* Et quoniam eum de Deo meo cogitare vellem, cogitare niſi moles corporum non noveram (neque enim videbatur mihi eſſe quiquam quod tale non eſſet) ea maxima & proprie ſola cauſa erat inevitabilis erroris mei. St. *Auguſt. Confeſſ.* Lib. V. C. X.

abſtract, and more difficult to comprehend than a real Subſtance, which is omnipreſent, and yet in no particular Place; who is entirely in every Part of Space, and yet is not contained in any Space; who beſides is entire in the Parts at an infinite Diſtance from each other, and yet far from being divided? In a Word, is it eaſy to comprehend a Subſtance, which is intirely in every Point of the Immenſity of Space, which yet is not ſo infinite in Number as the Points of Space, in which he is found whole and intire? St. *Auguſtine* may be eaſily pardoned for having ſtumbled at theſe Difficulties, eſpecially at a time when the Doctrine of the *pure Spirituality* of God was, if I may ſo ſpeak, in its Infancy. It was this very Father who afterwards brought this Opinion to greater Perfection; nevertheleſs he did not leave it without it's Difficulties, and excepting the Eſſence of God, he always reaſoned like a perfect Materialiſt concerning ſpiritual Subſtances. He allowed Angels and even Dæmons to be endued with Bodies *, and he allowed three or four kinds of *ſpiritual*, that is to ſay *ſubtile Matters* †; he made cœleſtial Subſtances to have one Eſſence, and Dæmons to have another, which he affirmed to be like a groſſer Kind of Air. As for the human Soul, ‡ he ſaid, it was formed of Matter that was proper and peculiar to itſelf.

Hence

* Nunc vero intelligeremus animarum merita non qualitatibus corporum eſſe penſanda, aërium peſſimus Dæmon, homo autem, & non licet malus, longe minoris mitioriſque malitiæ, & certe ante peccatum tamen luteum corpus accepit. *Auguſt. de Civit. Dei*, Lib. II. Cap. XXIII. Tom. VII. p. 290. Edit. Bened. Sti. Mauri.

† Credo ſub firmamento cœli materiam corporalem viſibilium, ab illa incorporali invifibilium fuiſſe diſcretam. *Auguſt de Gen. cont. Manich.* Lib. I. Cap. XI.

‡ Fortaſſe & potuit animi habere *materiam aliquam*, pro ſuo genere *ſpiritualem*, quæ nondum eſſet anima. *Auguſt. de Gen. ad Lit.* L. VI.

Hence it appears, what various Ideas they had of the *pure Spirituality* of immaterial Subſtances, in the time of St. *Auguſtine*, and how imperfect and confuſed they were. As for the Ideas which this Father had, of the Nature of the Soul, we need only conſult what he ſays of the Work, which he had written concerning it's Immortality, to be convinced how obſcure and unintelligible they were. He acknowledges, that it was publiſhed without his Conſent, and that it is ſo obſcure and confuſed *, that he had much ado when he read it, to find out his own Meaning.

It ſeems to me that ſome time after the Age of St. *Auguſtine*, the Opinion of *pure Spirituality*, inſtead of being brought to greater Perfection, was by little and little rendered more obſcure. *Ariſtotle*'s Philoſophy, which became in vogue in the twelfth Century, was the Cauſe of almoſt bringing back the Divines to the Opinion of *Origen* and *Tertullian*. They denied, it is true, in expreſs Terms, that the Eſſence of ſpiritual Subſtances, had any thing corporeal therein, though never ſo ſubtile, or any thing elſe which related to Matter; but on the other hand, they deſtroyed their own Suppoſitions, by allowing Extenſion to Spirits, for they ſuppoſed the Spirit of God to be infinite, and Angels and human Souls to be finite. They pretended that ſpiritual Subſtances occupied and filled a fixed and determinate Place: Hence it is evident, that theſe Opinions are directly contrary to the true Ideas of Spirituality; thus one may

* Poſt libros ſoliloquiorum jam de agro Mediolanum reverſus, ſcripſi librum de immortalite animæ, quod mihi quaſi commonitorium eſſe volueram propter ſoliloquia terminanda, quæ imperfecta remanſerant. Sed neſcio quomodo me invito exiit in manus hominum, & inter mea opuſcula nominatur, qui primo ratiocinationum contortione atque brevitate ſic obſcurus eſt ut fatiget cum legitur, etiam intentionem meam, *vixque intelligatur a meipſo*. *Auguſt. Retractat.* Lib. I. Cap. V. Tom. I. p. 6.

venture to affirm, that until the *Carteſians* appeared, the Explanations which St. *Auguſtine* had given of the pure Immateriality of God, had been greatly diminiſhed. The Divines, it muſt be owned, condemned the Opinions of *Origen* and *Tertullian*, and yet in reality approached much nearer the Opinion of theſe ancient Fathers, than that of St. *Auguſtine*. The learned Critick, for whoſe Defence I have partly written this Treatiſe, evidently proves what I ſay; I ſhall here tranſcribe the learned Reflections which he makes on this Subject, which ſhall conclude what I thought neceſſary to ſay of the different Interpretations, which the Philoſophers, the Fathers of the Church, and other Divines, have given of the Word ἀσώματον, *incorporeal.*

'Till the Appearance of *Deſcartes*, ſays Mr. *Bayle* *, all our Doctors, whether Divines or Philoſophers, had given Extenſion to Spirits, that is infinite Extenſion to God, and finite to Angels and rational Souls. It muſt be owned, that they ſaid this Extenſion was not material, nor conſiſted of Parts, and that the Spirits are whole and intire, in every Part of Space, which is occupied by them, that is, *toti in toto, et toti in ſingulis partibus.* Hence are derived the three kinds of local Preſence, *ubi circumſcriptivum*, *ubi definitivum*, *ubi repletivum*; the firſt for Bodies, the ſecond for created Spirits, and the third for God. The *Carteſians* have ſet aſide all theſe Opinions; they affirm that Spirits have no ſort of Extenſion nor local Preſence, but their Opinion has been rejected as very abſurd. For almoſt all Philoſophers and Divines have affirmed, agreeable to popular Prejudices, that the Subſtance of God is diffuſed throughout in-

'finite

* *Bayle*'s Hiſt. and Crit. Dict. Art. *Simonides*. Remark.

'finite Space. Hence it appears that they have 'ruined with one hand, what they have built 'with the other; it is in effect to reſtore Ma-'teriality to God, which they had before taken 'away. You affirm, that God is a Spirit, and 'this Aſſertion is good; it is enduing him with 'a Nature, quite different from Matter. But 'when you aſſirm, that his Subſtance is diffuſed 'throughout all Parts of the Univerſe, you en-'due him with Extenſion; but how is it poſſible, 'we ſhould have an Idea of two kinds of Ex-'tenſion: We clearly apprehend that Extenſion 'of every kind has diſtinct impenetrable Parts, 'which may be ſeparated one from another. It 'is monſtrous to aſſert, that the Soul can be whole 'and intire in the Brain, and at the ſame time 'whole and intire in the Heart. We cannot 'comprehend how the Extenſion of the Deity, 'and the Extenſion of Matter, can exiſt toge-'gether in the ſame Place; this would be a real 'Penetration of Dimenſions, unconceivable by Rea-'ſon. Beſides, things which are penetrated by 'a third, are penetrated among themſelves, and 'thus the Heavens and the Globe of the Earth are 'penetrated by each other: For they would be 'penetrated by a Divine Subſtance, which accord-'ing to your Opinion is void of Parts, whence 'it follows that the Sun is penetrated by the 'ſame Being as the Earth. In a Word, if Mat-'ter is only Matter becauſe it is extended, it 'will thence follow that all Extenſion is Matter: 'and you are defied to ſhew any Attribute dif-'ferent from Extenſion, by which Matter is 'Matter. The Impenetrability of Bodies can 'proceed only from Extenſion, and we cannot 'conceive of any other Foundation for it; and 'therefore you ought to ſay, that if Spirits are

'extended, they are likewiſe impenetrable; therefore they cannot be different from Bodies by Penetrability. After all, according to the common Opinion, the Extenſion of the Deity, is neither more nor leſs impenetrable or penetrable, than that of Matter. You may call its Parts virtual as much as you pleaſe, I affirm theſe Parts cannot be penetrated by each other; but they may be ſo, with the Parts of Matter. Is not this the ſame thing which you affirm concerning thoſe of Matter? They cannot penetrate each other, but they may penetrate the virtual Parts of the Divine Extenſion. If you carefully conſult common Senſe, you will conceive, that when two Extenſions may be penetrated in the ſame Place, the one is as penetrable as the other: It is therefore certain, that all Extenſion is Matter, and conſequently, though you nominally take away Materiality from God, you in reality endue him therewith when you ſay he is extended.'

SECT. IX. *Of the Syſtem of* Pythagoras, *and of the manner of* Plato's *admitting the* Metempſychoſis, *or Tranſmigration of Souls.*

PYTHAGORAS borrowed the Opinion of the *Metempſychoſis* from the *Ægyptians*, as well as that of the Soul of the World. This Philoſopher believed God to be a Soul diffuſed throughout all the Subſtances of the Univerſe, and he looked upon human Souls to be Particles of the Soul of the World. It is well known, that the Syſtem of the Soul of the World, was generally that of almoſt all the learned *Ægyptians*, and that it was not known in *Greece* but at the time of the Return of *Pythagoras* from *Ægypt*, to which

Country he had travelled for no other Purpoſe, but to gain Inſtructions in the Theology of the Prieſts of that Nation. And as for the Opinion of the *Metempſychoſis*, *Herodotus* informs us, that *Pythagoras* borrowed it from the *Ægyptians*, and that he taught it in *Greece* without changing any thing, of what he had learnt with relation thereto. *The* Ægyptians*, ſays this Hiſtorian, *are likewiſe the firſt who taught the Immortality of the Soul; that after the Death of the Body, it paſſes ſucceſſively into the Bodies of other Animals; that after having paſſed through the Bodies of terreſtiol, aquatick, and aerial Animals, it returns to animate the Body of a Man, and that it finiſhes this Circuit in the Space of three thouſand Years. There are* Grecians, *who have adopted this Opinion, and taught it as their own, ſome ſooner, others later; I am acquainted with their Names, but I ſhall paſs them over in Silence.* All the Learned, as well ancient as modern, agree that *Herodotus* hints at *Pythagoras*; thus this ſingle Paſſage is ſufficient to prove that this *Grecian* Philoſopher had borrowed the Opinion of the *Metempſychoſis*, and to explain in the cleareſt manner, what this Opinion was.

Plato, who owed many of his Opinions to the Writings of *Pythagoras*, has likewiſe borrowed that of the *Metempſychoſis* or Tranſmigration of Souls. The Abbe *D'Olivet* pretends that he has corrected many things therein †. *And that he did not make it ſo extenſive as* Pythagoras *himſelf, by ſending human Souls into the Bodies of Animals, but ſo far as they were either good or bad, making them paſs into other human Bodies, wherein they became more or leſs miſerable.* But the Abbe *D'Olivet* is

* Hiſtory of *Herodotus*, Book II.
† D'Olivet, Theologie des Philoſoph. Grecs. p. 83.

deceived; for St. *Auguſtine* ſays expreſsly *, *that it is very certain*, Plato *believed that Souls after Death paſſed into the Bodies of Beaſts.* This Aſſertion is neither doubtful nor wavering, but on the contrary, plain and certain, *certiſſimum eſt*; it is a ſuperlative, which teſtifies that ſome Philoſopher of the *Platonic* Sect, who were zealous for the Honour of their Maſter, were willing to maintain the Opinion of the Abbe *D'Olivet*, and that St. *Auguſtine* had contradicted them in the ſtrongeſt manner.

The Abbe *D'Olivet* perhaps will reply, that we ought to judge of the Opinions of *Plato* from the Aſſertions we meet with in his Works; and that it does not appear from thence, that he has ſaid in expreſs Terms, that human Souls paſt into the Bodies of Brutes; but on the contrary †, *he makes nine Claſſes of them in his* Phœdra, *in the firſt whereof he places the Philoſophers with true and conſtant Lovers, and in the laſt, Tyrants; as if he judged the latter to be the moſt culpable of all Mankind, and the former to be the moſt virtuous.* In anſwer to this, I affirm, that we at this Day have not all the Works of *Plato*, and that

* Si poſt Platonem aliquid emendari exiſtimatur indignum, cur ipſe Porphyrius nonnulla et non parva emendavit? 'Nam 'Platonem animas hominum poſt mortem revolvi uſque ad cor-'pora beſtiarum, ſcripſiſſe certiſſimum eſt.' Hanc ſententiam Porphyrii doctor tenuit et Plotinus: Porphyrio tamen jure diſplicuit, in hominum ſane, non ſua quæ dimiſerant, ſed alia nova corpora redire humanas animas arbitratus eſt. Puduit ſcilicet, illud credere ne mater fortaſſe filium in mulam revoluta vectaret: et non puduit hoc credere, ubi revoluta mater in puellam, filio forſitan nubertt. Auguſt. de Civit. Dei, Lib. X. Cap. XXX. Tom. VII. p. 267. Edit. Bened. Sti. Mauri.

We ſee by this Paſſage, the Reaſons which have obliged the Diſciples of *Plato* to endeavour to juſtify their Maſter as much as poſſible, for having admitted the *Metempſychoſis* of *Pythagoras*, in its full extent. They as well as *Porphyry* perceived how unbecoming this Opinion was.

† *D'Olivet*, Theologie des Philoſophes Grecs, &c. p. 83.

that what this Philoſopher ſays in thoſe which remain, do not hinder him from having allowed the *Metempſychoſis* to have been as extenſive as that of *Pythagoras*. If this had not been the Caſe, St. *Auguſtine* would not have ſaid it was *very certain* that he believed the Tranſmigration of human Souls into the Bodies of Brutes. Should the Abbe *D'Olivet* think me as troubleſome as a *Janſeniſt* to a *Moliniſt*, I ſhould conſtantly return to the *certiſſimum eſt* of St. *Auguſtine*; this is not the Aſſertion of a Journaliſt of *Trevoux*, but that of a Father of the Church; and what ſort of a Father of the Church for Heaven's Sake! Can it be ſuppoſed that St. *Auguſtine* durſt expreſs himſelf as he has done, if he had not read in the Works of *Plato*, the Opinion he accuſes him with? But I am going to prove by the Confeſſion of a celebrated *Platonic* Philoſopher, that *Plato* muſt have expreſsly affirmed, that human Souls after Death paſs into the Bodies of Brutes; and we ſhall at the ſame time ſee, what Ground there was for ſome of the Diſciples of this Philoſopher, to deny his ever having maintained this Opinion.

Plato, ſays an * ancient *Greek* Author, having written, that the Souls of mad and paſſionate Men

* Εἰπόντος γὰρ, Πλατῶνος τὰς μὲν θυμικὰς καὶ ὀργίλους, καὶ ἁρπαλικὰς ψυχὰς, λύκων καὶ λεόντων σώματα μεταμφιέννυσθαι· Τὰς δὲ περὶ τὴν ἀκολασίαν ἠχολημένας, ὄμοιον καὶ τῶν τοιούτων ἀναλαμβάνειν σώματα, οἱ μὲν κυνῶν ἤκουσαν τοῖς λαγωοὺς καὶ τοῖς ὄνοις, εἰδὲ ποικίλως αὐτὸν εἰρῆκναι διεγνωσαν, τὰ ἤθη διὰ τῶν ζώων παρεμφαίνοντα. Et mox. Ἐκ βλάβης δὲ τὴν ἐκλογὴν τούτοις δράμων, καὶ τὸ εἶδος ζώων ψυχῆς εἶδος εἶναι, ὥγε ἴδιον διάφορα γίγραπται γᾶυ αὐτῷ μονοβίβλοι ἐπίγραφον, ὅτι ἐκ ἀπ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἄλογα κἀὲ ἀπὸ ζώων ἀ λόγων εἰς ἀνθρώπους αἱ μετεμψυχώσεις γίνεσθον, ἀλλὰ ἀπὸ ζώων εἰς ζῶα καὶ ἀπὸ ἀνθρώπων εἰς ἀνθρώπους καὶ μοι δοκεῖ μὴ λογον ὀφεῖλειν ἕκαστον τοῦτον καλῶς κατεσκευάσθαι μὴ μόνον τῆς Πλάτωνος γνώμης ἀλλὰ καὶ τῆ ἀληθείᾳ τυχόν.

Cum enim dixerit Plato iracundas, & furioſas & rapaces animas, luporum & leonum corpora induere, quæ vero intemperantur

'and of Robbers paſſed into the Bodies of 'Wolves and Lions; thoſe of laſcivious Men into 'the Bodies of Aſſes: Many Perſons have miſ-'taken the Senſe of the Words, Wolves, Lions, 'and Aſſes, and have taken them to be the com-'mon Animals denoted thereby; others on the 'contrary have looked upon them as figurative 'Expreſſions, ſignifying their Manners and Cha-'racters. *Jamblichus* ſuppoſed, that we ought 'to underſtand by the different kinds of Animals, 'whereof *Plato* ſpeaks, the different Characters of 'the Souls. He has written a Book upon this 'Subject, in which he attempts to prove, that 'human Souls never paſs into the Bodies of Beaſts, 'nor thoſe of Beaſts into the Bodies of Men; but 'that the Tranſmigration of both is always fixed, 'that thoſe of Men paſs into the Bodies of Men, 'thoſe of Brutes into the Bodies of Brutes. It 'ſeems to me, that *Jamblichus* has not only com-'prehended aright the real Senſe of *Plato*'s Diſ-'courſe; but that he was perfectly well acquaint-'ed with the Truth.'

Theſe are very evident Proofs that *Plato* had ſaid in expreſs Terms, in ſome Part of his Works, that the Souls of luxurious, mad and paſſionate Men paſt into the Bodies of Brute Animals. St. *Auguſtine* was in the right; when he ſaid *certiſſimum eſt*, and he had very great Reaſon not to be afraid of uſing the ſuperlative Degree. It remains to enquire, whether the favourable Explanation

rantur vixiſſent, aſinorum, aut aliorum ejuſmodi corpora aſſumere, nonnulli propriæ intellexerunt leones, & lupos & aſinos: alii vero figurata hæc ipſum dixiſſe judicarunt, mores per animalia indicantem. Et mox Jamblichus vero his contrariam decurrens viam, pro animalium ſpecie, animæ ſpeciem eſſe dicit ſpecies nimirum differentes. Ab eo ergo ſcriptus eſt liber ſingularis ita inſcriptus. *Migrationes animarum non fieri ex hominibus in bruta, neque a brutis animalibus in homines, ſed ab animalibus in animalia, & ab hominibus in homines.* Ac mihi videtur ille præ reliquis optime aſſecutus non Platonis ſententiam modo, ſed & ipſam veritatem. *Nemes. Cap.* II.

nation of certain *Platonick* Philoſophers, who lived near ſix hundred Years after their Maſter, have been willing to give to his Opinions, ought to have been received, and counterbalance the Authority of St. *Auguſtine*. As for myſelf, I believe theſe Explanations and pretended allegorical Senſes have only been invented as an Expedient to ſilence the Clamour of the primitive Chriſtians. I may be deceived; but I may at leaſt affirm that the manner wherewith *Plato* has admitted the *Metempſychoſis* of *Pythagoras*, appears uncertain enough, to have prevented the Abbe *D'Olivet* from treating on this Subject in ſo cavalier a manner. A Man who undertakes to clear up the Theology of the *Greeks*, ſhould acquaint his Readers with the Difficulties which are to be met with relating to the moſt important Points of that Theology. I ſhall take care not to follow the Example of the Abbé *D'Olivet* in this Matter, and therefore I ſhall mention here, that I have conſulted what ſeveral of the Learned among the Moderns have written upon this Queſtion; a Queſtion, which has divided the Philoſophers of the third and fourth Centuries, and I have found them very *different in* their Opinions. Father *Mourgues* * keeps to the Authority of St. *Auguſtine*, and believes, that *Plato* hath admitted the *Metempſychoſis* of *Pythagoras* in it's full Extent; Father *Bouchet* is of the ſame Opinion in his Letter to Mr. *Huet*, Biſhop of *Avranche*. His Words are as follow:

'After all, human Souls would not be entirely 'degraded, if they were deſtined to no worſe a 'Puniſhment than that of animating human Bo- 'dies, but the *Platonick* Philoſophy has ſo far de- 'baſed them, as to animate the Bodies of Brutes, 'which

* The Letter of Father *Bouchet*, Miſſionary of the Society of *Jeſus* to Mr. *Huet*, Biſhop of *Avranche*, inſerted in the Ceremonies of all Nations, by *Picart*, Tom. II. Part. I.

'which would not at all ſeem credible to me, if 'ſo fooliſh an Opinion might not be gathered 'from diverſe Parts of *Plato*'s Works. This is 'the Opinion which St. *Auguſtine* mentions in the 'third Book *of the City of God*, where he has 'theſe Words: *Platonem animas hominum poſt 'mortem revolvi uſque ad corpora beſtiarum ſcrip-'ſiſſe, certiſſimum eſt.* When the *Platonick* Philo-'ſophers have had a Deſign to correct their Maſ-'ter, as *Porphyry* has done, they have alledged 'Reaſons which prove nothing at all, or which 'equally prove, that human Souls go to animate 'the Bodies of Brutes, as well as the Bodies of 'Men.

'Such then is the Syſtem of *Plato*. All Souls, 'except thoſe of certain Philoſophers, are deſtined 'to different States, the Moment that they are ſe-'parated from their Bodies; ſome are ſent down 'to the infernal Regions where they are puniſhed 'and purified; others, whoſe Life has been inno-'cent, aſcend into Heaven there to be rewarded in 'a manner proportionable to their Virtues; but 'after a thouſand Years are expired, they return 'back to the Earth again, where they chuſe a kind 'of Life agreeable to their Inclinations. It then 'happens, that thoſe Souls which animated human 'Bodies in the preceeding Life, paſs into the Bodies 'of Brute Animals; and others who have animated 'the Bodies of Beaſts return to animate human 'Bodies. It is thus this Philoſopher explains him-'ſelf in his *Phædra*.

'But we are not to imagine that theſe Souls 'make a blind and random Choice, or are indiffe-'rent with regard to all Sorts of Brutes; it is a 'voluntary Choice, ſince they ſeek for that kind 'of Brute Animals which bear the greateſt Reſem-'blance to the State and Condition they were in,

in

'in a former Life. Thus the Soul of *Orpheus* 'made Choice of the Body of a Swan; the Soul of '*Thamiris* was placed in the Body of a Nightin-'gale; that of *Ajax* paſſed into the Body of a Lion, 'the Soul of *Agamemnon* animated an Eagle, 'and that of *Therſites* paſt into the Body of an Ape. 'It is in the Books of his Republick that *Plato* 'teaches this rare Doctrine.'

The learned Mr. *Huet*, Biſhop of *Avranche* *, ſeems to think on the contrary, that *Plato* has fixed the Tranſmigration of human Souls into human Bodies. Perhaps the Deſire he had of juſtifying in part an Error of *Origen*, has not a little contributed to determine this illuſtrious Prelate to clear *Plato* of a Fault, which might have affected the Reputation of that ancient Father for whom he ſeems to have had the *Zeal of a Commentator*.

SECT. X. *Of the Syſtem of* Ariſtotle, *and whether the Works which paſs under his Name, were really written by him or not.*

THE Abbe *D'Olivet* has thought, that for two Reaſons he might forbear verifying or explaining, what *Cicero* makes *Velleius* ſpeak, concerning the Theology of *Ariſtotle*. I ſhall examine the firſt as conciſely as poſſibly I can; but I ſhall dwell longer on the ſecond, on account of

* Animarum itaque προϋπαρξιν cum a Platone accepiſſet Origenes, ipſarum que μετεμψυχωσιν ab eodem accepit. Ab humanis autem corporibus in humana corpora tranſire animas affirmavit Plato, a cæleſtibus vero in humana, ab his in dæmonica migrare animas dixit Origenes; et ut hominum animas eatenus, animas pecudum fieri dixit Plato, quaternus nequitiæ addictæ pecudum ſimiles fiunt, ita id ipſum Origenes pronuntiavit. Præiverat Platoni Pythagoras, ſed non animorum ſolum ex humanis corporibus in humana, verum etiam ex his in ferina veras commentationes admiſerat. Huet. Origin. Quæſt. VI. de Anima, Art. XX. Tom. I. p. 80.

of its Singularity; and indeed it ought to be examined with a great deal of Attention. The firſt Motive for the Abbe *D'Olivet*'s Silence concerning the Theology of *Ariſtotle*, is to avoid entering into thoſe Diſputes which have ariſen among the modern Philoſophers about the principal Opinions of *Ariſtotle*. *A great Number of Schoolmen*, ſays he *, *have made a great Clamour concerning the Opinions of* Ariſtotle, *in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries. Some have affirmed him to be an Atheiſt, in the worſt Senſe of that Word; others have carried their Prejudices in his Favour ſo far, as to maintain that he was acquainted with the Myſtery of the Trinity; and others have ventured to place him in the Catalogue of Saints. An Author, whoſe pretended Writings are full of impenetrable Obſcurity, may be wreſted to whatever Opinion his Readers ſhall pleaſe.*

In my Opinion, the very Reaſon which prevailed on the Abbe *D'Olivet* to be ſilent, ought on the contrary to have made him ſpeak. Does it not become a Man, who has undertaken to explain the Theology of the *Greeks*, to ſhew what Opinions of the Moderns were falſe, and what true, concerning this Theology? Beſides theſe very Diſputes, which have divided the Schoolmen, have alſo reigned among the ancient Eccleſiaſtical Writers. *Ariſtotle* has been praiſed by ſeveral Fathers of the Church, and has been tranſlated in the firſt Centuries, by Perſons whoſe Piety has been equal to their Learning; notwithſtanding which, he has been highly blamed by other Fathers. *Origen* and St. *Ambroſe* have maintained that his Doctrine was more pernicious than that of *Epicurus*; thus you ſee exactly the ſame Diverſity of Sentiments among the ancient Fathers, as that which now obtains among the Moderns. Might we not therefore

* *D'Olivet* Theologie des Philoſophes Grecs, p. 105.

fore have expected from ſo learned a Man as the Abbe *D'Olivet*, from a Man of ſuch great Penetration, and extenſive Knowledge in the Theology and Philoſophy of the Ancients; in ſhort, from a Man who is continually finding Fault with Mr. *Bayle*, that he ſhould have taken upon him the Taſk of clearing up thoſe Opinions, which have divided Chriſtian Divines, in every Age ſince Chriſtianity was firſt promulgated? I make no doubt but the Abbe *D'Olivet* would have done great Service to the Publick, if he had not looked upon the Works of *Ariſtotle* as ſuppoſititious. He himſelf acquaints us, that this is the ſecond Reaſon which prevented him from loſing his Time in ſearching into the Syſtem of *Ariſtotle*. *In the Heap of Books*, ſays he *, *which bear the Name of* Ariſtotle, *and which commonly paſs for his Works, perhaps there is not one, the Authenticity whereof has not been queſtioned by one or other among the Learned. However this is out of all Queſtion, that not one ſingle Paſſage among thoſe which* Cicero *has quoted in his Dialogues from* Ariſtotle, *is to be found in the Works which are attributed to him. I ſhall therefore, for this Reaſon, forbear endeavouring to verify or clear up, what* Velleius *relates concerning his Theology.*

May not one reaſonably conclude from this Paſſage of the Abbe *D'Olivet*, that he has altogether adopted the Syſtem of his good Friend Father *Hardouin?* This Jeſuit acknowledges no Works among the *Latin* Authors to be genuine †, but

* *D'Olivet* Theologie des Philoſophes Grecs, p. 105.

† Deprehendit ille, ut quidæm muſſitabat nobiſcum, cætum certorum hominum ante ſæcula neſcio quot extitiſſe, qui hiſtoriæ veteris concinnandæ partes ſuſcepiſſent, qualem nunc habemus, cum nulla tunc extaret ſibi probe notam illorum ætatem atque officinam eſſe: inque eam rem ſubſidio fuiſſe Tullium, Plinium, Maronis Georgica, Flacci ſermones & epiſtolas; *nam hæc illa ſola cenſet*,

but the Works of *Cicero*, the Satires of *Horace*, the Georgicks of *Virgil*, and the Natural Hiſtory of *Pliny*; all other Books, ſacred and prophane now extant, were compoſed according to him, by a Society of Atheiſts. Obſerve, that theſe Atheiſts were *Benedictine* Monks; thus St. *Cyprian*, St. *Auguſtine*, and St. *Ambroſe* were made in the ſame Shop with *Petronius*, *Ovid*, and *Martial*. Among the *Greek* Authors, *Homer*, *Herodotus*, and *Plato* were the only Exceptions from this Rule. The Abbe *D'Olivet*, upon all Occaſions, treats St. *Auguſtine* almoſt as ill as he has done Mr. *Bayle*. He rejects *Ariſtotle*, becauſe certain Paſſages which *Cicero* quotes from this Philoſopher, are no longer to be found among the Works which have been handed down to us, as written by this Author. May we not reaſonably conclude from this manner of acting, that the Abbe *D'Olivet*, though he adopts the fooliſh Syſtem of an Arch-heretick, dares not on account of the Character wherewith he is inveſted, openly deny the Authenticity of the Works of St. *Auguſtine*, and the Fathers of the Church; but indirectly diffuſes the monſtrous Opinions of Father *Hardouin*, in the ſame manner that this Jeſuit attacks the *Æneis* of *Virgil* *, to deſtroy the Works of the Biſhop of *Hippona*, in which are found a great Number of Verſes from the ſame *Æneis*? So the Abbe *D'Olivet* does not judge of the

cenſet, quod vereor ut cuiquam ſuadeat, ex omni Latina antiquitate *ſincera monumenta*, præter inſcriptiones admodum paucas faſtoſque nonnullos. *Harduin. Chronologiæ ex nummis antiquis reſtitutæ Proluſio*, &c. p. 60.

* Proponebatur enim mihi negotium animæ meæ ſatis inquietum præmio laudis & decoris, vel plagarum metu ut dicerem verba Junonis iraſcentis & dolentis, quod non poſſet Italiæ tenerorum regem avertere, quæ nunquam Junonem dixiſſe audieram. Sed figmentorum poëticorum veſtigia errantes ſequi cogebamur, & tale aliquid dicere ſolutis verbis, quale Poëta dixiſſet verſibus. *Auguſt. Confeſſ.* Lib. I. Cap. XVII.

the Authenticity of a Work, but from the Diſagreement thereof with the Dialogues of *Cicero* upon the Nature of the Gods *.

I ſhall here obſerve *en paſſant*, that if the *Æneis* was a Poem falſly attributed to *Virgil*, and compoſed in the thirteenth Century, it will thence follow, that the Works of St. *Auguſtine* cannot be genuine, becauſe this Father, who lived in the middle of the fourth Century, informs us, that his Maſters obliged him when he was young to ſtudy the *Æneis* of *Virgil*, and to expreſs in Proſe what this Poet makes *Juno* ſay, in the Tranſport of Grief and Anger, wherewith ſhe was ſeized, becauſe ſhe could not hinder the *Trojan* King from landing in *Italy*.

Beſides, St. *Auguſtine* often in his Writings attributes Opinions to the Philoſophers, very different from thoſe which *Cicero* mentions in the Dialogues, which I have quoted. What then muſt we conclude according to the Principles of the Abbe *D'Olivet?* That St. *Auguſtine* is a ſuppoſitious Author; that he was a *Benedictine* Monk, whoſe Deſign was in the thirteenth Century to overturn all Religion; that he was a Man who was ignorant of the Subjects which he treated of; in ſhort, a Perſon who is mad enough, and ſo great a Viſionary, as to give any Credit to the Syſtem of Father *Hardouin*, may with as great Facility make uſe of the Principles of the Abbe *D'Olivet*, as thoſe of the Jeſuit. However, I cannot ſuppoſe a Man, who

* Among two thouſand Examples which I could quote, I ſhall content myſelf with one. Apud hunc ergo Virgilium nemque Juno inducitur infeſta Trojanis, Æolo ventorum regi adverſus eos irritando dicere:

Gens inimica mihi Tyrrhenum navigat æquor,
Ilium in Italiam portans victoſque Penates.

Auguſt. de Civit. Dei. Lib. I. Cap. III.

In the ſame Chapter there is more than thirty Verſes, taken from different Places of the *Æneis*.

who makes an Oſtentation of ſo great Piety as the Abbe *D'Olivet*, who ſeems to be ſo rigid in his Morals, who is ſo ſcrupulous, that the leaſt Reflection of Mr. *Bayle* alarms him, his Religion ſtirring up his Zeal; I cannot ſuppoſe, I ſay, that ſuch a Man, ſo very devout, can have an Intention to undermine all the Fathers of the Church, not excepting the moſt illuſtrious. I am charitable enough to believe, that the Abbe *D'Olivet* did not conſider all the Conſequences which might be drawn from deſtroying the Authenticity of all *Ariſtotle*'s Works; ſince if they are all ſuppoſititious, it will thence follow that thoſe of the moſt illuſtrious Fathers of the Church would be abſolutely ſo too. If the Abbe *D'Olivet* had foreſeen ſuch a Conſequence as this, he would never have advanced ſo aſtoniſhing a Paradox, as he has borrowed from his Friend Father *Hardouin*.

I am ſo fully perſuaded of the Abbe *D'Olivet*'s Integrity, that though I am able to prove the Authenticity of the Works of *Ariſtotle*, by the Authority of prophane Authors, deſcending from Century to Century, from the Time of *Cicero* to our own Times, I chuſe rather to make uſe of the Teſtimony of Eccleſiaſtical Writers. For who can doubt that a Prieſt of the Holy *Roman* Church will not prefer their Authority to that of all other Authors; the Abbe *D'Olivet* will doubtleſs acknowledge that the Works of *Ariſtotle* exiſted in the Days of *Cicero*, ſince this Orator, ſpeaking of ſeveral of his Works, in other Books beſides thoſe which he has written of the Nature of the Gods, named ſome of them, which are ſtill extant, or at leaſt which we affirm to be the ſame, as thoſe now remaining.

I ſhall mention ſome of thoſe Paſſages from *Cicero*, in which thoſe of *Ariſtotle* are ſpoken of, and

and which are exactly the ſame, as in the Books which yet remain. Ariſtoteles *quidem ait*, ſays *Cicero* in his *Tuſculan Diſputations*, *omnes ingenioſos melancholicos eſſe* *, this Sentiment is to be met with in the thirtieth Section of the Problems of *Ariſtotle*. In another Place he gives an account of *Ariſtotle*'s Philoſophy, and mentions all the principal Opinions, which we now read in thoſe Works of this Philoſopher which are ſtill extant. He takes Notice of the fifth Element invented by *Ariſtotle*, and of the *Entelechios*, a Word which ſignifies a *Motion* without Diſcontinuation and without *End*; by which this Philoſopher pretends to define the Nature of the Soul, Ariſtoteles *longè omnibus* (Platonem *excipio*) *præſtans et ingenio, et diligentia, cum quatuor nota illa genera principiorum eſſet complexus eæ e quibus omnia orirentur, quintam quandam naturam cenſet eſſe, e qua ſit mens; cogitare enim et providere et dicere, et docere, et invenire aliquid, et tam multa alia meminiſſe, amare, odiſſe, cupere, timere, angi, lætari, hæc ſimilia eorum, in horum quatuor generum nullo in eſſe putat. Quintum genus adhibet vacans nomine, et ſic ipſum animum entelechios appellat nomine, quaſi quandam continuatam motionem et perennem* †.

If the Works of *Ariſtotle* ſhould be thought ſuppoſititious, becauſe we cannot find certain Paſſages which *Cicero* has quoted; they ought alſo for the ſame reaſon to paſs for authentick, becauſe we find therein ſeveral Paſſages related by the ſame Author. I do not know why we ought not to take this Side of the Queſtion, as well as the other; is it not natural, in order to explain the Cauſe of this apparent Contrariety, to believe that we have loſt ſome of *Ariſtotle*'s Works, in

* Cicer. Tuſcul. Diſput. Lib. I. Cap. XXXIII.
† Cicer. Tuſcul. Diſput. Lib. I. Cap. X.

in which the Paſſages were contained that we are now not able to meet with? and that there are others yet remaining, wherein we meet with other Paſſages, and the ſame Opinions, which have been mentioned by the ſame *Cicero:* this appears to me to be ſo probable, that I am aſtoniſhed at the ſyſtematic Spirit, which ſometimes draws aſide the moſt ingenious Men.

Chriſtianity began to be promulgated a few Years after the Death of *Cicero*; let us therefore ſearch into all the Fathers from *Origen* and *Tertullian*, let us conſult the moſt illuſtrious Eccleſiaſtical Authors in every Century, and we ſhall ſee, whether, or not, the Works of *Ariſtotle* were unknown to them. The Writings of theſe two firſt Eccleſiaſtical Authors are full of Paſſages and Quotations from *Ariſtotle*, either to refute them, or to oppoſe them to other Paſſages of ſome other Philoſophers. Theſe Paſſages are to be found in the Works of *Ariſtotle* at this very Day, except a few; and is it not natural to conclude, that thoſe we cannot find therein, have been taken from ſome Writings, which have not been tranſmitted down to us? For what reaſon, if the Works of *Ariſtotle* are ſuppoſititious, ſhall we find ſome of them and not others? Would they have put in the former to prevent our finding out the Fraud? If this was reaſonable, how ſhall we account for their omitting the reſt? It is plain then, that notwithſtanding the want of certain Paſſages, that the Works of *Ariſtotle* are authentick, and were truly written by that Philoſopher.

If among a great Number of Paſſages, which the primitive Fathers have quoted from *Ariſtotle*, ſome have been extracted from Works which are now loſt, is there not a Probability that thoſe which *Cicero* has inſerted in his Dialogues of the Nature

Nature of the Gods, ſhould be taken from theſe very Works? It is impoſſible to produce the leaſt Proof on the contrary Side of the Queſtion, becauſe *Cicero* has not quoted the Books, from whence thoſe Paſſages were extracted.

But we have a Teſtimony more ſtrong than thoſe of *Origen* and *Tertullian*; it is that of St. *Juſtin*. This Father has written a *conſiderable Work* upon the Philoſophy of *Ariſtotle*, wherein we have a full Account, not only of his principal Opinions, but alſo of a very great Number of Paſſages, from the eight Books of this Philoſopher: Beſides, in almoſt all the other Works of St. *Juſtin*, there is mention made of thoſe of *Ariſtotle*; in ſhort, we ſhall afterwards find this *Teſtimony* of St. *Juſtin* return upon us, and acquiring new Strength by the Approbation of many Ages. Let us go on ſtill farther, from the Time of *Cicero*. St. *Ambroſe* and St. *Auguſtine* give us Aſſurance in various Places of their Works, that they have read the Books of *Ariſtotle*, they refute them, they extract ſeveral Paſſages, and we find theſe Paſſages in the Writings ſtill extant, and that theſe Refutations perfectly agree with thoſe Opinions, which are contained therein.

I ſhould have placed *Athenagoras*, *Arnobius*, and *Lactantius*, before theſe two laſt Fathers; but as the ſingle Authority of St. *Auguſtine* is equal to that of theſe three Authors, I only place them here to ſhew what ſuperabundant Proof there is of my Aſſertion; becauſe we find there is a perfect Agreement between our *Ariſtotle*, and the *Ariſtotle* quoted in their Writings.

Let us now go forwards in our Journey, till we arrive at the ſixth Century. *Boëtius* lived in the Beginning thereof, and often ſpeaks of the

Books of *Ariſtotle* which yet remain, and likewiſe mentions his principal Opinions.

Caſſiodorus, who was Co-temporary with *Boëtius*, but lived much longer, ſince he did not die till towards the ſeventh Century, is an inconteſtible Evidence for the Writings of *Ariſtotle*, and informs us that *Boëtius* had tranſlated ſeveral of them into *Latin*. Give me leave to relate a Paſſage in the Life of this great Man, written by one of the moſt venerable Authors which *France* has produced in theſe latter Days. This Paſſage is eſſential to the Queſtion now in Debate. *Caſſiodorus*, ſays he *, *propoſed* Ariſtotle, *as the greateſt Maſter in Dialecticks, which only differs from Rhetorick, according to* Varro *and* Zeno, *but as a Hand when it is ſhut differs from the ſame Hand when it is open. He ſpeaks of the Introduction of* Porphyry, *of the ſeven Books written by* Boëtius, *upon that of Tranſlation by* Ariſtotle *he gives him the Appellation of* homo magnificus, *which is a very conſiderable Title of Honour, as we may learn from the* Theodoſian *Code. He ſpeaks likewiſe of the Treatiſe of* Apuleius *of* Madaura, *written concerning Interpretation, which he affirms to be very ſubtile; of another Book of* Marius Victorinus *concerning Hypothetical Syllogiſms, and of* Tullius Marcellus *of* Carthage, *who had likewiſe written a Book upon the ſame Subject. He gives us to underſtand, that he had written large Commentaries on the Book of Tranſlation by* Ariſtotle, *and had compoſed a Book upon Diviſion, which is explained in Logick, after* Definition, *and which his Friend* Patricius Boëtius *had tranſlated; the Introduction of* Porphyry, *the Categories of* Ariſtotle, *his Book upon Interpretation, and the eight Books of the Topicks.*

From

* The Life of *Caſſiodorus*, &c. with Remarks upon his Works, p. 258.

From the ſeventh Century, I paſs on to the eighth and ninth, and there I meet with the Teſtimony of one of the greateſt Genius's of thoſe Times, of a Man whoſe Erudition was ſo profound, whoſe Knowledge of Antiquity was as extenſive as certain, who *confirms the Teſtimony of St.* Juſtin, who informs us by the Books which he had written upon the Phyſicks of *Ariſtotle* *, that thoſe of that Philoſopher were ſtill preſerved. The great Man of whom I am ſpeaking is *Photius*, Patriarch of *Conſtantinople*. In ſpeaking in whoſe Praiſe, all the Learned, both ancient and modern, have endeavoured to excel each other. After this, ought we to believe that the Works of *Ariſtotle* are loſt, upon the Aſſertion of ſome Authors of the third or fourth Claſs? For the Abbe *D'Olivet* has no better Authority for his Belief, as I intend to make appear in a ſhort time.

I proceed as faſt as I can to conduct *Ariſtotle* down to the preſent Times; which will be no difficult Taſk: *Suidas*, *John* of *Salisbury* Biſhop of *Chartres*, ſhall be my Guide. We need only conſult them, and we ſhall ſee whether they are leſs determinate, and leſs inſtructed about the Queſtion which is debated, than the learned Patriarch whom I have juſt quoted.

I am now arrived to the twelfth Century, wherein St. *Bernard* was ſo great an Enemy to *Ariſtotle*'s Philoſophy, that he cauſed his Meta-

 phyſicks

* Lecta eſt Juſtini Martyris Apologia pro Chriſtianis cum adverſus Græcos, tum adverſus Judæos: et præter alter ejus 'Tractatus contra primum et ſecundum librum phyſicæ auſcul-'tationes, ſeu contra materiam, formam et privationem,' rationibus epicherematicis ac violentis, quod ex uſu eſt, inferens; itidemque contra 'quintum illud corpus motumque ſempiter-'num.' Quem Ariſtoteles mirifico ratiocinationum contra (Chriſtianam) pietatem ſummariæ ſolutiones. Ex Photii Tractatu, qui ΜΥΡΟΒΙΒΛΟΣ, ſive Bibliotheca inſcrib.

phyſicks to be condemned by a Council: however, a ſhort time after it gained the Aſcendant, and *Peter Lombart*, *Albertus Magnus* and St. *Thomas Aquinas*, ſtudied it with the greateſt Attention, in whoſe Works it is to be met with almoſt entire. Theſe great Men brought the Works and Opinions of *Ariſtotle* ſo much into Vogue, that they were carried to the higheſt Degree of Reputation, and have continued to be in the greateſt Eſteem, till *Gaſſendus* and *Des Cartes* gave it the finiſhing Stroke.

I now come to examine what thoſe Authors were, who have aſſerted, that the Works of *Ariſtotle* were ſuppoſititious. No particular Author ever maintained that they were not all genuine: one, according to his own Whim and Fancy, adopted ſome and rejected others; an evident Proof that Caprice alone led them to that Deciſion. I ſhould be glad if the Abbe *D'Olivet* would think proper to inſtruct us, concerning the Name and Merit of theſe pretended learned Authors, who have believed the Works of *Ariſtotle* to have been ſuppoſititious; he only mentions for this purpoſe a Treatiſe of *Gaſſendus*, and the *Bibliotheca* of *John Albert Fabricius*. I have carefully conſulted theſe two Pieces, and I have only met with one Author that they have mentioned, which is *Francis Picus*, except a few Smatterers; for what elſe can we call theſe half learned Scriblers, who determine ſo boldly about a Subject which they underſtand nothing of, and who are only known to thoſe Writers, who are obliged by the Nature of their Labours, to ſpeak of bad as well as good Authors?

The moſt conſiderable Author, who has queſtioned the Authenticity of the Books of *Ariſtotle* now remaining, is *Jamblicus*, who has pretended to

to reject his Categories. But the Ancients, who were his Co-temporaries, and the moſt ingenious modern Criticks, have ridiculed his Folly *. One *Andronicus* of *Rhodes* †, who was doubtleſs the *Hardouin* of that Age, has likewiſe rejected the Books of Interpretation, as not genuine. Theſe are the prodigious Scholars, on whoſe Authority the Abbe *D'Olivet* had placed *Ariſtotle* in the ſame Claſs, wherein his Friend the *Jeſuit* had put all the *Latin* Authors, and three-fourths of the *Grecian*.

I now come to the Objection which the Abbe *D'Olivet* makes, relating to the Paſſages of *Ariſtotle* quoted by *Cicero*, which are not to be met with, in the Books of that Philoſopher now extant. For he looks upon it as impoſſible to prove, that theſe Paſſages ſhould be taken from the Works which have been handed down to us, though it appears to me very natural and very probable. I am going to ſhew, that one of the greateſt Men in *Europe*, who is a competent Judge of the Queſtion in Debate, ridicules this pre-

* Porro hujus libri Cathegor. auctorem eſſe Ariſtotelem Stagiritam, licet (auctore Boëtio) Jamblicus dubitaverit, et quidam minoris notæ auctores inficiati ſint, eſt tamen communis omnium peripateticorum conſenſio, quam Boëtius hoc loco triplici ratione confirmat. Prima, quia cæteris in operibus ſecum maxime conſenſit Ariſtoteles in hoc opere. Secunda, quia Styli brevitas, et ſubtilitas Ariſtotelem redolent. Tertia, quoniam aliter imperfectum opus edidiſſet, ſi de Syllogiſmis ſcripturus, aut propoſitiones, ex quibus illi proxime, aut ſimplices voces, ex quibus remote coaleſcunt, omiſiſſet. Commentar. Collegii Coimbrenſis e Societate Jeſu. in univerſ. Dialect. Ariſtot. &c. Part. I. Comment. in lib. Cathegor. p. 252.

† Non eſt tanti faciendus Andronicus quidam Rhodius, quem refert Ammonius in præfatione hujus operis, ut propter illum in controverſiam vocandus ſit horum librorum de interpret. auctor fueritne Ariſtoteles, an quidam alius, ut ipſe opinatur; cum ſe verum dicendi genus, Styli comitas, et gravitas, peripateticorum principem prodant auctorem, ut D. Thomas, Boëtius, Ammonius, cæterique ejus alumni judicarunt. Id. Part. II. Comment. in lib. de Interpretatione, p. 289.

tended ground of ſuſpecting the Works of *Ariſtotle* not to be genuine; for he maintains, that *Cicero* had fathered Opinions upon *Ariſtotle*, which it is impoſſible that Philoſopher ſhould ever have dreamt of. The Author that I mean is Mr. *Leibnitz*. If I knew a greater Philoſopher than he, and who is better able to determine the Genuineneſs of *Ariſtotle*'s Works, I ſhould give him the Preference; for I make it a Rule always to take thoſe for Judges, who are moſt eminent in the Knowledge of the Subjects which are in Diſpute. If I am in doubt about a Point of Theology, I have recourſe to St. *Auguſtine*; I would no more conſult *Zanchius*, *Schobar*, *Tambourin*, than I would my Shoemaker or Taylor. If I would judge of the Merit of a *Greek* Philoſopher, I examine what *Leibnitz*, *Newton* and *Locke* have ſaid with relation thereto. If ſuch as theſe have mentioned them, I pay no regard to all the pretended Men of Letters, whoſe very Names the Abbe *D'Olivet* himſelf has perhaps forgot. I believe this Rule will meet with Approbation, and that I have no need of ſaying any thing farther in its Juſtification. But be this as it will, I ſhall give you a Paſſage from Mr. *Leibnitz*, and I ſhall tranſlate his Words, as litterally as poſſibly I can. 'It is time to return, ſays he*, to the Errors of

* Nunc ad Nizolii errores redeundum eſt ----- Quod item contendit genuina Ariſtotelis opera nunc non haberi, idque loco potiſſimum Ciceronis, mihi nunquam perſuaſerit. Nam quod mirum eſt hominem politicum et infinitis curis obrutum, qualis erat Cicero, nonnunquam ſubtiliſſimi cujuſdam Philoſophi ſententias, fugiente oculo lectas, non ſatis aſſequi? qui credit Ariſtotelem in veris ſuis operibus Deum appellaſſe Κυμα ουρανου ardorem cœli; nec is Ariſtotelem fatuum putat; et quum ſapientem et ingenioſum habeamus per vim nobis ineptum et ſtultum obtrudit. Novum hoc criticæ artis genus eſt, in dignoſcendis ſcriptis auctoris omnium confeſſione ingenioſi, quædam pro ſuppoſititiis habere, quia ſtultum aliquid auctori

'of *Nizolius* ——— this Man pretends that the 'true Works of *Ariſtotle* are not now extant; 'and I find that his Objection, founded upon 'ſome Paſſages of *Cicero*, is trifling and ridiculous, 'and which cannot make the leaſt Impreſſion upon 'my Mind. Is it at all ſurpriſing, that a Man 'overwhelmed with Care, loaded with the Buſi-'neſs of the Publick as *Cicero* was, ſhould not 'comprehend the true Senſe of certain Opinions 'of a very ſubtile Philoſopher, and that he ſhould 'not be deceived in running them over in a ſlight 'manner? What ſort of Man muſt he be who 'can ſuppoſe, that *Ariſtotle* had in his genuine 'Works, called God Καῦμα οὐρανιον, *the Heat of* 'Heaven? If we can believe, that *Ariſtotle* had 'uttered ſuch a manifeſt Abſurdity, we muſt ne-'ceſſarily conclude him to have been a Madman; 'nevertheleſs it appears from the Works ſtill re-'maining, that *Ariſtotle* was a *great Genius*. Why 'then ſhould we forcibly, and againſt all Reaſon, 'ſubſtitute *Ariſtotle* the Madman in the room of '*Ariſtotle* the Wiſe? It is a kind of Criticiſm en-'tirely new, and very ſingular, to judge of the 'Genuineneſs of an Author's Writings, who is 'generally looked upon by all great Men, as a ſu-'perior Genius, from certain Abſurdities which 'are not to be met with therein. Therefore, 'before we determine the Fate of ſo ſubtile and 'profound a Philoſopher, and condemn his Works

a conviciatoribus impoſitum (nam nec Cicero niſi alia ſibi perſona Ariſtoteli iniqua impoſita hæc loquitur) in iis non reperitur, mihi genuitatem operum Ariſtotelicorum, quicquid dicant Joh. Franciſc. Picus in Examine Vanitatis Doctrinæ Gentium, quicquid Nizolius, quicquid Ramus, quicquid Patricius, quicquid in Apologia magnorum virorum magiæ ſuſpectorum, ubi et hunc Nizolius librum citat, Naudæus; ſatis ſuperque perſuadet perſpecta hypotheſium inter ſe harmonia, et æqualis ubique methodus velociſſimæ ſubtilitatis.

Leibnitz. Epiſt. Tom. II. p. 115. Edit. Lipſ. 1738.

'to be ſuppoſititious, we ſhould firſt be ſatisfied, that all the Faults which are attributed to 'him, are truly his own, and not thrown upon 'him by Inadvertence or Malice. It is likewiſe 'proper to obſerve, that *Cicero* is the only Writer that we know of, who has attributed theſe 'Opinions to *Ariſtotle*. As for me, I am verily 'perſuaded, that all the Works which we have 'under the Name of *Ariſtotle* are truly his own; 'and though ſome of them have been looked upon 'a ſuppoſititious, or at leaſt as doubtful, by *John 'Francis Picus*, by *Nizolius*, by *Peter Ramus*, by '*Patricius*, and by *Naudæus*, I am not leſs convinced that theſe Books truly belong to *Ariſtotle*. 'I find a perfect Connection and Harmony in 'them all, which unites them together; I diſcover the ſame Hypotheſis therein always well 'purſued, and well ſupported; in ſhort, there is 'the ſame Method, the ſame Sagacity, and the 'ſame Subtlety in them all.'

I ſhall ſtop at theſe Reflections of Mr. *Leibnitz*; for any Reaſons that I can alledge will be no Addition, to thoſe which have been produced by this great Man. However, give me leave to obſerve here, that it is not at all ſurpriſing, if in the Number of fourteen thouſand Commentators * upon the Works of *Ariſtotle*, there ſhould be ſome found, who in order to appear great Criticks, and to ſhew, that they had a more refined Taſte than others, have thought themſelves obliged

* They would take me for a *Madman*, if when I had a Deſign to ſtudy *Ariſtotle*, and was deſirous of underſtanding this Philoſopher, I ſhould undertake to read the fourteen or fifteen thouſand Commentators who have *each explained him in their own manner*, inſtead of chuſing *a ſmall Number of thoſe whom I know to have ſucceeded beſt*, from the Fame and Reputation they have among the Learned who have read them. Jugemens des Savans, &c. par Adrien Baillet, &c. Tom. I. p. 56. Edit. in Quarto of Amſterdam 1725.

obliged to look upon some one Book, among the rest of this *Greek* Philosopher as not genuine. Thus should we only admit that ten or twelve Persons among fourteen thousand should have been of the same Opinion, we should have Grounds to look upon the Works of *Aristotle* to be supposititious, because it is sufficient for this Purpose, according to the Abbe *D'Olivet*, *that there not being genuine has appeared very probable to some one or other of the Learned.*

It is now incumbent upon me to shew in a few Words what *Aristotle*'s System of Theology was; and to this end I shall not search for any Explanation thereof among the *Arabian* Commentators, nor the modern Christians. I will not oblige the Abbe *D'Olivet* to submit to the Authority of *Averroës* nor *Avicenna*; I am too well acquainted with the Aversion of a zealous Ecclesiastick against *Mahometan* Commentators, and I have found on diverse Occasions that the Abbe *D'Olivet* is no Friend to the Schoolmen. Perhaps it will be demanded what Author I shall take for my Guide? A learned Father of the Church who lived at the time, when almost almost the Sects of the ancient Philosophers were still in being, and who was himself an illustrious Philosopher; I mean St. *Justin*; and can I have a better Authority than his? He quotes the very Terms of the Philosopher whose Opinion he is about to refute. ' *Aristotle*, says he *, explaining in the

* Αριστοτέλης δὲ, ἐν τῷ πρὸς Αλεξανδρον τον Μακεδόνα λόγῳ συντομόντινα τῆς ἑαυτοῦ φιλοσοφας εκτιθεμενος ὅρον σαφῶς καὶ φανερῶς τὴν Πλατωνος ἀναιρεῖ δόξαν, οὐκ ἐν τῇ πρώδει ουσίᾳ τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι λεγων, ἀλλὰ πέμπτον αἰθέριον τικαὶ αμετὰ βλητον αναπλαττων σῶμα, εν τούτῳ αὐτὸν εἶναι φησί. γεγραφε γοῦν οὕτως οὐχ ὡς ἔνιοι τῶν περὶ τοθεῖον ---- πλημμελουντων, ἐν τῇ πυρώδει ουσία τὸν Θεὸν εἶναι φασίν. εἶτα, ὥσπερ μὴ αρκουμενος ἐπὶ τῇ κατὰ Πλάτωνος βλασφημίᾳ, και τὸν ὑπ'

'Work which he wrote for *Alexander*, what the 'Aim and Principle of his Philosophy was, over-'turns the Opinion of *Plato*, in a very ample 'and very clear manner. He maintains, that the 'Essence is not an *igneous Substance*, as this Phi-'losopher supposed it to be: but he introduces 'I know not what *Æther* or fifth Element which 'he pretends to be immutable and unchangeable, 'which he calls God; upon this Account he af-'firms, that certain Persons, reasoning upon the 'Nature of God, were grosly deceived, when they 'made it consist of an *igneous Essence*. *Aristotle*, 'not contented with his Attack upon *Plato*, sup-'ports his Opinion with the Authority of *Ho-'mer*, whom the same *Plato* had banished from 'his

ὑπ' αὐτοῦ τῆς πολιτείας ἐκβληθέντα ὡς ψεύστην καὶ τριτὸν τῶν ἀπὸ πῆς ἀληθείας εἰδώλων, ὡς αὐτὸς ἐφη μιμητὴν ὄντα Ομήρου, εἰς ἀπόδειξιν τῶν ὑπ' αὐτοῦ περὶ τοῦ αἰθερίου σώματος λεγομένων παλεῖ μάρτυρα· γεγραφε γάρ, οὕτω γοῦν καὶ Ομήρος ἔφη,

Ζεὺς ἔλαχ' οὐρανὸν εὐρμὺν ἐν αἰθέρι καὶ νεφέλῃσι

Βουλόμενος ἐκ τῆς Ομήρου μαρτυρίας ἀξιόπιστον τὴν ἑαυτοῦ δεικνύναι δόξαν. ἀγνοῶν ὅτι εἰ Ομήρω πρὸς ἀπόδειξιν τοῦ ἀληθῆ ἑαυτὸν λέγειν μάρτυρι χρῷτο. πολλὰ τῶν αὐτῷ δοξάντων οὐκ ἀληθῆ φανήσεται ὄντα.

Aristoteles autem, in eo, quod ad Alexandrum Macedonem scripsit opere, compendiose philosophiæ suæ exponens rationem et finem, clare et diserte Platonis abrogat opinionem, non in ignea substantia Deum esse inquiens; sed quintum quoddam æthereum et immutabile corpus fingens, ibi Deum esse ait. Quapropter ita scripsit: 'Non quemadmodum nonnulli de divini-'tate hallucinantes, in ignea essentia Deum esse asserunt.' Deinde veluti maledicto hoc in Platonem effuso non contentus, quem Plato e civitate sua quasi mendacem et tertium veritatis imaginum (sicut ipse dixit) imitatorem ejecit Homerum, ad ea demonstranda qua a se de æthereo corpore sunt dicta, testem laudat. Scribit enim:

Ad hunc ergo modum et Homerus ait:
Sorte Jovi cessit in nube et in æthere cælum.

Opinionem ille quidem suam credibilem esse probare et declarare volens Homeri testimonio: interim tamen ignorans, dum Homero, ut dictis suis veri fidem astruat, teste utitur, multas se illius sententias falsi arguere. Sti. Justini Martyr. ad Græcos Cohortatio, p. 6.

'his Republick as a Lyar, and a Teller of idle 'Tales; and he makes uſe of the Words of this 'Poet to prove what he had advanced relating 'to the *Æther*. He quotes that Verſe, which 'ſays, that the *Heaven which is in the* Æther, '*fell to the Lot of* Jupiter; however, as *Ariſtotle* 'did not reſt entirely on the Authority of *Homer*, 'he endeavours to ſtrengthen his Opinion by a 'great Number of Reaſons.'

I might have kept to this firſt Explanation of *Ariſtotle*'s Theologick Syſtem on the Nature of God; but I ſhall here add, that St. *Juſtin* has elſewhere repeated very near the ſame thing. When he ſpeaks of the Works of this Philoſopher, he is always plain and conſiſtent with regard to the Opinions which he attributes to him; he does not at all vary, as *Cicero* ſometimes does, in thoſe which he reports as thoſe of certain Philoſophers. As for me, I ſhould believe, that *Cicero* had confounded this *Æther*, this fifth Element, with the *Heat of Heaven*, which he pretends *Ariſtotle* had acknowledged to be God, if the Tranſcribers, as is very probable they did, had not diſguiſed the Thought of the Author, and changed the Terms which he had made uſe of. As for the firſt Principles which *Ariſtotle* admits of, St. *Juſtin* ſays the very ſame thing thereof, as we now meet with in the Works of this Philoſopher; namely, that he admits * of Matter and Form, and that he had no regard to the Ideas and Patterns of *Plato*. We have already ſeen what this Idea was in the Opinion of the latter.

* Ἀριστοτέλης τὰ μὲν εἴδη ὡς ἀρχῆς οὐδαμοῦ μέμνηται δύο δὲ ἀρχὰς Θεὸν καὶ ὕλην εἶναι φησι

Ariſtoteles ideæ quidem tanquam principii haud quæquam meminit: duo vero principia, Deum et materiam eſſe dicit. Sti. Juſtini Martyr. ad Græcos Cohortatio, p. 7.

SECT. XI. *Of the Syſtem of* Democritus.

CICERO informs us, that *Democritus* * *beſtowed the Quality of Gods, as well on the Images of the Objects with ſtrike us, as on* that Nature *which furniſhes, which ſends theſe Images, and on the Ideas which they excite in the Mind. That after this, he affirms nothing to be eternal, becauſe nothing continues always in the ſame State.* The Abbe *D'Olivet*, having quoted the ſame Paſſage from *Cicero*, afterwards adds; † *if it was juſt to adhere to the Reflection of a Critick, whoſe Pen ſeldom ſpares* any thing either ſacred or prophane, *we ſhould have* in the ſearch after Truth *the fineſt Commentary upon this Paſſage that can be wrote.* Let us then ſee what this dreadful Compariſon is, this frightful Parallel which has ſo greatly irritated the Abbe *D'Olivet*; inſomuch, that abandoning the polite Stile, which is ſo natural to Meſſieurs the Academicians, and which is always predominant in their Works, he falls into a Paſſion, and forgets himſelf ſo far, as to commit a moſt unworthy Outrage on the Memory of an illuſtrious Perſon deceaſed, whom he knew to be no longer able to defend himſelf. If I was not as much perſuaded, as I really am, of the Abbe *D'Olivet*'s Integrity, I ſhould attribute theſe Injuries to a baſe and daſtardly Jealouſy, which only

* Quid ? Democritus, qui tum imagines, earumque circuitus in deorum numero refert : tum illam naturam, quæ imagines fundat, ac mittat : tum ſcientiam, intelligentiamque noſtram ; nonne in maximo errore verſatur ? cumque idem omnino, quia nihil ſemper ſuo ſtatu maneat, neget eſſe quidquam ſempiternum ; nonne Deum ita tollit, ut nullam opinionem ejus reliquam faciat ?

Cicer. de Nat. Deor. Cap. XII.

† D'Olivet Theologie des Philoſophes Grecs, p. 96.

only are derived from a great Vivacity and too ardent a Zeal. But without making any farther Complaints of the injurious Terms which the Abbe *D'Olivet* makes uſe of, let us examine what Mr. *Bayle* has written concerning *Democritus* and Father *Mallebranche*. We ſhall find at firſt, that he has ſpoken of the latter with all the Politeneſs in the World. Secondly, that he has ſaid no more of him than what twenty other Authors have ſaid; and thirdly, that his Remarks are very juſt. 'I know not, ſays he *, whether 'any Perſon has taken Notice, that the Opinion 'of *one of the moſt ſublime Genius's of the Age, 'that we ſee all things in the infinite Being, that 'is in God*, is nothing but an Explanation and 'an Improvement of the Opinion of *Democritus*. 'You are to obſerve, that *Democritus* taught, 'that the Images of the Objects, thoſe Images, 'I ſay, which are ſcattered round about us, or 'which turn themſelves on all ſides, to preſent 'themſelves to our Senſes, are Emanations from 'God, and are themſelves a God, and that the 'actual Idea of our Mind is a God. Is this far 'from the Thought of ſeeing all things in God, 'and that our Ideas are in God, as Father *Mallebranche* affirmed, and that they cannot be the 'Modification of a created Spirit? Does not it 'follow from hence, that our Ideas are God himſelf? For our Ideas, and our Knowledge, may 'eaſily paſs for the ſame thing. *Cicero* may ſay 'as long as he pleaſes, in the Character of one 'of the Speakers in his Dialogue, that the Thoughts 'of *Democritus* are worthy of an Abderite; that 'is, of an Aſs and a Madman; I am certain, 'that a narrow Genius could never have conceived them. For in order to conceive them, we

* *Bayle* Hiſt. and Critic. Dict. Art. *Democritus*, Remark O.

'we muſt comprehend the whole extent of Power, 'which is ſuitable to a Nature capable of paint- 'ing the Images of Objects in our Mind. The 'intentional Speeches of the Schoolmen are the 'Diſgrace of the Peripateticks, he muſt be I know 'not what, that can perſuade himſelf a Tree pro- 'duces its Image in every part of the Air all 'around, even to the Brain, of an infinite Num- 'ber of Spectators. The Cauſe, which produces 'all theſe Images, is quite a different thing from 'a Tree. Seek for it as much as you pleaſe, if 'you find it on this Side the infinite Being, it 'is a ſign you do not comprehend this Matter 'rightly. I do not deny, that theſe Opinions of '*Democritus* are very abſurd at the Bottom, and I 'own St. *Auguſtine* has refuted them very ſolidly.'

Perhaps it may be expected, that the Abbe *D'Olivet* ſhould prove Mr. *Bayle* is miſtaken, or at leaſt make it appear, that there is no Reſemblance between the Syſtem of *Democritus* and that of Father *Mallebranche*; but this he has quite forgot; it never ſo much as entered into his Head, he is ſatisfied with canonizing Father *Mallebranche*, and calling *Democritus* an Atheiſt; and hence he concludes, that we ought to make no Compariſon between theſe two Philoſophers. It muſt be owned, that this Canonization of this modern metaphyſical Father, is a Maſter-Stroke of Policy, which was not ſo much as looked for, and which forms an Argument, altogether unanſwerable. Perhaps, the Reader will be glad to know in what manner the Abbe *D'Olivet* has done this; this may be ſeen from the Abbe's own Words *: *thoſe who were well acquainted with Father* Mallebranche, *and who knew that he was one of the greateſt Philoſophers of the Age, and likewiſe knew that he could*

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* *D'Olivet* Theologie des Philoſophes Grecs, p. 97.

unite the Study of the moſt abſtract Sciences to a ſolid Piety, will be exaſperated at Mr. Bayle *for daring to put the Theology of a holy Prieſt with that of a Pagan, ſuſpected of Atheiſm even by the Pagans themſelves.* But what will the Abbe *D'Olivet* ſay, if we ſhould evidently prove two Things? Firſt, That this holy Prieſt, in the Judgment of ſome very great Men, was violent in his Temper, paſſionate and cholerick. Secondly, That his Syſtem, which relates to Ideas, is not only very like that of *Democritus*, but is alſo a kind of *ſpiritual Spinoſiſm*, that is to ſay, that he makes all incorporeal Subſtances to be ſimple Modifications of a ſpiritual, ſole, infinite Subſtance. I ſhall begin with proving the laſt of theſe Aſſertions, and then ſhall return to the former.

To ſuppoſe, that we *ſee all Things in God*, is it not as much as to ſay, that God is the common Soul of all other Beings? Does not this eſtabliſh a general, infinite, ſpiritual, repreſentative Subſtance, in which all other ſpiritual Subſtances are to be found, and it is neither to think, nor act, nor know, but by the intimate Union which they have with this general Subſtance, of which they are nothing but pure and ſimple Modifications? If our Ideas, which are the only Operations of the Soul by which we can come to a Knowledge, not only of its Nature but even of its Exiſtence; if our Ideas, I ſay, are ſomething without us, if we have no power of creating them, if they are unalterable and eternal, in ſhort, if they are a part of the Divine Eſſence; this Eſſence of God, variouſly modified, is ſubject to all the inconveniences of the Subſtance of *Spinoſa*. We muſt not ſay according to the Syſtem of Father *Mallebranche*, *ſuch a Man has had a Thought of aſſaſſinating another*; but *that the general Subſtance, ſpiritual*

ritual Extent, in which are contained all the Modifications, has preſented the Idea of a horrid Crime to ſuch a Modification; is not this, in ſome ſort, to make God the Author of all the Crimes that have been committed, ſince it is in him from whence Men derive their Ideas; is not this to vilify the Deity, and to diſparage him as much as *Spinoſa* himſelf?

Father *Mallebranche* had doubtleſs foreſeen one part of the juſt Reproaches that he was liable to; he invented *an intelligible, infinite Extent, which God includes in himſelf*, and it in that Extent, that we ſee all things. Mr. *Arnaud*, who wrote a Book to refute the ideal Syſtem of Father *Mallebranche*, has clearly demonſtrated the Ridiculouſneſs and Uſeleſſneſs of this *intelligible, infinite Extent*, which does not ſhelter the Opinion of Father *Mallebranche* from all the Objections which have been formed, concerning the unworthy Notions which he attributes to the Nature of God. *It is impoſſible to gueſs* *, ſays this learned Man, *what Father* Mallebranche *intends we ſhould underſtand by this* intelligible, infinite Extent, *in which he pretends that we ſee all things; for he has ſaid ſuch contradictory things relating thereto, that it would be as difficult for me to form a diſtinct Notion of what he ſays, as to comprehend a Mountain without a Valley. It is a Creature, and it is not a Creature; it is God, and it is not God; it is diviſible, and it is not diviſible; it is not only eminently in God, but it is there formally too; and it is only eminently there, but not formally.*

It is a Creature, becauſe it is the Extent which God has made, and it is the Extent which God has made, ſince he proves by that, that God knows it.

God,

* Des vraies et des fauſsées idées, &c. par Mr. Antoine Arnaud, Docteur de Sorbonne, Chap. XIV. p. 135. Edit. de Colog. 1683.

God, *ſays he*, contains in himſelf an intelligible, infinite Extent; for God knows the Extent becauſe he has made it, and he could not know it unleſs it was in himſelf.

It is not a Creature, becauſe if it was, in ſeeing things in this intelligible, infinite Extent, *we ſhould ſee them in a Creature, and his Deſign is to ſhew that we ſee all things in God.*

Hence it appears, how weak and ſlight the Reſource of Father *Mallebranche* is, in introducing this *intelligible, infinite Extent*, which he places in God, and which ſerves for no other Purpoſe than to augment the Obſcurity, and the inſurmountable Difficulties which are met with in his Opinion. It is neceſſary therefore for him always to return from this to his firſt Principle, that after having ſhewn all the Difficulties in maintaining that our Ideas may be produced by finite Beings, he ſays, that we ought to ſeek for them in the infinite, that is, in God. This is preciſely the Doctrine of *Democritus:* for he taught that our Ideas were Emanations, and that theſe Emanations themſelves were Gods; and Father *Mallebranche* himſelf, when he reaſoned upon the Conſequence of his own Principles, could he deduce other Concluſions than thoſe which *Democritus* deduced from his? If our Ideas are in God, if they can only be Modifications of an infinite Subſtance, if they cannot proceed from a created Spirit, muſt they not be Parts of the Deity himſelf? Are not they Modifications of the ſpiritual Subſtance, and conſequently are they not Gods?

The Abbe *D'Olivet*, before he had complained in ſuch ſtrong Terms of Mr. *Bayle*'s manner of treating Father *Mallebranche*, ought to have well examined the Syſtem of this Metaphyſical Writer, and he would have ſeen that he was greatly favoured

voured by being treated in ſo gentle a manner, and in mixing ſo many Praiſes in what was ſaid of him. All thoſe who have read the Paſſage of Mr. *Bayle*, which has drawn ſuch a Deluge of Injuries upon him, will be aſtoniſhed at the Procedure of the Abbe *D'Olivet*. But what will he ſay, if I ſhould here quote a great Number of Authors of Diſtinction, who have condemned the Opinion of Father *Mallebranche* as exceeding dangerous? *If our Ideas*, ſays an ingenious Critick *, *are the Eſſence of God variouſly modified, I do not know by the means of this Eſſence, but two things in the Univerſe, my own Underſtanding and the Univerſal, immutable Natures in which the Eſſence of God conſiſts. My Underſtanding is ſomething real, ſince it is myſelf; my Reaſon, or the Truth of my Ideas, is alſo ſomething real. And what can I have a Conception of more than this, if all theſe univerſal Natures are the Eſſence of God? There is nothing more deſtructive to what we call Religion, nothing puts the Mind of Man more at eaſe. Every Idea has ſomething in it of I know not what that is abſolute, diſtinct, and independant of my Underſtanding: every one of theſe Ideas is even the Eſſence of God thus modified; then all the Ideas compoſe all the Deity; then it is every where diffuſed, and ſubſiſts in every Underſtanding.*

Mr. *Arnaud* does not treat the Syſtem of Father *Mallebranche* one jot more favourably. According to him †, *the Ideas by which we ſee all things in God, are mere Chimeras, only invented to make us comprehend more eaſily, how our Souls which are immaterial, may come to a Knowledge of the material Things, which God has created; but makes*

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* Deſlandes Hiſt. Critiq. de la Philoſop. Tom. II. p. 512.

† Des vrais et des fauſsées idées, &c. par Mr. Antoine Arnaud, Docteur de Sorbonne, Chap. III. p. 19.

us underſtand them ſo little, that the Fruit of theſe Speculations tends only to perſuade us after a great many Words to no purpoſe, that God has given our Souls no Method of perceiving the real and true Bodies which he has created, but only of the intelligible Bodies which are without them, and which reſemble the real Bodies.

Of theſe two celebrated Authors, whom I have juſt quoted, the firſt accuſes the *holy Prieſt Mallebranche* with overturning Religion, and the ſecond would have it, that his Principles directly lead to the moſt extravagant *Pyrrhoniſm*. But there is athird, who maintains that this *holy Man* was an Atheiſt, and a *Madman* into the Bargain. The Abbe *D'Olivet* cannot reject the Authority of this Critick; he is a Man whom the College of *Louis le Grand* ought always to have been proud of having *brought forth* *; he is the Rival of the *Petaux*, the *Sirmonds*, the *Vaſſeurs*, *&c.* He is a learned Man, who has the only right of criticizing *Cicero*, and of reproaching him †, with having changed the *lawful Wife* of *Epicurus* into a Courteſan, though it is very certain, that this Philoſopher never had a

* A College who has *brought forth* the *Sirmonds*, the *Petaux*, the *Fantons-du-Duc*, the *Salians*, the *Vaſſeurs*, the *Hardouins*; can it be diſhonoured in your Opinion for having entertained a Grammarian, whoſe Commentary upon *Cicero* is not very excellent? Apol. de Mr. L'Abbe *D'Olivet*, contre les Journaliſtes des Trevoux, p. 161. This Apology is placed after the Remarks upon the *Grecian* Theologers.

† Father *Hardouin* in his Remarks upon *Pliny*, XXXV. p. 40. pretends that *Leontium* was the lawful Wife of *Epicurus*. The following Quotation is his Proof, which I ſhall give in the very Words which he has made uſe of. Plinius inter tabulas Theodori pictoris habet Leontium Epicuri cogitantem. Quo dicto non meretricem, ſed Epicuri conjugem fuiſſe Leontium ſignificat, et in tabula pingi de rebus philoſophicis meditantem. Sic enim in nummis antiquis appellantur Plotina Trajani, Sabina Hadriani, et apud Plinium aliæ, conjuges certe, non meretrices. Traduct. de la Nat. des Dieux, Liv. I. p. 309, Tom. I. Not. 4.

a Wife; in a Word, it is the great Father *Hardouin.* Let us hear him ſpeak for himſelf: *Mallebranche* *, ſays he, *boaſts of ſeeing all Things in God; and could not be ignorant of the Verſes which have been applied to him, and which are become ſo common.*

Lui, qui voit tout en Dieu, n'y voit pas qu'il eſt fou.

Who ſees all things in God, can his Sight be ſo bad,
As not plainly to ſee, that himſelf muſt be mad?

I am reſolved to collect from his Works ſome of thoſe Paſſages wherein he eſtabliſhes Atheiſm, *and I ſhall chuſe thoſe eſpecially, wherein he moſt plainly inſinuates this impious Opinion; for if I ſhould relate them all, it would be too great a Task. I ſhall nevertheleſs quote enough to prove, that however heavy this Charge of* Atheiſm *may be, it is not raſh and advanced without Foundation.* How! Can Father *Hardouin* ſay, that this *holy Prieſt* is an *Atheiſt*, a moſt determinate *Atheiſt*, does he treat him as a whimſical Perſon, nay, as a Madman! Notwithſtanding this, the ſame Father *Hardouin* will do Honour to the *College which has brought him forth*; and Mr. *Bayle* ſhall be looked upon as a Man, *who ſeldom ſpares any thing, either ſacred*

* Quamobrem in verbo Dei deoque videre ſe omnia gloriatur, tametſi novit ea occaſione hunc verſiculum in ſe fuiſſe jactitatum, et a plebe ipſa decantatum;

Lui, qui voit tout en Dieu, n'y voit pas qu'il eſt fou.

Hujus αθεότητος documenta corradere et congerere hoc loco ex libris ab eo ſcriptis, tametſi ſunt numero multi, deliberatum eſt, neque omnia certe, nam eſſet iſtud infinitum, ſed inſigniora dumtaxat. Id quod moleſtum eſſe nemini debet, ſi conſiderarit, graviſſimam impietatis accuſationem eſſe: quæ ne temere proinde jacta videatur, multis eget ſtabiliri argumentis.

Hard. Athei Detecti. p. 43.

cred or prophane, only for having ſaid, that the *Opinion of Father* Mallebranche, *one of the moſt ſublime Genius's of the Age, was nothing but an Explanation and an Amendment of the Tenet of* Democritus! But what real Injury has he done to this metaphyſical Gentleman? May one not ſay of *Gaſſendus*, that his Philoſophy is nothing but *an Amendment of the Tenet of* Epicurus, without offending the moſt zealous Partizans of this Philoſopher? *Gaſſendus* however, is worthy of as great Reſpect as Father *Mallebranche*, or to ſpeak more properly, this *holy Prieſt* was much his inferior, both in Learning and Probity. There was not, and there is not at this Day, but one ſingle Voice among all the Learned againſt the Character of *Gaſſendus*; but that of Father *Mallebranche* has been often painted by Writers of the greateſt Reputation in very dark Colours. I might produce here ſeveral Portraits of this *holy Prieſt* taken from the Works of Mr. *Arnaud* *, who places him in rather too flattering a Light: I could produce ſeveral others in the Letters of a famous Divine; but to prove in the manner which I have promiſed, that the *holy Prieſt* was *violent*, *paſſionate*, *cholerick*, and that his Theology is much leſs certain, much leſs edifying, and much leſs *chriſtian*, than the Abbe *D'Olivet* imagines, it is neceſſary to produce a much greater Authority than that of two or three Writers, however great their Merit may be. I ſhall therefore produce the Deciſions of the principal Members of one of the moſt famous Univerſities in *Europe*, and ſhall copy it Word for Word. I make no doubt but the Abbe *D'Olivet* has made uſe of this very Piece in

* In the Philoſophical and Theological Reflections upon the new Syſtem of Grace.

in the Act of the Canonization of Father *Mallebranche* *. ‘ This third Book of *Philoſophical and* ‘ *Theological Reflections, &c.* does not appear leſs ‘ Orthodox then thoſe which the ſame Author ‘ has already publiſhed upon the ſame Subject; ‘ but it will be ſo much more uſeful and more ‘ neceſſary, as the Errors which he refutes are ‘ more *important*, and more *dangerous*; inaſmuch ‘ as they regard the Perſon of *Jeſus Chriſt*, as ‘ being the Author and Diſtributer of Grace. ‘ There is no Genius how mean ſoever, that ‘ may not, by the Aſſiſtance of this Book, ſee the ‘ Falſity thereof with one Glance of the Eye. ‘ Father *Mallebranche* may be a great Philoſo- ‘ pher; but what he teaches of *Jeſus Chriſt* as ‘ the Author of Grace, is not *worthy* of a Chri- ‘ ſtian Divine. May we not ſay with St. *Au-* ‘ *guſtine*, that theſe are the *dreaming Aſſertions* ‘ *of great Doctors*, and that we had much better ‘ continue our Attachment to the great Truths, ‘ which Saints of the firſt Rank have tranſmitted ‘ down to us? This is what Mr. *Arnaud* ſhews ‘ us ſhould be done, and by this means he triumphs ‘ over his Adverſary; for there is *nothing but* ‘ *Truth which carries the Victory*. And as he is ‘ well acquainted with this Aſſertion, that *Cha-* ‘ *rity is the Victory of Truth*, ſo he has put it in ‘ Practice in all the Sequel of this Diſpute, as ‘ much as lay in his Power, either by diſſembling ‘ the *injurious and offenſive Terms* wherewith the ‘ Writings of his Adverſary abound, or by ſay- ‘ ing thereupon every thing that was capable of ‘ making him reflect upon his own Conduct, and ‘ by every where obſerving the Rules of Chri- ‘ ſtian Moderation. It muſt be owned *the Con-*

duct

* This Piece is printed at the beginning of the third Volume of the Theological and Philoſophical Reflections.

'*duct of Father* Mallebranche, *has been quite the* '*reverſe, even to this hour*, and it is difficult to 'excuſe him for having committed that Fault, 'which St. *Auguſtine* ſays, they have committed 'againſt us, *when we have explained ourſelves con-* '*cerning what we do not approve in the Works* '*or Diſcourſes of ſome of our own Party, accord-* '*ing to the Liberty which Charity permits us to* '*uſe among Brethren, it is thought to be Envy rather* '*than Charity, which provokes us to ſpeak*; and that 'we commit the ſame Fault with regard to thoſe '*who meet with ſomething blameable in our Sentiments,* '*when we believe that they ſeek leſs in this to cor-* '*rect our Faults, than to give us Pain.* This is a 'Reflection which we thought ourſelves obliged 'to make upon the Conduct of a Diſpute, 'which ſeems to be at an end, ſince Mr. *Ar-* 'naud gives us no reaſon to expect any thing 'farther upon this Subject, and becauſe he has 'in reality placed this *new Syſtem* in ſuch a light, 'that he ſeems to have done all that was ne-'ceſſary for the Explanation and Refutation there-'of. Dated at *Louvain* the 18th of *May*, 1686. '*G. Huygens*, Doctor in Divinity. *J. L. Hen-* 'nebel, Doctor in Divinity. *Martinus de Swaen*, 'Doctor in Divinity. *J. de Cuyper*, Dean of 'the Metropolitan Church of *Maliens*, Cenſor of 'Books, *&c.*'.

Though the Abbe *D'Olivet* has been ſo ſcandalized at the Parallel, which Mr. *Bayle* has drawn between the Syſtem of Father *Mallebranche* and that of *Democritus*; he has, however, thought proper to compare the *Pyrrhoniſm* of theſe two Philoſophers with each other: It is known, that the *holy Prieſt* has maintained, that *we cannot be abſolutely certain, by the Evidence that we have, of the Exiſtence of Bodies; and that it is by Faith alone*

that

that we can be convinced of their Exiſtence. This Tenet leads us to the moſt extravagant *Pyrrhoniſm*, and agrees perfectly well with that of *Democritus*, by which he maintains, that we are entirely ignorant whether any thing exiſts without us or not. But the Abbe *D'Olivet* *, *after having given us a Sketch of the Agreement* between the ancient and modern Philoſopher, informs us, that there is nothing bad in the Opinion of Father *Mallebranche*, *becauſe he had a ſure Entrenchment in the Infallibility of Faith.* I ſhall inſtantly examine the Goodneſs of this *Entrenchment*; but I ought firſt to take Notice of an *Act of Faith*, which the *holy Prieſt* performed Morning and Evening, and which the Abbe *D'Olivet* has been pleaſed to give us as an excellent Antidote againſt whatever might be found dangerous in the Syſtem of Father *Mallebranche* †. *O my God! I believe that there are Bodies, becauſe it has been demonſtrated that thou art no Deceiver, and that thou haſt given us Aſſurance that thou haſt really created them.* How is it poſſible the Abbe *D'Olivet* ſhould not perceive that this Act of Faith, however full of Love and Submiſſion it may ſeem to be, contains an Abſurdity: For, either we have no Proof by Faith of the Exiſtence of Bodies, or the Report of our Senſes ought to be believed; Faith cannot be known but by the Exiſtence of the Senſes, and is founded thereon, how then can we be ſure of the Truth of the Incarnation, if there is no other Proofs thereof but the Belief of this Incarnation? What Reaſon will oblige me to give Credit thereto, if the Senſes did not aſſure me in the moſt authentick manner that there are Bodies, and conſequently, that the Son of God could

* D'Olivet, de la Theologie des Philoſop. Grecs, &c. p. 99.
† The ſame p. 101.

could aſſume one of theſe Bodies? Is it not as clear as the Sun at Noon-Day, that we ought to be certain of the Exiſtence of Bodies before we can believe this Article, becauſe this Faith abſolutely ſuppoſes the Exiſtence of Bodies, that is, the Exiſtence of the Prophets and the Apoſtles? Are all theſe holy Perſons nothing but mere Fantoms? If I had no Proof by the Evidence of their real and corporeal Exiſtence, what would become of the Authenticity of the Scripture, of Miracles, and of Tradition?

Father *Mallebranche* thought he could obviate theſe formidable Objections, by ſaying: *If we look a little nearer into this Affair* *, *we ſhall perceive, that though we only ſuppoſe, that the Appearances of Men, of Apoſtles, of the Holy Scriptures, of Miracles, &c. What we have learnt by theſe pretended Appearances, is abſolutely inconteſtible; ſince as I have proved in ſeveral Parts of this Work, nothing but God could repreſent theſe pretended Appearances to the Mind, and God is no Deceiver, for Faith takes all this for granted: therefore in the Appearance of the Holy Scriptures, and by the Appearances of Miracles, that God has created the Heavens and the Earth, that the Word is made Fleſh, and other Proofs of the ſame kind which ſuppoſe the Exiſtence of a created World: then it is certain by Faith, that there are Bodies, and by it all theſe Appearances become Realities.* Mr. *Arnaud* has ſo well demonſtrated the Falſity which predominates in all this Reaſoning, that I cannot forbear inſerting his Refutation in this Place. *I know not*, ſays he †, *whether I am deceived, or not, but I believe there never was a more vicious Circle of Argumentation than this. For if the Queſtion is to know, after*

* Recherche de la Verite, &c. Tom. II. p. 199.

† Des vraies et des fauſſes Idees, &c. Chap. XXVIII. p. 333.

the Suppoſition of there being no Bodies, and there is nothing but God and my own Mind, I am to continue in this Suppoſition till I have gained the Faith which he ſpeaks of, and not leave it, but for the ſake of that Faith. I will venture to maintain that this is impoſſible, and that the reaſoning of this Author does not prove it in any ſort; for while I continue in this Suppoſition, I am obliged to believe, that there is nothing but God which could repreſent to my Mind, every thing that I have read whether good or bad, in the Books which I muſt have ſuppoſed not to have been written. He might therefore as well have repreſented to my Mind, what I imagined I had read in the Alcoran, *as what I believed I had read in a Book called the* Bible: *therefore according to this Hypotheſis, that there is nothing but God and my Soul, if this Reaſon is good with regard to the* Bible, that God being no Deceiver, and there being none but himſelf, who could repreſent to my Mind what I ſuppoſed I had read in the Bible, this ought to paſs with me for inconteſtible; *I cannot ſee wherefore this will not hold good with reſpect to the* Alcoran. *And thus I am certain I cannot get over this Difficulty, but by making uſe of the Maxim, that God is no Deceiver, to convince me of the evident Falſity of the Suppoſition of there being no Beings but only God and my Soul; and not to conclude therefrom, that before I had perceived the Abſurdity of this Hypotheſis, the Appearances of the Prophets, of the Apoſtles, of the Holy Scriptures, and of Miracles were ſufficient to oblige us to believe the Scriptures, and by this means to change Appearances into Realities.*

If any one can make it appear, that there is no Contradiction in all this, I will freely own my Stupidity; for I am perſuaded there is a manifeſt Contradiction therein.

I refer thoſe who want to ſee a more ample Refutation of this extraordinary Opinion of Father *Mallebranche* to the Book of Mr. *Arnaud*, from whence I have extracted this Paſſage. I ſhall, however, add an Objection of this learned Man, which in my Opinion is altogether unanſwerable. * *I have thought I have heard*, ſays he, *Men who have ſpoke to me, a great number of times, ſome of which have ſeemed to have ſaid very good things, and others very bad, and might have been capable of making me offend God greatly if I had followed the Impreſſions which their Words might have been capable of making upon me; for there were ſome that might have inclined me to believe that there was no ſuch Being as God. Therefore I am certain, that theſe Words could not proceed from myſelf, becauſe they filled me with Horror; they muſt then have proceeded from God, who ſpoke to me internally, inſtead of the Perſons whom I believed to ſpeak externally. But the Idea which I have of a perfect Being, will not permit me to attribute to him a Conduct ſo unworthy of his Goodneſs; therefore I ought to look upon it as an impoſſible Suppoſition, that there are no Beings but God and my own Mind.*

SECT. XII. *The Concluſion.*

I MIGHT have produced many other Things from the Work of the Abbe *D'Olivet*, which have ſeemed to me to be falſe, or very uncertain; but I have ſtopped at thoſe which have appeared moſt glaring.

Some perhaps may be ſurprized that I have criticized a Book which appeared twenty Years ago, and they may think that I have undertaken the Defence of Mr. *Bayle* ſomewhat too late. I

* The ſame, p. 27.

anſwer, that I was at the Univerſity when the Abbe *D'Olivet* publiſhed his Work. I had hardly finiſhed my Studies when I entered into the Service; and the Employ of a military Man allows but little time for ſerious Studies; and though it had been otherwiſe, a young Officer is ſeldom prudent enough to make a good uſe thereof. It is ſix Years ago ſince I retired into a Solitude, where the *Belles Lettres* were my only Delight; I had a mind ſeveral times, to have done what I actually now do; but other Occupations have prevented me. I now acquit myſelf of a Duty, which I owe to Truth and the Memory of the greateſt Man, and the moſt profound Genius in the World. I look upon it as my chiefeſt Honour to admire the Learning and Probity of Mr. *Bayle*; I have this at leaſt in common with a great Number of famous Men, who doubtleſs would have prevented me in anſwering the Abbe *D'Olivet*, if their Occupations and ſome other Hindrances, had not diverted their Thoughts. I own I have been greatly ſurprized that this Academician, who ſeems ſo ſenſible of the ſmalleſt touches of Criticiſm, has been ſo unwary in his Conduct towards a Man of ſuch great Merit. Could he poſſibly be ignorant that Mr. *Bayle* had Friends who would revenge the Affront * offered to his Memory.

It

* Though the perſonal Merit of Mr. *Bayle* had not requ'red the Abbe *D'Olivet* to be more careful in the Diſplay of his Criticiſms, this Academician might have conſidered at leaſt that it was decent, to have ſpoken of a Man with greater Moderation, who was allied to the moſt Illuſtrious of his Province. Could not he act the Part of a Critick, without ſaying injurious Things? I ſay nothing of the Birth and Quality of Mr. *Bayle*, ſo well known to all the World. Mr. *Bayle* belonged to two Houſes in the Country of *Foix*, illuſtrious for their Nobility. The Life of Mr. *Bayle* by Mr. *Des Maizeaux*.

It perhaps will be proper in this Place, to ſay a Word or two, of ſome wretched Authors who have been ſo bold as to publiſh defamatory Libels againſt the Character of Mr. *Bayle* and his Works: But this would in reality be doing them too much Honour; their Writings ſhould have deſerved as great Attention as thoſe of the Abbe *D'Olivet*. What Man of good Senſe will not ſhrug up his Shoulders when he reads the impertinent and ridiculous Libel * of the Enthuſiaſtick Father *le F****, whom a young Counſellor of the Parliament of *Paris* has ſo well chaſtized for his Blunders and Abſurdities, in a ſmall Treatiſe in the *Bibliotheques Françoiſes*, printed by *Sauzet* at *Amſterdam?* What Man of Honour will not be offended when he reads the impudent Diſcourſe of Father † *P****, who in a publick Delivery of it has ventured to affirm, that Mr. *Bayle* was not a Man of Probity? All the World may give the lye to a Calumny of this kind. Only conſult thoſe illuſtrious Perſons who have held an intimate Correſpondence with Mr. *Bayle*, many of whom are ſtill living. Aſk all *Holland*; enquire of the Magiſtrates, the Officers, the Citizens, in ſhort, People of all Conditions who were acquainted with this great Man, and you will know what Opinion you ſhould entertain of the Accuſation of Father *P****. Mr. *Bayle* will always be reſpected and eſteemed by People who have merit enough to acknowledge his.

Par le fougueux ‡ *Jurieu, Bayle persècutè*
Sera des bons eſprits a jamais reſpectè,

* *Bayle* in Miniature, or the Anatomy of his Works.

† See what has been ſaid on this Subject in a Letter inſerted in the *Bibliotheques Francoiſes*, printed at *Amſterdam* by *Du Sauzet*.

‡ *Voltaire Epit. ſur l'Envie.* The following is a Note which Mr. *Voltaire* has added to theſe Lines. *Jurieu* was a Proteſtant

Et le nom de Jurieu, ſon rival fanatique,
N'eſt aujourd'hui connu que par l'horreur publique.

Tho' fiery Zealots perſecuted Bayle,
His Worth, with Men of Senſe, will ſtill prevail;
While his Fanatick Rival Jurieu
With Infamy appears to publick View.

I ſhould make a large Volume in *Folio*, if I ſhould place here all the Encomiums which the moſt illuſtrious Writers have beſtowed upon Mr. *Bayle*, as it were ſtriving who ſhould praiſe him moſt. I have juſt quoted a Paſſage from one of the greateſt Poets of *France*. I ſhall beg leave to ſecond it with another Quotation from one of the fineſt Writers of the laſt Age.

Qu'on

Proteſtant Miniſter, who was equally an Enemy to Mr. *Bayle* and to good Senſe. He wrote like a Madman, and made a Prophecy; he predicted, that the Kingdom of *France* ſhould undergo Revolutions which never happened. As for *Bayle* he was, as every Body knows, one of the greateſt Men *France* has produced. The Parliament of *Toulouſe* has done him a ſingular Honour in making his Will valid, which ſhould have been annulled as that of a Refugee, according to the Rigour of the Law, and which it declared valid, as the Will of a Man who had 'inſtructed the World, and done Honour to 'his Country. In reality, ſuch an Honour as this, effectually 'takes off the Calumnies, which ſome wretched Writers and 'ignorant Criticks had invented againſt the Memory of this 'great Man.'

This Reflection does not at all affect the Abbe *D'Olivet*; 'a Man greatly to be valued, as I have often ſaid, who has 'a great Integrity joined to an extenſive Genius, and whoſe 'Works ought to be the Model of thoſe, who are deſirous 'of Writing with as much Strength, as Exactneſs and Elo-'quence. The Abbe *D'Olivet* has only erred through an in-'conſiderate Zeal, which nevertheleſs is highly blameable. 'The other Criticks, who have wrote againſt Mr. *Bayle*, are 'not in the ſame Situation; to theſe, this Reflection may 'be applied without any Reſtriction, which I have taken from 'Mr. *Voltaire*'s Note.'

Qu'on admire le grand ſavoir,
L'érudition infinie,
Ou' l'on ne voit ſens ni gènie.
Je ne ſaurois le concevoir ;
Mais je trouve Bayle admirable
Qui, profond *autant qu'* agreable,
Me met en etat de choiſir
L'inſtruction ou le plaiſir.

Let ſtupid Readers heavy Works admire
Call Dullneſs Gravity, and Pertneſs Fire ;
In Bayle's *unequall'd Labours I delight,*
Where Learning, Senſe and Reaſon all unite.
Where I, as ſuits my Taſte, am ſure to meet
With wiſe Inſtruction, or with pleaſing Wit.

To this wiſe Deciſion of *St. Evremond*, I ſhall add that of one of the moſt judicious Criticks that *Europe* has produced; I mean Mr. *de la Monnoye.*

Tel fut l'illuſtre Bayle, honneur *des beaux eſprits*
Dont l'elegante plume en recherches fertile,
Fait douter qui des deux l'emporte en ſes Ecrits,
*De l'*agreable *ou de l'utile.*

Such was illuſtrious Bayle, *whom all admire,*
Whoſe Labours always charm, and never tire.
'Tis hard to ſay, with ſo much Art he writes,
Whether the grave *or* pleaſant *moſt delights.*

I might join to theſe Encomiums thoſe of all the learned in *Europe*, but it will be ſufficient to ſhew how far the Impudence of a Man will carry him, who dares refuſe Mr. *Bayle* the Character of a Man of Probity, to place here the Names of Perſons with whom he has been intimately acquainted. Hence you will ſee, if a Man who

has had the Approbation of the Perſons who eſteemed Mr. *Bayle*, does not deſerve the Eſteem of the whole World. In *France* *, his Friends were the Duke *De Noailles*, Mr. *De Bonrepaux*, the Abbe *Bignon*, Mr. *Thomaſſin* of *Mazaugues* Councellor of the Parliament of *Aix*, Father *Mallebranche*, the two Fathers *Lamy*, Mr. and Mad. *de la Sabliere*, the Abbe *Nicaiſe*, the Abbe *du Bos*, Mr. *Rainſſant*, and Mr. *Oudinet*, Keepers of the Cabinet of Medals to the King, Mr. *Bayle*, Phyſician and Profeſſor at *Toulouſe*, Mr. *Perault*, Mr. *de Longe-Pierre*, *de la Monnoye*, &c. In *England*, Doctor *Burnet* Biſhop of *Salisbury*, Meſſieurs *Cappel*, *Du Bordieu*, *Abbadie*, *La Riviere*, *Le Vaſſor*, *Pujolas*, &c. In *Germany*, the Count *de Reckheim*, Meſſieurs *Leibnitz*, *Thomaſius*, *Buddæus*, &c. In *Italy*, Mr. *Magliabecchi*, Library-Keeper to the Great Duke of *Tuſcany*. In *Holland*, the Count of *Frieſland*, the Marquis *de Bougi*, Mr. *Le Leu de Wilhem*, Mr. *Fremont D'Ablancourt*, Mr. *Baſnage de Flotte-Manville*, Meſſieurs *Grævius*, *Drelincourt*, *Regis*, &c. In *Flanders*, the Counteſs *de Tilly*, the Baron *le Roi*, &c. At *Geneva*, Meſſieurs *Chouet*, *Turretin*, *Leger*, *Pictet* &c.

* See the Life of Mr. *Bayle*, p. 106. But eſpecially conſult the Letters, whereof Mr. *Des Maizeaux* was the Editor.

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